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CHAPTER ZERO 
INTRODUCnON 
1 Scope and subject of the study 
This study is focused on applying well developed parts of financial theory 
(or for that matter: the theory of finance)1 to the area of macroeconomics. 
Financial decisions are modelled according to the view that individuals 
and firms allocate (risky) cash-flows through time to achieve a desired 
goal. When actors decide on behalf of cash, time and risk, financial assets 
and capital markets come into play. A financial asset is a claim against 
some other economic unit, such as an individual or a firm. 
It is the synthesis of financial theory and macroeconomics that ties togeth-
er the different parts of this study. The asset-approach to macroeconomics 
looks at the behaviour of asset prices as determined by the different mar-
ket forces. In contrast to the larger part of financial theory, the scope of 
macroeconomics is of a general character. Macroeconomics is concerned 
with the interaction between markets, whereas finance is (mainly) con-
There are several textbooks that deal with the matters I refer to. One 
good example of an overview of "the theory of finance" (as I use the 
phrase) is Allen(1983). 
1 
cerned with price-formation at financial markets. 
It is generally believed that financial markets clear faster than non-
financial ones. A simplifying assumption of our study is that as a general 
rule all markets clear all the time. This strong assumption excludes all 
kinds of price-stickiness which together have formed the subject of 
another branch in the field of macroeconomics.2 This assumption has cer-
tainly not been made for analytical convenience. Numerical simulation of 
theoretical models of the kind studied here is far more complex in the case 
of clearing markets. 
The kind of model best suited to the needs of modelling financial assets in 
macro perspective is in my opinion the class of intertemporal optimizing 
models. Two such models are presented in Blanchard/Sachs(1982) and 
Van de Klundert/Peters(1986). These two models were chosen as a point 
of reference regarding method and scope. Some ingredients of these mod-
els will be discussed now. 
Though the roots of the intertemporal optimizing models can be found 
way back in the sixties,3 it was only in the eighties that the different pieces 
were put together in one model. The drawback of the approach is the enor-
mous complexity of the models which led to numerical simulation experi-
2
 See the dissertation of Meijdam(1991b), which deals with matters of 
price-stickiness, using the same family of models as used in this study. 
3
 Ramsey(1928) is one of the forerunners using calculus of variations. It 
was only after the 1962-appearance of Pontryagin's translated work that 
optimal control techniques could be used. Some examples of the sort are 
Shell(1967), Fair(1974) and Mussa(1976). 
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ments. This complexity probably caused the literature to dismiss the 
approach to a great extent. With the benefit of hindsight it is probably 
legitimate to say that a more partial approach to the problem has reaped 
more fruits in the literature. In my opinion the beauty of the Blanchard/ 
Sachs-model lies in the strict adherence to microfounding the actions of 
different agents in a market context. The price to pay is loss in analytical 
rigour, but one can easily argue that a lot of rigour can be "observed" from 
numerical simulation experiments. Parameter sets are not chosen as arbi-
trarily as may seem at first sight. Sensitivity analyses of the results derived 
in the Van de Klundert/Peters paper were carried out by Meijdam(1986) 
and showed some of the "empirical" robustness to be got from simulation. 
Also, looking at the different tables with simulation results in this study, 
the same patterns of simulation can be seen again and again regardless of 
the exact nature of the model. 
The most apparent feature of the models is that they are simple and 
abstract in the sense that as actors in the economic playground they dis-
cern producers and consumers only. On top of that, it is assumed that pro-
ducers and consumers are of the representative type, which does away 
with much of what should be the matter of macroeconomics. The repre-
sentative producer and consumer are assumed to be infinitely lived and to 
have perfect foresight with respect to all variables concerning their opti-
mizing plans. The assumption of perfect foresight is closely related to the 
rational expectations postulate. Both producers and consumers use all rele-
vant information to reach their decisions. In the absence of uncertainty 
rational expectations lead to the same thing as perfect foresight. The only 
thing the representative actors forget is the fact that every now and then 
the economy is hit by some "unexpected" event. The intertemporally opti-
3 
mizing agents have the goals of utility maximization and profit maximiza-
tion. These goals are as standard as can be and are copied from any micro-
economic textbook available. 
The papers of Blanchard/Sachs and Van de KJundert/Peters to a great 
extent deal with the matters of price-stickiness. As said before, the 
assumption of price-stickiness is traded for the assumption of clearing 
markets throughout. Since solving these models analytically is complex 
and probably impossible within life-time limits, the authors of both papers 
use numerical simulation as a way out (both papers do not regret this to 
the same degree, it seems). 
To make a study of intertemporal price formation of financial assets a non-
trivial one, the concept of adjustment costs is introduced at several places 
in our study. To assume a combination of clearing markets and no adjust-
ment costs whatsoever would exclude all interesting dynamics. Adjust-
ment costs are introduced only at the level of product markets. It is there-
fore possible to have markets where real assets are traded showing 
adjustment costs, while financial markets are perfectly efficient. The pro-
cess of real investment can be described in this way: the introduction of 
adjustment costs (it takes time and trouble to install real capital goods) 
causes a slowdown in the process of reaping the (windfall) profits from 
new opportunities. At the same time, the price of the relevant security 
reflects the existence of all future cashflows immediately and correctly. 
When the prices of securities reflect the values of these securities as 
implied by the relevant information set, we have efficient capital markets. 
All relations of the models are stated in continuous time. All numerical 
simulation experiments carried out in this thesis, use the same parameter 
set. All models were simulated using the same technological shock to 
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obtain the possibility of comparing the model-outcomes directly with one 
another. It should be noted at this point that (traditional) monetary policy 
has no (real) effects whatsoever in any of the models used. 
2 Overview 
In chapter 1 we formulate a model where no financial assets exist. This is 
the famous Robinsonade, where borrowing and lending is not possible. A 
number of introductory finance books start with the Crusoe case as a 
means of illustrating the individual consumption/investment decision (see 
for example Bishop, Crapp, Twite(1984)). The formulation of this model 
serves as a blue-print for all other models to be discussed. This material is 
covered at the start of chapter 1. 
Allowing Crusoe to borrow and lend to other people in the same circum-
stances as he is (the postulate of the representative consumer/producer), is 
modelled by the introduction of a first financial asset called a share of the 
firm "coconut incorporated". The "cash-flows" in this model are 
expressed in terms of goods, because there is not yet such a thing as mon-
ey. The scope of this Crusoe-model (and its extension to borrowing and 
lending) can also be found in Abel/Blanchard (1983). 
The introduction of money allows individuals to store financial wealth in 
either of two forms: shares or money. A direct consequence of the intro-
duction of money is that actors are confronted with nominal magnitudes 
rather than real ones. Chapter 1, which deals with the topics discussed 
sofar, excludes all forms of uncertainty. It is therefore a matter of conven-
5 
ience that the first financial asset is called a share, while it could have 
been labelled a bond as well. As the concept of dividend plays a central 
role in clarifying matters, equity seems more appropriate a label. As we 
distinguish between equity and bonds in chapter 4, it becomes feasible to 
see the consequences of introducing bonds at the firms level. 
In the absence of uncertainty or risk (treated here as different words for 
the same thing) the appropriate goal of the firm is to maximize the value 
of equity. Introducing bonds as a separate means of finance to the firm at 
this level is of no use. Pointing towards the results of Modigliani and Mill-
er (1958) is superfluous, since these results apply to the case where shares 
are a risky asset from the start. The irrelevance of finance structure in the 
case of certainty is of pre-Modigliani-Miller status. 
In chapter 1 the demand for money is modelled quite crudely, but in broad 
accordance with two main lines of reasoning in the recent literature. One 
approach of formally deriving a demand for money is taking it as an argu-
ment in the utility-function as if real cash-balances are goods as any other 
goods. The interpretation of money in the utility-function is that having 
real cash at hand provides liquidity services. Another approach claims that 
money is needed to buy goods. The latter approach is catered for by imple-
menting a continuous-time cash-in-advance condition for consumers and 
firms. Some writers argue that both approaches come to the same thing 
(of course using the "right" assumptions, see for instance Feenstra(1986)), 
while it is argued in the book that represents the state-of-the-art at the time 
of writing that the distinction can be a most sensible one (see Blanchard/ 
Fisher(1989)). In any case, numerical simulations did not show any differ-
ences between the two modes of modelling worth mentioning. 
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The monetary model of chapter 1 incorporates all relevant variables to dis-
cuss the matters in the chapters that follow. The simulations of tables 3 
and 4 serve as a reference for simulations in later chapters. For simplicity, 
in later chapters the demand for money will be derived either from the 
utility-function approach or from the cash-in-advance approach (and not a 
mixture of both). The supply of money in chapter 1 is assumed to be 
exogenous to the model. 
The subject of chapters 2 and 3 is to make the supply of money an endoge-
nous variable. A banking sector is introduced and the goal of the represen-
tative bank is to maximize the market-value of bank-equity. In this man-
ner, another financial asset is introduced apart from shares of 
goods-producing firms and money. In the spirit of corporate finance, the 
bank is modelled as any other firm. In order to "produce" money, a bank 
has access to a production technology with labour and a banking licence as 
inputs and credit as output. By introducing a banking licence, we cope 
with the problem of price-level indeterminancy in the economy. The 
introduction of a banking licence forms another financial asset again. To 
start a banking business one needs a banking licence and as long as profits 
can be reaped from banking, the licence has some positive market-value. 
The problem of price-level indeterminancy is circumvented due to 
decreasing returns to scale in labour. The latter can be obtained by postu-
lating a constant-returns-to-scale technology in both inputs but assuming 
the number of banking licences to be of a fixed magnitude. 
Chapter 2 assumes perfect competition at the credit-market. The market 
for credit is cleared by the rate of interest charged on credit. Chapter 3 
assumes monopolistic competition at the credit market. Credit is the out-
put of the banking sector, so the credit market is best seen as a product 
7 
market. This imperfection at the credit market introduces some exceptions 
to the general rules described above. In the first place, banking behaviour 
is to some extent myopic since every representative bank acts as if it is 
unique in offering a specific product. Secondly, the credit-market is no 
longer a clearing market by assumption. The phenomenon of non-clearing 
is not obtained by implementing some arbitrary price-adjustment mecha-
nism however. It appears that the regime of credit rationing is not possible 
in the absence of adjustment costs to changing the rate of interest. Intro-
ducing adjustment costs shows that credit rationing is theoretically possi-
ble, but simulation "experience" shows that credit rationing hardly ever 
shows up. 
Chapter 4 introduces debt and equity at the firm's level in a non-trivial 
way. The Yaari-Blanchard life-time model (see Yaari(1965) and Blanch-
ard(1985)) is used to discuss problems of optimal leverage for the firm. It 
is only in this chapter that some form of explicit risk is considered. The 
assumption of perfect foresight is not applicable for this chapter. It is 
assumed that though any risk is absent at the aggregate level, consumers 
(think they) are small enough not to be able to buy a riskless porfolio with 
equity. 
The Modigliani-Miller result that the financial structure is irrelevant to the 
value of the firm in a world without taxes is shown to hold in the model. 
Because debt is assumed to be of absolute risk-free quality, there is no 
possibility for management to make debtholders worse off. Therefore the 
goal of the firm can be expressed as either maximizing the value of equity 
or maximizing the total value of the firm, since the behavioural relations 
of the firm will be the same under both regimes. 
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Introducing a corporate tax (allowing for deductability of interest pay-
ments) shows that a tax-shield can be obtained by using leverage. The 
higher the amount of debt the higher the value of the levered firm will be. 
The amount of debt is bounded from above by introducing a so-called 
capital-in-advance condition throughout chapter 4. This additional con-
straint imposed on management springs from a lack of belief that debt will 
be repaid totally in the case of financial breakdown of the firm. The 
capital-in-advance condition guarantees that debt will be repaid without 
remorse. 
Debt is modelled as paying a variable rate of interest during its life-time as 
would be the case with a floating rate note. As a consequence the market-
value of debt always equals the contractual amount of debt (that is: debt 
can not be sold at a discount).4 The framework adopted does not easily 
allow for studying the impact of changing yield curves on optimal repay-
ment schedules of outstanding debt. The fact that debt can be of different 
maturity (measured by the concept of duration), though one of the most 
relevant parts of financial theory, is left out of the analysis altogether. It is 
superfluous to say that here is ample scope for future research.5 When 
dealing with equity, it is assumed that the firm never issues new shares. 
Since we do not impose beforehand that dividend payments must be of 
4
 Alternatively, one could say that debt is recontracted infinitely fast. The 
term to maturity equals zero in such a case. 
5
 One could think of the introduction of flotation costs associated with the 
issuance of debt. Discriminating between different vintages of debt 
could make sense in that case. 
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positive value, in our model paying a negative dividend comes formally to 
the same thing as issuing new shares. 
Other financial assets dominating the finance literature and left out of the 
analysis altogether, are options (on shares) and futures. Implementing 
these financial assets at the level of macroeconomic models is a real chal-
lenge for future research. I am convinced however that the complexity of 
the models has reached awful degrees right now. The complexity not only 
refers to analytical matters but to numerical matters as well. It proved a 
reasonably hard task to interpret the simulation results of chapter 4. 
Reference model: 
cash-in-advance 
-consumers 
-producers 
money-in-utility 
compare with: 
chapter 1: 
table 3,4 
yes 
yes 
yes 
chapter 1: 
table 1,2 
chapter 2: 
table 5 
yes 
no 
no 
chapter 2: 
table 6,7 
chapter 3: 
table 8,9 
chapter 5: 
table 14 
no 
no 
yes 
chapter 4: 
table 10,11 
12,13 
chapter 5: 
table 15 
Finally chapter 5 takes as its starting point that the value of a (small) coun-
try can be measured by the net exports of that country. It is shown that 
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looking at a small open economy as being a big firm financed with shares 
of equity possessed by the outer world, can deliver a neat balance-of-
payments condition. The no-Ponzi-game condition of a small open econo-
my implies for the model of chapter 5 that the shares must have value zero 
at the beginning of time. Chapter 5 is based on a paper by Meijdam and 
myself (Meijdam/Van Stratum(1990)). 
3 A simple numerical example regarding chapter 4 
In order to illustrate some of the points to be made in chapter 4, we follow 
a numerical example adopted from Moyer, McGuigan and Kretlow(1987). 
Of course this example is arbitrary to a great extent, but many of these 
examples can be found in other textbooks on managerial finance, all being 
the same in spirit. 
Looking at the table ("corporate structure without a corporate income 
tax"), the question is whether the unlevered firm (U) can be better off by 
going into some degree of leverage. To answer this question, another firm 
is constructed. This firm L is different from firm U only in capital struc-
ture. Both the levered and unlevered firm have equal levels of operating 
risk and have the same earning power as measured by the net operating 
income (NOI). Firm L is levered with a perpetual debt, B, of 2,000 (say 
dollars). The setting of the numerical example is a Modigliani-Miller 
(MM) world without taxes. It is assumed that the financial data presented 
in the table stay this way for eternity (assuming zero growth). 
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Capital structure without a corporate income tax 
Equity amount 
Cost of equity 
Debt amount 
Cost of debt 
NOI 
Interest payments 
Dividend 
firm U 
10,000 
10% 
— 
~ 
1,000 
~ 
1,000 
firm L 
8,000 
11.25% 
2,000 
5% 
1,000 
100 
900 
We start to calculate the present value of firm U. The cost of equity is 
assumed to be 10% as a starting point for the example. This cost of equity 
represents the required rate of return associated with the risk of the unlev-
ered firm. The following perpetuity valuation formula can be applied: 
(0.3.1) V . £ - ^ - i M = M o o . v
 '
 u
 R R 0.10 
Vu is the market-value of the unlevered firm and equal to the market-value 
of equity E. The symbol D represents the dividend of the firm and the 
symbol Re represents the return on equity, which equals the cost of equity 
for the time being. 
Turning to the levered case, we have to know what the required return on 
equity is since the higher debt/equity ratio involves more risk to holders of 
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equity. MM(1958) and MM(1963) argue with help of the principle of 
"home-leverage" that the required rate of return on equity depends linearly 
on the debt/equity ratio according to: 
(0.3.2) R -R +(R -R,).— . 
Here I introduce the symbol Ru to represent the cost of capital in the unlev-
ered case. This symbol serves as a benchmark for the MM-analysis. 
Assuming no taxes, this cost of capital Ru must be the same as the return 
on the portfolio of assets in the levered case. Formula (0.3.2) simply is a 
rewritten version of the definition of the return on the portfolio (consisting 
of debt and equity). The symbol Rf represents the risk-free rate of return, 
assumed to be equal to the cost of debt. 
We can not compute the cost of equity in the levered case since we do not 
know the market value of equity. We know that in case of the levered 
firm: 
D NOI-R..B goo 
(0.3.3) E = — L — . 
v
 ' R R R 
e e e 
Combining the latter two equations, we obtain for the required rate on 
equity and the value of equity: 
(0.3.4) R - 0.1125 , E - 9 0 0 - 8,000 . v
 ' · 0.1125 
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The value of the levered firm (Vy equals the market-value of equity plus 
the market-value of debt, so: 
(0.3.5) VL-E+ B-10,000 . 
The conclusion is that the value of the firm is unaffected by the financial 
structure. The value of the firm (in either case) is determined by the NOI 
divided by the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Both the NOI 
and the WACC can not be changed by leverage. Checking this for the 
numerical example in case of the levered firm: 
(0.3.7) WACC - — . R + — . R,- Λ" . 0.1125 + — . 0.05 - 0.10 , 
v
 ' V « V f 10 10 
(0.3.8) v
r
 - -Ш- - 1Ш
 =
 щооо . 
v
 '
 L
 WACC 0.10 
We see that the return on the porfolio equals the cost of capital of the 
unlevered firm in the case without taxes. 
The next step is the introduction of a corporate tax, as indicated in the fol­
lowing table ("capital structure with a corporate income tax"). 
As should be clear from the table, interest payments to debtholders is tax-
deductable while the corporate tax rate (τ) is chosen to be 40%. In all oth­
er respects the firms U and L are the same as the ones from the table with­
out taxes. 
The value of the unlevered firm in the case of a corporate income tax is: 
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Capital structure with a corporate income tax 
Equity amount 
Cost of equity 
Debt amount 
Cost of debt 
NOI 
Interest payments 
Corporate tax (40%) 
Dividend 
firm U 
6,000 
10% 
— 
— 
1,000 
— 
400 
600 
firaiL 
4,000 
11.25% 
2,000 
5% 
1,000 
100 
360 
540 
(0.3.9) v
u
-2~2~LlzlLm. «2..6,000 . 
v J u
 R R R 0.10 
e u и 
No comments are necessary here. 
Again we have a problem determimng the required rate of return on equity 
in the levered case. Referring to MM(1958 and 1963) once again, the fol­
lowing is stated for the case with a corporate profit tax: 
(0.3.10) Rt-Ru + (RH-Rf). (1-х). 1 . 
Though the derivation of this relation is by no means clear from any arti­
cle that I know of, it is a most important one. A number of remarks con-
15 
cerning this relationship will be made in due time. 
The value of equity in the case of the levered firm is: 
D {l-x).{NOl-Rf.B) 
(0.3.11) E - — L 
R R 
Using the last two equations solves the required rate of return and the val-
ue of equity for the numerical example: 
(0.3.12) R - 0.1125 , E - 5 4 0 - 4,800 v
 ' * 0.1125 
The amount of equity for the levered firm in the table (4,000) is not a 
market-value, since the the latter is higher due to the existence of a so-
called tax-shield. The fact that the required rate of return on equity is the 
same for the levered firm with and without taxes is not a matter of coinci-
dence here. Given the exogenity of the amount of debt, the net operating 
income, the risk-free rate of interest and the cost of capital for the unlev-
ered firm, the corporate tax rate does not figure in the expression that ulti-
mately determines the return on equity. MM show that the value of the 
levered firm equals the value of the unlevered firm plus the tax-shield as 
follows: 
(0.3.13) VL~Vu + x.B . 
The fact that interest on debt is tax-deductable leads to a gain of 800 for 
holders of equity of the levered firm. In fact, the difference in value 
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between the levered and the unlevered firm is equal to the present value of 
the (per period) tax-shield from the perpetual debt (see Moyer p.432). This 
present value is expressed as: 
Rt.B.x 
(0.3.14) -L τ.В . 
Rf 
The weighted average cost of capital is in the levered case with a corpo­
rate tax: 
(0.3.15) W4CC-£.Ä + ( 1 - х ) . £ . Л / . 
This can be calculated for the example as: 
(0.3.16) WACC - — . 0.1125 + — . 0.6 . 0.05 - — . v
 ' 68 68 68 
The value of the levered firm in the case of a corporate tax can also be 
computed as: 
(0.3.17) VL - LLzlUiOL· . 600 68 _ V
 '
 L
 WACC 1 6 
Now there can be a problem in the case with taxes. It is not clear from the 
start what rate of return can be expected from holding the levered firm, 
being the portfolio of debt and equity. A starting point in making matters 
clear is the fact that (for the first time) there are three parties that receive 
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money springing from the earning capacity of the firm. These three parties 
are holders of debt and equity and (the third party) the government that 
levies the taxes. At this stage we introduce some imaginary new financial 
asset that gives right to the reception of the money levied from taxes. The 
market value of this asset could be computed theoretically from the inte­
gral of all transfers over time discounted by the relevant rate of return. 
Denoting the market value of the transfers by S, and the required rate of 
return by the symbol R
ov
, the steady state formula for the third asset is: 
τ
 τ.(ΝΟΙ-ϋ,.Β) 
(0.3.18) S - ^ - ^ . 
ov ov 
The symbol Γ represents the per-period amount of tax assumed to be redis­
tributed by government to consumers. For the numerical example dis­
cussed so far S has a value of 3,200 (the total of assets has to be of value 
10,000). The per-period value of taxes is 360, so the computed required 
rate of return for the transfer asset is 11.25%. 
The next that can be stated without problem is that the total return of hold­
ing all three assets must be equal to the cost of equity of the unlevered 
firm. Adding the values of three relevant assets in the case of debt and tax­
es should deliver the value of the firm in the case without debt and taxes. 
So we have: 
(0.3.19) R .R + .R,+ .R . 
K
 ' " E + B + S ' E + B + S f E + B + S °v 
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Now the problem can be seen easily. The fact is that the value of the gov-
ernment transfers is not necessarily under the control of the consumer. 
When consumers look upon the gifts from government as falling from 
heaven, the "required rate of return" of the third (imaginary) asset could be 
the risk-free rate of return. If holders of debt and equity look upon the firm 
after taxes as being exposed to the same risk as the firm before taxes, the 
required rate of return on the portfolio (consisting of debt and equity only) 
would be equal to the symbol Ru. Making assumptions on behalf of these 
matters solves the problem in principle. This seems to be a matter of arbi-
trary choice open to the designer of the model.6 
Though I believe several "plausible" strategies are open to the specifica-
tion of the complete macroeconomic model of chapter 4, one of the main 
concerns is "reproducing" standard Modigliani-Miller results now and in 
chapter 4. When the consumer sees through the model, he can easily 
detect that the gifts from the government are taken away from "his" firm. 
When the net operating income of the firm drops as a result of depressing 
economic factors, the amount of governmental transfers will drop too. As 
a result, it seems very reasonable to discount the transfers of government 
The following illustrates our point: "The Internal Revenue Service can 
be considered as just another security holder, whose claim is essentially 
an equity one in the normal sense of events (but which can also take on 
some of the characteristics of secured debt when things go badly and 
back taxes are owed). Securities, after all, are just ways of partitioning 
the firm's earnings; the MM propositions assert only that the sum of the 
values of all the claims is independent of the number and the shapes of 
the separate partitions." (Miller(1988), p . l l l ) 
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at the same rate of return as the stream of dividends. This insight adds a 
constraint to our problem: 
(0.3.20) Rt-Rm. 
The latter condition combined with condition (0.3.19) delivers the famous 
MM-relation for the required rate of return for equity as described in 
(0.3.10). Another way of writing the "required rate of return" for transfers 
is: 
(0.3.21) Λ -R +(R -Rt).x.- . 
The latter is written down to show the similarity of the MM relation 
expressing the required rate of return for equity. The risk associated with 
the "holding" of the transfer-asset depends on the degree of leverage of the 
firm. Since the risks attached to holding equity and the transfer-asset are 
the same, the values of both differ only because of the fact that different 
portions of the net operating income of the firm are expected. 
The assumption of equal return on equity and transfers implies that the 
return of what is commonly called the consumer's portfolio (equity and 
debt) is less than the return of the unlevered firm. For the numerical exam­
ple we see that the return on the portfolio equals: 
(0.3.22) R - — . 0.1125 + — . 0.05 - - ^ - < 0.10 . v
 ' Ρ 68 68 680 
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This phenomenon is quite logical as the risk of the standard portfolio is 
not as high as the risk of the unlevered firm. The total of risk is shared 
between equity and government transfers. 
The results so far are used in the complete macroeconomic model of chap­
ter 4. The consequence is that the budget constraint of the model of con­
sumers has to be written in terms of the total "enlarged" portfolio, being 
the addition of debt, equity and transfer-assets. The present value of the 
tax-shield as stated by expression (0.3.14) can be derived given the rela­
tions so far. Though utterly irrelevant, the expression for the present value 
of the tax-shield could as well be written as: 
R .B.x 
(0.3.23) -2 τ.В . 
и 
This relation is derived for the macroeconomic model in chapter 4. 
To illustrate the far-reaching consequences of assuming that consumers 
see (unjustly) upon the transfers as appearing out of thin air in a random 
fashion (not in any way connected with the firm), we continue the numeri­
cal example. The macroeconomic model requires for the stationary state 
that the return on the portfolio equals the exogenous rate of time prefer­
ence (symbol: v) (see relevant chapters). Assuming that only the amounts 
of debt and equity are under the control of consumers, we want the system 
to generate: 
(0.3.24) R - Я
и
- -0.10 . 
In that case the correct present value of the tax shield is: 
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R .τ.В 
(0.3.25) present value of tax-shield - -^ 
R 
In that case the required rate of return for equity reads: 
(0.3.26) R -Л +(R - / ? , ) . — 
This relation holds strong whether there are taxes or not. 
We use this relation for the required rate of return on equity to revisit the 
numerical example of this section. Assuming that the cost of capital of the 
unlevered firm has to be equal to the return on the portfolio, we have: 
? non (0.3.27) Rt - 0.10 + ( 0.10 - 0.05 ) . - = ^ ^ · 
The other relation for equity is: 
(0.3.28) Я - ^ - П ^ Ъ Ж - І ^ 
v
 R . R R 
Combining these two relations delivers: 
54 540 440 
(0.3.29) R - — , , E - _ . - t Z Ü - 4,400 
V
 ' ' 440 1 54 
The value of the levered firm becomes: 
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(0.3.30) VL-£ + 5-6,400 . 
The present value of the tax shield now is: 
(0.3.31) V, - V„ - 0.4 . ^ - . 2,000 - 400 
' L U o.lO 
It can now easily be checked that the rate of return on the (levered) portfo­
lio stays the same at a rate of 10 percent: 
44 54 20 (0.3.32) R - — . — + — . 0.05 - 0.10 . v
 ' ρ 64 440 64 
The weighted average cost of capital is: 
(0.3.33) WACC = — . — + 0.6 . — . 0.05 = 0.09375 
v
 ' 64 440 64 
As before, it remains true that the value of the levered firm equals the net 
operating income after taxes divided by the WACC. 
(0.3.34) vL - ilzl2J!2L . _6oo_ . 6 ( 4 0 0 
v У ι
 WACC 0.09375 
The value of the transfer-asset is 3,600 (total value of assets equalling 
10,000). The computed required rate of return on the transfer-asset is 
therefore 10%. The consumer attaches a risk to the transfers equal to the 
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risk belonging to the levered firm.7 The one-period tax-shields from lev­
erage must be discounted at the portfolio's total return. The interpretation 
of this result could be that the extra money gain from leveraging can be 
reinvested at the rate of return on the portfolio (consisting of debt and 
equity only). 
We originally stated the model of chapter 4 in terms of the assumption that 
the return on the portfolio (debt and equity) equals the cost of equity in the 
unlevered case. It served to show that for numerical simulation it does not 
matter that much. It seems to me however that the MM-version is the ver­
sion that presupposes the most of rationality and "see-through" of agents. 
For that reason, equations (0.3.24) to (0.3.34) must be considered irrele­
vant for the chapters to come. 
7
 Now it is about time to quote the other half of the MM-couple. It was 
only after I had written this chapter that I came across an article of 
Modi gl i am( 1988) (thanks to B. Hasselman). 
"In other words, if one accepts the reasonable notion that the appropiate 
discount rate for τ . Rf. В is Ru rather than Rf, then the correction paper 
and its "definitive" corrections need never have been written: Personal 
taxation aside, the definitive truth was all in MM (though the original 
way of establishing the result was defective). Of course this is some­
what of an exaggeration since it would be foolhardy to claim that R
u
 is 
the appropriate way to discount the tax saving under all circumstances 
and tax regimes." (Modigliani(1988), p.153) I have taken the liberty to 
change the symbols used by Modigliani into (I hope) corresponding 
symbols of this chapter. 
24 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCING FINANCIAL ASSETS IN CRUSOE AND BARTER 
ECONOMIES 
1 Introduction 
The role and impact of the introduction of two financial assets is studied in 
an infinite horizon general equilibrium model. The modelling is done in 
the tradition of intertemporal optimization of firm and household problems 
in a deterministic setting under the assumption that expectations are 
formed rationally. A representative firm and household are assumed to 
avoid any serious aggregation problems. The chapter evolves from the 
simplest barter economy without borrowing and lending (the Robinson 
Crusoe model) to a full-fledged monetary economy, this idea being 
derived from a textbook on macroeconomic theory (Hadjimichalak-
is(1982a)). Clearing markets are assumed throughout, while the impact of 
the same technological shock is demonstrated in the models with the help 
of numerical simulation. 
The case of introducing borrowing and lending is demonstrated in the 
Fisher separation theorem. A two-period case is used as a starting point for 
our more complex infinite horizon model. The separation theorem con-
cludes that the objective rate of interest, determined by demand for and 
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supply of loans, determines the range of possibilities when maximizing net 
worth and utility. The main drawback of the Fisher model is that the deter-
mination of the rate of interest at the loanable funds market is left out of 
the analysis. We repeat the Fisher analysis at a general equilibrium level 
by the introduction of a financial asset in a Crusoe economy. In this situ-
ation a firm becomes a net borrower of funds and a household becomes a 
net lender of funds, while the rate of interest clears the financial asset mar-
ket. 
The next step is the introduction of money in the barter economy with bor-
rowing and lending. Money is looked at as a financial asset with its own 
characteristics. The necessity of money in the optimal portfolio of house-
holds and firms is underpinned with a liquidity constraint on certain trans-
actions (transactions demand for money) and with Keynesian motives 
(precautionary/speculative demand for money). Money supply is assumed 
exogenous and constant. The monetary economy can be compared with 
the barter models when money demand resulting from liquidity preference 
is denied. In that case we also obtain a version of the famous quantity 
theory of money. 
2 The separation theorem of Fisher 
Before discussing the model under consideration it is instructive to look at 
a simpler case. The plot of the story is well-known and can be found at 
several places in the literature (see for instance Hirshleifer(1958) and Sut-
cliffe and Bromwich(1986)). Assume Robinson Crusoe lives for two peri-
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ods in a deterministic environment. When Robinson starts to live he is 
endowed with a certain bundle of commodities, say coconuts. Now Robin­
son is free to choose how many of the coconuts he wants to consume 
today (period 0) and how many he wants to consume tomorrow (period 1). 
Just laying the nuts aside is always inferior to putting the nuts in a hole in 
the ground and reaping the fruits next period. Non-consumption of period 
0 can be converted to consumption of period 1 along a production possi­
bilities frontier (PPF) as shown in the figure. Goal of Robinson is maxim­
izing intertemporal utility, some function of consumption in periods 0 and 
1. Suppose that the highest attainable level of utility is reached at point E 
in the figure. 
Now it is straightforward to see that Robinson will consume OG coconuts 
in the first period, while putting GK of them in the ground. The invest­
ment of GK coconuts brings him a consumption of OH coconuts in the 
second and last period. 
Now let us introduce a financial market. Robinson faces a market for bor­
rowing and lending, that is, he can trade any bundle of commodities (con­
sisting of today's and tomorrow's coconuts) against time. Given an exoge­
nous interest rate, the value of his coconut-plant is known with certainty. 
Every point along the PPF brings along a different value of his plant. A 
wise thing for Robinson to do seems to be to maximize the value of his 
plant in the first place. The line RP in the next figure indicates the highest 
attainable net present value of "coconut incorporated". 
Optimal consumption is somewhere along this line and guarantees that the 
intertemporal budget constraint is met. Now Robinson maximizes his util­
ity by consuming OV coconuts today and ОТ coconuts tomorrow. A quan­
tity of MK coconuts is put in holes, so there is a shortage of MV coconuts 
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today. The latter quantity can be lent at the inter-isle coconut market when 
he promises to pay back ( 1 + R ) times MV coconuts of tomorrow. The 
process of lending and borrowing can be envisaged here by the introduc­
tion of bonds made payable in coconuts. 
Now at least two conclusions can be drawn. In the first place Robinson 
gets better off when borrowing and lending is possible. In the second place 
we have seen that Robinson derives his optimal plans in a two-step proce­
dure: Robinson as a producer maximizes the net present value of his firm 
and Robinson as a consumer maximizes his intertemporal utility. The two 
decisions are completely separated. The latter result is referred to as the 
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Fisher separation theorem. 
Our intention now is to generalize these results for an infinite horizon gen-
eral equilibrium setting. The main drawback of the Fisher-model is the 
exogenity of the interest rate. 
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3 The Crusoe model 
There is only one person, even Friday is missing (in a very unfriendly way 
Friday can be seen as capital stock for Crusoe). There is absolutely no 
market where exchange takes place. Now Robinson likes two things: con­
sumption of coconuts and (afterwards) doing nothing. To obtain the 
desired coconuts Robinson must stroll along the beach and this (produc­
tion) process takes time (and consequently: leisure). Robinson has an con­
tinuous endowment of leisure of l
m
 units of time. Spending / units of time 
searching for coconuts leaves ( / „ - / ) units of free time. Robinson's pref­
erences can be described by an intertemporal utility function in consump­
tion (c) and leisure ( l
m
 - I ) : 
(1.3.1) и-£и(с,І
я
-1).с-"**(Ь , 
t 
where ν denotes the exogenous rate of time preference. 
The output of the production process (y), the nuts found at the beach, can 
be either consumed immediately (c) or put in holes in the ground, that is 
invested (ƒ) : 
(1.3.2) у- с +j . 
This equation denotes equality of supply and demand for coconuts. 
Just building an inventory of coconuts is not allowed; putting them into 
the ground is more profitable anyway. The more nuts in the ground, the 
more likely it is to find nuts (falling from the new trees) in the next peri-
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od(s). The search- or production-process can then be modelled by a pro­
duction function: 
(1.3.3) у - Д / Д ) , 
where к denotes the stock of accumulated investments. This physical capi­
tal stock depreciates at the constant rate of Ö. The capital accumulation 
can be described by: 
(1.3.4) k-i-ò.k , 
where ι denotes investment net of installation costs. 
Total investment can be decomposed into investment net of installation 
costs and installation costs,1 where the latter can be described by a func­
tion /і(/, к) : 
(1.3.5) ; - i +АО',*) · 
Installation costs are introduced to derive a well-behaved investment func­
tion, this method being standard by now. Total life-time utility is maxim­
ized with respect to consumption and leisure, subject to the accumulation 
equation and the condition that guarantees that total production equals 
consumption plus investment, using Pontryagin's maximum principle. The 
following first order conditions for an optimal solution can be found: 
1
 This is a form of the adjustment costs mentioned in chapter 0. 
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(1.3.6) u
e
-x , 
(1.3.7) и ( , _ 0 - * · ƒ , , 
(1.3.8) í - x . í l + A.), 
(1.3.9) 4 - ( + о ) . 9 - х . ( / 4 - Л 4 ) . 
The symbol χ is a Lagrange multiplier associated with equality constraint 
(1.3.2). The symbol q stands for the costate variable associated with the 
accumulation equation (1.3.4) and can be interpreted as the marginal utili­
ty of capital. 
The real wealth of Crusoe (a) equals his capital stock (k) , the only asset in 
his portfolio: 
(1.3.10) α-it . 
In contrast with the barter economy of the next section, there is no market-
value for the (coconut)-firm of Crusoe. The reason is pretty obvious: Cru­
soe is the sole owner of the firm and there is no market for equity. When 
some unexpected technological innovation is discovered by Cnisoe, he 
will probably feel richer because he has got a greater earning capacity now 
and in the future. His real wealth however is determined by history and 
consists of the existing physical capital stock. Crusoe cannot trade the 
coconuts over time and his prosperous new situation can be checked by 
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looking at his life-time utility, which will be higher when innovation takes 
place. 
It is interesting to look at a numerical simulation of such a technological 
shock. In the first place the stationary state of the economy is determined, 
preferably in a non-numerical way. The stationary state of the model 
exhibits saddlepoint stability for the chosen parameter values. Stationary 
state and parameter values can be found in the appendix. The following 
specifications for the utility function, the production function and the 
function that describes the installation costs are used: 
(1.3.11) M — . ln(c) + — ' — . ln(/ - / ) , 
Ye + Y, Υ, + Υ, 
σ-1 σ-1 σ 
(1.3.12) ƒ ( / , * ) - £ . {α. ka + ( 1 - α ) . / σ } ^ 1 
2 
(1.3.13) А О Д ) - {Ì~Ò-P -
The latter two function specifications are homogenous of degree one, 
which implies: 
(1.3.14) ƒ,. l
 + fk.k- ƒ ( / , * ) , 
(1.3.15) h..i + hk.k = h(i,k) . 
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The technological innovation is symbolized by a shift in the parameter ε 
from 0.25 to 0.26. Table 1 shows the outcome of the simulation of the 
Crusoe economy. The evolution from the old to the new stationary state is 
shown by the time paths of the percentage deviations of all variables from 
their old stationary state values. 
Table 1 A technological shock in a Crusoe economy 
period -»· 
variable I 
k(=a) 
q 
и 
с 
i 
j 
1 
У 
χ 
0 
0 
-1.38 
41.85 
4.16 
3.40 
3.45 
-0.03 
3.98 
-4.00 
1 
0.32 
-1.86 
42.71 
4.41 
3.42 
3.45 
0.00 
4.17 
-4.22 
2 
0.62 
-2.29 
43.48 
4.63 
3.43 
3.46 
0.03 
4.34 
-4.43 
5 
1.35 
-3.35 
45.39 
5.19 
3.45 
3.47 
0.11 
4.76 
-4.93 
10 
2.18 
-4.54 
47.54 
5.81 
3.48 
3.48 
0.19 
5.23 
-5.49 
stationary 
state 
3.50 
-6.36 
50.88 
6.79 
3.50 
3.50 
0.32 
5.96 
-6.36 
As one can see from the table, the capital stock is the only variable that is 
determined by history. Optimal capital accumulation takes time as a result 
of the introduction of installation costs. Welfare (as indicated by life-time 
utility) jumps instantaneously to a higher level, which is due to a higher 
consumption pattern over time. Initially the more productive economy 
offers more leisure for Crusoe, but later on Crusoe works more than before 
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and is compensated for this disutility through consumption of extra nuts. 
Part of the extra production is used for investment and capital stock gradu­
ally builds up over time. 
To ensure comparability with the macro-economy to be described in the 
next section, the Crusoe-economy must be thought of as scaled up to a 
many-individuals-economy, where each individual lives on his isle and is 
totally isolated from the other isles. 
4 The barter economy with shares as a financial asset 
We introduce the possibility of trade over time: one individual can move 
goods over time in order to get an optimal intertemporal consumption 
planning. Intertemporal trade is carried out not in terms of money but in 
terms of goods now against bonds or shares denominated in future goods. 
This possibility is introduced by making a distinction between households 
and firms. There is no money and consequently there are no nominal pric­
es. For simplicity, we call the new financial asset a share of the firm. 
Ownership of a share guarantees real dividend payments. Consumers/ 
workers are owners of the firm and have all existing shares in portfolio. 
No new shares are issued, which means that in case the firm faces negative 
cashflows dividend payments are of negative sign. Workers get paid a 
real wage w. Maximum consumption for an individual consumer/worker 
is: 
(1.4.1) с - d + I. w + net sales of shares , 
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where the symbol d stands for real dividend payments. 
For the economy as a whole it holds true that net sales of shares is zero. 
For the representative consumer net sales of shares must therefore be zero. 
The representative firm is a net lender of goods, the representative con­
sumer is a net borrower of goods. The interest rate guarantees that all 
shares are willingly held by consumers. In other words the share-market 
does "work" in such a way that the interest rate brings ex ante equilibrium 
at this market. The interest rate can be said to be determined on a market 
for "loanable funds". 
This time there is a labour market and it is assumed that according to clas­
sical doctrines the real wage rate clears the labour market at all times. Two 
prices, the interest rate and the real wage rate, are sufficient to clear three 
markets, labour market, goods market and financial market, this being an 
application of Walras' law. 
It is not straightforward to compute the rate of interest that clears the 
financial market, because the interest rate lurks in the background of the 
economy. The real rate of interest is not paid to anyone in a literal sense. 
As said above, the rate of interest is the rate of return that is required to 
keep consumers willing to hold the existing shares in portfolio. The return 
of holding shares consists of dividend payment and the increase in the 
market value of shares: 
(1.4.2) г - ¿ І І , 
e 
where e stands for the market value of shares and è for the increase of the 
market value of shares. 
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The value of the consumer's portfolio (a) consists of the value of shares 
only, capital stock being one of the underlying elements of the value of 
shares: 
(1.4.3) a - e . 
Now from (1.4.1) to (1.4.3) we derive the intertemporal budget constraint 
for consumers: 
(1.4.4) α-r.a + l.w-c . 
The consumer's optimization problem can be stated as follows. Maximize 
intertemporal utility as stated in (1.3.1) with respect to consumption and 
leisure under consideration of the intertemporal budget constraint (1.4.4). 
The wage rate and interest rate are treated as given for the representative 
consumer. By forming the Hamiltonian function of this problem and 
using Pontryagin's maximum principle, we get: 
(1.4.5) u
c
-x , 
(1.4.6) u^^-w.x , 
(1.4.7) jc-(v-r) . jc . 
The symbol χ stands for the costate variable associated with the dynamic 
budget constraint and can be interpreted as the marginal utility of a unit of 
real wealth. Though not easy to detect, this variable contains the same 
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information as the symbol дс in the Crusoe model. 
The producer's problem is to maximize market value of shares, which 
equals the net present value of dividend payments: 
r 
(1.4.8) e- Ç{d.e ' } dz . 
t 
Dividend equals total output of the firm minus wages paid to workers 
minus total investment: 
(1.4.9) d-y-w.l-j . 
Maximization of (1.4.8) takes place with respect to employment and 
investment under consideration of accumulation of capital according to 
(1.3.4). By applying the same principle as above, we find the following 
neccesary conditions: 
(1.4.10)/,-Η», 
(1.4.11) q-l + h. , 
(1.4.12) q.(r
 + ò).q-fk + hk. 
The symbol q again stands for the costate variable associated with the 
accumulation equation and can be interpreted as the marginal (real) profit 
of investment (note the difference with the symbol q in the section on Cru-
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soe). 
The real wage rate can be solved by equating labour supply from the con-
sumer's problem and labour demand from the producer's problem. Using 
the fact that total demand for goods must equal total supply of goods 
according to (1.3.2), the computation of the interest rate becomes feasible 
as it clears the market for shares. Loosely speaking, the firm faces the 
dilemma of investment (retained earnings) versus dividend payment, 
whereas the household faces the dilemma of consumption versus savings. 
The famous equality of savings and investment is thus the outcome of 
opposing forces in the economy. Now we have formulated the complete 
system of a barter economy with shares as a financial asset. 
It is interesting to see how this economy responds to the same technologic-
al shock as was imputed on the Crusoe model. The variable q now has a 
clear interpretation as the ratio of market value of shares to the value of 
capital stock, which equals Tobin's average q (see for instance Haya-
shi(1982) and Precious(1987)).2 The latter statement implies that the time 
paths of financial wealth (=value of equity) and capital stock go their own 
way, this in contrast with the Crusoe model. Using (1.4.11) and the speci-
fication of installation costs, the investment function can be written as a 
function of q: 
(1.4.13) i-b.k + k.yi/.(q-l) . 
2
 Marginal and average q coincide in this classical market-clearing model. 
In the next section, after introduction of money in the classical model, 
we have a problem here. 
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It can be seen that a value of q other than 1 causes net (dis-)investment. 
Now it is also clear that in the absence of adjustment costs on investment ( 
ψ tends to infinity) the rate of adjustment from the old to the new optimal 
capital stock is infinitely fast, whereas in the case of infinitely high adjust­
ment costs (ψ - 0) net investment is always zero. 
Two new variables, reflecting the existence of new markets, are the real 
wage rate and the real rate of interest. Table 2 shows the numerical simu­
lation of a technological innovation in the barter economy with equity as a 
financial asset. The first striking result is that all variables but q and a (for 
reasons mentioned above) have exactly the same value as in table 1. Just 
generalizing the Fisher result for the infinite horizon general equilibrium 
case clearly gives false insights. It is not the rate of interest that deter­
mines the consumption possibilities but the other way round: the rate of 
time preference determines the rate of interest. It is quite easy to see that 
one can tie together the producer's and consumer's problems of the barter 
economy with the financial asset to obtain results that are in line with the 
Crusoe results. 
Table 2 describes an economic process altogether different from the one of 
table 1. The technological innovation spurs investment activity as can be 
seen from Tobin's q. The value of equity during adjustment is greater than 
the value of capital stock. The value of equity immediately jumps to a 
higher value, because of a more profitable future. Equity is therefore an 
important forward looking indicator of the economic system. Firms strug­
gle for means to invest (retained earnings) and this can be seen as the main 
reason for higher interest rates over time. Real wages are in line with 
higher productivity of labour that accompanies the higher capital stock. 
The real wage rate always equals the marginal product of labour, while it 
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Table 2 A technological shock in a barter economy 
period -* 
variable | 
к 
q 
и 
a 
с 
i 
j 
1 
У 
г 
w 
χ 
0 
0 
2.72 
41.85 
2.72 
4.16 
3.40 
3.45 
-0.03 
3.98 
2.49 
4.04 
-4.00 
1 
0.32 
2.47 
42.71 
2.80 
4.41 
3.42 
3.45 
0.00 
4.17 
2.25 
4.42 
-4.22 
2 
0.62 
2.23 
43.48 
2.87 
4.63 
3.43 
3.46 
0.03 
4.34 
2.04 
4.76 
-4.43 
5 
1.35 
1.66 
45.39 
3.03 
5.19 
3.45 
3.47 
0.11 
4.76 
1.51 
5.62 
-4.93 
10 
2.18 
1.01 
47.54 
3.22 
5.81 
3.48 
3.48 
0.19 
5.23 
0.91 
6.58 
-5.49 
stationary 
state 
3.50 
0.00 
50.88 
3.50 
6.79 
3.50 
3.50 
0.32 
5.96 
0.00 
8.10 
-6.36 
is only in the new stationary state that the marginal product of capital (net 
of depreciation) equals the real rate of interest. 
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5 A monetary economy 
We introduce a second financial asset called money. But from what 
sources can supply and demand for money be derived? One could argue 
on sound reasons that in deterministic models of the kind presented above 
there is no need for money at all. Of course we can apologize by saying 
that economic agents carry out plans by acting in some respects as if there 
is uncertainty. Money does facilitate trade and is a way of reducing the 
(implicit) costs of walking to the barter markets and search for the right 
partner to trade with. In order to keep the model simple and in line with 
historical development of economic theory, the supply of money is treated 
here as exogenous. It is the subject of chapters 2 and 3 to derive an 
endogenous supply of money by the introduction of a value-maximizing 
bank. 
Demand for money springs mainly from two motives: a transactions 
demand for money and a demand that embodies all (other) kinds of uncer-
tainty and is usually called precautionary and/or speculative demand for 
money. The first motive has a classical origin, whereas the second motive 
is more or less of "Keynesian" nature. A straightforward and simple man-
ner to introduce money in a barter economy would be to use some version 
of the well-known quantity theory of money. The volume of output is 
determined as in the barter economy, the income velocity of money is 
assumed to be constant and hence a one-to-one relation exists between 
money and prices. The problem with this approach is that the quantity of 
money is held by no one, it just is there when needed. This can be circum-
vented by imposing a liquidity constraint upon households and firms. 
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The money market is assumed to be in a state of equilibrium all the time, 
which implies the equality of money supply (M) and money demand, 
which consists of transactions demand for money (Mt) and precautionary/ 
speculative demand for money (MJ : 
(1.5.1) M-Mt + Mv 
The precautionary/speculative demand for money is modelled by assum-
ing that money used for the purpose (expressed in real terms) gives direct 
utility to consumers. Consumers maximize intertemporal utility, which 
now is: 
M 
(1.5.2) U-Çu(c,lm-l,^).r^dz, 
ι У 
where Ρ denotes the price level of the homogenous goods in this econo­
my. For instantaneous utility (w) a more general version of (1.3.11) is 
used for numerical simulation: 
Y Y, y M 
(1.5.3) и '— . ln(c) + '— . 1п(/
ж
 -0 + ^- . l n ( - ^ ) . 
Yc+Y/+Yn Y C + Y , + Y „ Yc+Y/+Y„ py 
When the parameter y
m
 is set to zero, we have (1.3.11) again. 
The transactions demand for money can be modelled by imposing a cash-
in-advance constraint upon households and firms. The idea of cash-in-
advance was originally motivated by the fact that government-issued cur-
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rency (which we assume is the case with M ) must be acquired prior to 
purchasing goods. The latter suggests that a discete time model best fits 
the bill and this tradition was started by the work of Lucas(1984), who 
meant to embody a version of the constraint on transactions recommended 
by Clower(1967). Essential is to capture the notion that in monetary econ­
omies money buys goods and goods buy money. As we use a continuous-
time model we propose a continuous-time version of the Lucas cash-in-
advance constraint, which implies that some cash must be held in 
"advance" all the time because transactions are carried out continuously.3 
In this way we hope to cater for both mainstream approaches to modelling 
3
 It is a relevant question whether transactions are meant to denote goods 
transactions or some broader transactions concept (including exchange 
of financial assets). The idea that money is needed to carry out financial 
transactions can be implemented in the model by adding constraints 
such as: 
η, .с.Ρ sM _, , 
η , . Ε s Af , . . . 
Now there are different velocities of circulation for different "monies". 
Two interesting optimality conditions for the problem are: 
и - ( 1 + η ι .R).P .X , 
c
 1 + η 2 > 
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money demand: the currency in the utility function approach and the cash-
in-advance approach (see Sargent(1987) and Blanchard/Fisher(1989)).4 
Total nominal wealth of households (A) consists of the nominal value of 
shares (E) and total money holdings (Mv+Mtl): 
(1.5.4) A-E + Mv + Mth . 
We state the consumer's problem. Maximize intertemporal utility (1.5.2), 
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (1.5.5) (stated in nominal 
terms this time) and the cash-in-advance constraint (1.5.6): 
(1.5.5) À-R.(A-Mv-Mih) + l.Pl-c.Py, 
(1.5.6) c.Py*Mih , 
X-{v-—)—.R).X. 
1 + η 2 
The reader who is interested in the differences between cash-in-advance 
and money-in-the-utility-function has to compare table 5 of chapter 2 
and table 14 of chapter 5. The models used are exactly the same for the 
two tables, except for the specification of the demand for money on 
behalf of consumers. There are absolutely no differences to be detected 
that are worth mentioning. It does not seem relevant to argue much 
about which of the two methods to choose for numerical simulation. 
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with respect to consumption, leisure and real balances. Upper case sym­
bols are used to express their nominal character, i.e. they are stated in 
money terms (the exception to this is U ). New symbols are Ρ,, which is 
the nominal wage rate, and Mth, which is the transactions demand for 
money by households. Households take the time paths of good prices, 
nominal wage rates and the nominal interest rates as given. We derive the 
following conditions in the same manner as before: 
(1.5.7) u
c
-{l+R).Py.X, 
(1.5.8) u^-P,.X, 
(1.5.9) u
u/p-R.PX, 
(1.5.10) Mih - с. Py, 
(1.5.11) X-(v-R).X . 
Note that the cash-in-advance constraint is always binding. Comparing 
(1.5.7), (1.5.8) and (1.5.11) with the results of the analogous barter prob­
lem (1.4.5) to (1.4.7), shows that, apart from nominal changes, the interest 
rate now figures in the expression for the marginal utility of consumption 
due to the extra cash-in-advance constraint. The idea behind this is that a 
consumer loses the amount of money he spends on goods, which is of 
course always the case, but additionaly he foregoes a return on the amount 
of money he has to keep in cash. 
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The producer's problem is to maximize nominal market value of shares, 
the equivalent of expression (1.4.8): 
» -р!(і)Л 
(1.5.12) E-f {D.e' } dz 
Dividend equals total receipts of money minus total cash-outlays: 
(1.5.13) D-y.Py-l.Pl-j.Py-Z , 
where Ζ is the change in cash-holdings: 
(1.5.14) Μ
Γ
Ζ . 
Mtf represents the amount of money the firm holds for transactions pur­
poses. 
The firm faces a cash-in-advance constraint with respect to the purchase of 
investment goods: 
(1.5.15) ).Py*Mtr 
The value of the firm as expressed by (1.5.12) is maximized with respect 
to employment, investment and cash-holdings, subject to accumulation of 
capital (1.3.4), accumulation of cash-holdings (1.5.14) and the liquidity 
constraint (1.5.15). This leads to the following insights: 
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(1.5.16) fr y . , 
y 
(1.5.17) ß - P y . ( l + Ä ) . ( ! + * . ) , 
(1.5.18) ß - ( / ? + ö ) . ß - P y . ( / a - ( l + Ä ) . A 4 ) , 
(1.5.19) Л /
г / - ; . Ρ , 
Comparing the results with (1.4.10) to (1.4.12), the main difference we 
see, again ignoring the nominal differences, is the effect of the cash-in-
advance constraint, which is always binding, and the fact that a rate of 
return is foregone on idle balances. 
To obtain the same investment function as described by (1.4.13), we have 
to redefine our uppercase Q as follows: 
(1.5.20) q 2 . 
v
 '* Ρ . (1+Ä) 
Average and marginal q no longer coincide in our market-clearing mone-
tary economy. The reason for this result is that the liquidity constraint is 
always binding for the firm. For the barter economy, the marginal produc-
tivity of capital, fk, equals r + δ in the stationary state, while the value of 
marginal and average q equal 1. As these results are standard, it is interest­
ing to see how they change in case of a liquidity constraint. From (1.5.17) 
and (1.5.18), we have for the stationary state of the cash-in-advance econ-
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omy: 
(1.5.21) Д - ( Л
 + 0 ) . ( 1 + Л ) . 
In general a relationship exists between average and marginal q that states 
that marginal q equals average q minus the discounted value of all costs 
and benefits associated with the constraints (see for instance Pre-
cious(1987), p.63). Worked out for the stationary state of the cash-in-
advance model, we obtain: 
(1.5.22) average a - marginal q + . 
1 +Ô 
Another way of writing this is: 
(1.5.23) 1 + - A - . 
v
 ' k.P +M, 1 + Ô 
у if 
The result that the constrained firm is associated with a higher average q 
than the unconstrained firm, is most peculiar. This result can also be found 
in Meijdam(1991a) for the more intelligible case of a price setting firm 
that faces a demand constraint. 
The nominal wage rate is derived from equating labour supply and labour 
demand. The price of goods is determined to clear the market for goods. 
Now we have two markets left: the market for shares and the "new" mon­
ey market. We only need one to determine the rate of interest. According 
to historical doctrine it is the loanable funds theory that considers the rate 
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of interest to be the price of loans, which is determined by the demand for 
and supply of loans, whereas it is the liquidity preference theory that con­
siders the rate of interest to be the price of money, determined by the 
demand for and supply of money. We support the vision that the two theo­
ries are not opposed to one another but merely say the same thing in other 
words. In the end it is misleading to speak of different prices determined at 
different markets as the economic system consists of a set of markets that 
interact continuously. It is true that ex ante reasoning forces to mention the 
driving forces at separate markets. 
Furthermore it is confusing to discriminate between stock- and flow-
approaches to the problem. There are no separate markets for old and new 
bonds. A correct statement of the problem seems to be that the single 
demand curve together with the single supply curve determine the price of 
bonds, be it that these demand and supply curves contain all relevant 
information of past, present and future (realisations and expectations). 
A final relation necessary to solve the complete monetary model is that 
total demand for transactions-money consists of consumers' and producers' 
demand, so that money market equilibrium reads: 
(1.5.24) M-M
 L + M C + M . 
4
 ' ih if ν 
In the classical case that γ^ = 0, together with the optimal cash-in-advance 
results (1.5.10) and (1.5.19) and good-market clearing, we obtain a 
quantity-theoretic result: 
(1.5.25) M-y.Py. 
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Table 3 A technological shock in a monetary economy ( y
m
 - 0 ) 
period -* 
variable | 
к 
Q 
U 
A 
X 
с 
Р
У 
J 
1 
У 
R 
Pi 
E 
Mth 
Mtf 
0 
0 
-1.16 
64.56 
-0.84 
-0.21 
4.15 
-3.83 
3.46 
-0.03 
3.98 
0.51 
0.06 
-1.11 
0.16 
-0.51 
1 
0.33 
-1.59 
65.96 
-0.92 
-0.26 
4.40 
-4.01 
3.48 
0.00 
4.18 
0.46 
0.26 
-1.22 
0.21 
-0.67 
2 
0.62 
-1.97 
67.22 
-0.99 
-0.30 
4.63 
-4.18 
3.50 
0.03 
4.36 
0.42 
0.44 
-1.31 
0.26 
-0.82 
5 
1.37 
-2.93 
70.37 
-1.16 
-0.41 
5.20 
-4.58 
3.55 
0.10 
4.80 
0.31 
0.90 
-1.56 
0.38 
-1.19 
10 
2.24 
-4.02 
73.99 
-1.36 
-0.53 
5.86 
-5.05 
3.61 
0.19 
5.31 
0.19 
1.43 
-1.85 
0.52 
-1.62 
stationary 
state 
3.70 
-5.81 
79.96 
-1.69 
-0.74 
6.95 
-5.81 
3.70 
0.32 
6.17 
0.00 
2.31 
-2.33 
0.74 
-2.33 
By this time we have formulated the complete monetary economy which 
is an intertemporal, micro-founded version of the IS-LM model with full-
employment. 
Differences between the numerical stationary states for the monetary 
economy and the barter economy can be found in the appendix. This com-
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Table 4 A technological shock in a monetary economy ( 7^=0.05 ) 
period -» 
variable i 
к 
Q 
U 
A 
X 
с 
Р
У 
j 
1 
У 
R 
Pi 
E 
Mt 
My 
0 
0 
-1.14 
96.50 
-0.73 
-0.21 
4.15 
-3.81 
3.47 
-0.03 
3.99 
0.27 
0.08 
-1.09 
0.03 
-0.06 
1 
0.33 
-1.59 
98.61 
-0.81 
-0.24 
4.40 
-4.01 
3.50 
0.00 
4.18 
0.25 
0.26 
-1.22 
0.00 
-0.01 
2 
0.63 
-2.00 
100.53 
-0.89 
-0.26 
4.63 
-4.20 
3.52 
0.03 
4.36 
0.22 
0.42 
-1.34 
-0.02 
0.04 
5 
1.38 
-3.01 
105.30 
-1.07 
-0.32 
5.20 
-4.66 
3.56 
0.11 
4.81 
0.17 
0.83 
-1.64 
-0.07 
0.15 
10 
2.24 
-4.16 
110.77 
-1.29 
-0.38 
5.86 
-5.18 
3.62 
0.19 
5.32 
0.10 
1.29 
-1.99 
-0.14 
0.28 
stationary 
state 
3.70 
-6.04 
119.75 
-1.64 
-0.49 
6.95 
-6.04 
3.70 
0.32 
6.17 
0.00 
2.06 
-2.56 
-0.24 
0.50 
parison cannot be made when the parameter γ^ has a value other than zero, 
because different utility functions apply in these cases. The monetary 
economy is clearly inferior to the barter economy as utility is lower. This 
result is not surprising: part of portfolio consists of money, a non-interest 
bearing asset. Consumption, production and employment are lower in the 
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monetary case. The monetary economy is money-neutral, no real effects 
occur at either short or long term. We start with the classical case (no 
precautionary/speculative money demand) of the monetary economy, 
which is best suited to be compared with the barter economy. Table 3 
describes the effects of a technological shock in the monetary economy. 
Global effects are not different from tables 1 and 2. We see that the price 
of goods falls in order to take away the (ex ante) excess supply of goods. 
Total money stock is constant over time, which means that fluctuations in 
output are counterbalanced by fluctuations in price. Household balances 
increase over time as total consumption outlays increase, despite lower 
price of consumption. Nominal investment outlays decrease over time, 
which means less cash-in-advance will be held by firms (excess cash is 
paid out as dividend). In effect investment is (more or less) rationed 
because idle cash must be held by firms. Table 4 describes the effect of a 
technological shock when part of money demand springs from Keynesian 
liquidity preference. As said before, comparison with other tables must be 
done with care. Global effects are again roughly the same. Most important 
is that extra money demand out of liquidity preference leaves less money 
for transaction purposes. This implies that either output or prices (or the 
combination) must decline, compared to the case without precautionary/ 
speculative money demand. 
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6 Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter was to develop some basic models that could 
serve as references for the chapters to come. The simplest model is the 
Crusoe-model, where lending and borrowing is not possible. As a conse-
quence, there are no financial assets in a Crusoe-economy. The next model 
contained one financial asset, called a share. At this point, we made the 
distinction between producers or firms on the one hand and consumers or 
households on the other hand. Consumers are in possession of the shares 
of the firm. The goal of the firm is to maximize the value of equity or 
shareholders' wealth. Households keep maximizing intertemporal utility. 
Households offer labour to the firm and sell shares when not satisfied with 
the firm's performance. While the decisions in the Crusoe-economy were 
in one hand, they are not anymore in the shares-economy. Introducing 
borrowing and lending in a Crusoe-model makes no difference however 
for the time-paths of the variables, be it that extra (market)-information is 
reflected in the real wage rate and the real rate of interest. This may be so 
from a formal point of view, economic reasoning behind the models with 
and without shares as a financial asset is completely different. A share 
market introduces the possibility of obtaining Tobin's q and deriving a 
sensible investment function. We saw that the subjective rate of time pref-
erence is more likely to be responsible for the determination of the (objec-
tive) interest rate than the other way round, as was claimed to be the case 
in the Fisher model. 
Finally, we introduced money which led to the formation of nominal pric-
es. In effect the real wage rate is split into a nominal wage rate and a 
nominal good price, while the real rate of interest "vanishes" to make way 
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for a nominal rate of interest. Whether the rate of interest is determined at 
the market for loanable funds or at the money market (loanable funds ver-
sus liquidity preference) does not seem to be a relevant question. A quanti-
ty theory of money is obtained by imposing a liquidity constraint on both 
households and firms. It is interesting to see that all simulations of this 
chapter show the same picture of an economy that is hit by an unexpected 
technological shock. It is fair to assume that roughly the same results are 
generated by a fairly broad range of models and parameter sets. 
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APPENDIX 
The Crusoe model, table 1 
с 
1 
У 
i 
j 
χ 
u 
а 
к 
q 
и 
и
с
-х 
«1.-1-fi 
y-f(l,k) 
ς - χ . Ο + Λ,) 
j-i + h(i,k) 
y-c+j 
u-u{c,l
m
-l) 
a-k 
ìc-i-ò.k 
q-(v + ò).q-
Ù-v.U-u 
Specifications used in simulation: (1.3.11), (1.3.12) and (1.3.13). 
The barter model, table 2 
с 
Is 
1-
w 
У 
i 
j 
г 
u
e
-x 
и, ,-W.X 
f,-w 
i.-is-i 
y-f(l,k) 
q-l + h, 
j-i + h(i,k) 
y-c+j 
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u 
e 
d 
к 
q 
а 
χ 
и 
u-u(c,l
m
-l) 
e-a 
d-y-w.l-j 
k-i-ò.k 
q-{r + b).q-fk + hk 
a-r.a + l .w-c-r .a-
jc- ( v - r ) . x 
Ù-v.U-u 
-d 
Specifications used in simulation: (1.3.11), (1.3.12) and (1.3.13). 
The monetary model, tables 3 and 4 
с 
ι. 
Id 
P, 
У 
i 
j 
Р
У 
4 
М,ь 
M, 
M, 
R 
u
c
-(l+R).P
r
X 
α,.,-Ρ,.Χ 
-f 
ι*-',-' 
y-fU,k) 
ß - P , . ( l + Ä ) . ( l + A ( ) 
У-і + п ( і Д ) 
y-c+j 
u
u
-R.Py.X 
p
, 
М
л
-с.Р
у 
M<-J-P, 
Μ,-Μ,,, + Μ, 
M-M
v
 + Mt 
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u 
E 
к 
Q 
А 
Χ 
и 
u-u(c,l
m
-l,-^) 
У 
E-A-MV-MA 
к-і-Ь.к 
β - ( Α + δ ) . β - Ρ , . ( Λ - ( 1 + Α ) Λ ) 
А-К.{А-М -М
л
) + І.Р
г
с.Р
у 
X-iv-RyX 
Ü-V.U-U 
Specifications used in simulations: (1.5.3), (1.3.12) and (1.3.13). 
Parameter values: 
α = 0.25 
ε = 0.25 
Y
m
 =0/0.05 
ψ = 0.125 
y
e
 =0.85 
M =1.00 
б =0.10 
γ. =0.10 
L = 9 · 0 
σ = 0.40 
ν =0.10 
Stationary state: 
Crusoe/barter 
к = 3.397 
q = 0.839/1.0 
U = 1.061 
a = 3.397 
с = 1.013 
j = 0.340 
1 =7.112 
у = 1.352 
r = --/0.10 
w = -/0.095 
χ = 0.839 
Monetary economy 
(κγ. 
к 
Q 
и 
А 
X 
с 
Р
У 
j 
1 
У 
R 
Pi 
E 
Mt 
My 
- 0 ) 
= 3.284 
= 0.810 
= 0.732 
= 3.660 
= 1.073 
= 1.030 
= 0.736 
= 0.328 
= 7.440 
= 1.358 
= 0.10 
= 0.063 
= 2.902 
= 1.000 
= 0.000 
Monetary economy 
ту, 
к 
Q 
и 
А 
X 
с 
Р
У 
J 
1 
У 
R 
Pi 
E 
Mt 
M
v 
- 0.05 ) 
= 3.284 
= 0.543 
= 0.492 
= 2.784 
= 1.519 
= 1.030 
= 0.494 
= 0.329 
= 7.440 
= 1.359 
= 0.10 
= 0.042 
= 1.947 
= 0.671 
= 0.329 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE BANKING FIRM: THE CASE OF PERFECT COMPEnnON 
1 Introduction 
In chapter 1 we introduced two financial assets, equity and money. The 
relevant distinction that can be made between equity and debt at the level 
of firms is only relevant when uncertainty is taken into account. The 
trade-off between risky equity and riskless debt will be discussed in chap-
ter 4. In chapter 1 we discussed two approaches of deriving a demand for 
the financial asset money. We did not bother too much about the very 
crude manner of modelling the demand for money, since this topic is not 
discussed in great detail in the area of managerial finance either. The sup-
ply of money was assumed to be exogenous to the model. It seems quite 
logical to use the finance framework to derive an endogenous supply of 
money, however. It is a surprising thing to see that not much work has 
been done on the matter. We formulate the requirements of the model to 
fit into this study as follows. 
There is some institution (or behavioral entity) that has the (technical) 
ability to produce a very liquid asset. Let us call this very institution a 
bank. Just as we did not bother about the question why a firm could 
produce goods or why it had access to some production function, we do 
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not bother about the question why a bank has access to a banking technol-
ogy. Given this technology, it is clear that the relevant goal of the bank is 
the maximization of the value of bank-shares.1 What really matters is how 
to specify the production technology and the banking environment. Just 
assuming a traditional production function with labour and capital as 
inputs and (real) money-supply as output, gives the well-known problem 
that the price-level of the economy is indeterminate. In order to get rid of 
this problem, we arrange diminishing returns to scale in one of the inputs. 
Assuming labour and capital are accepted inputs to the banking technolo-
gy, we want capital to denote financial capital. What physical capital is to 
the firm that produces goods, financial capital is to the firm that produces 
money. When banks are forced to buy a financial asset (called a banking 
licence) in order to start banking, we have a perfect analogy to the physi-
cal capital of other firms. Decreasing returns to scale in labour are 
obtained by stating that the government, the implicit issuer of the licences, 
has issued a fixed number of licences once in history.2 
1
 It should be clear that agency problems are circumvented in our model. 
For a dynamic theory of the banking firm that emphasizes agency prob-
lems see 0'Hara(1983). The latter states that a theory of the banking 
firm should incorporate the roles of a bank as a financial intermediary, a 
firm (presumably run to benefit its stockholders) and a regulated enter-
prise. Though I am not convinced that these requirements are necessary 
and/or sufficient, our model incorporates these elements to a certain 
extent. 
2
 Baltensperger(1980) gives an interesting overview of theories of the 
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On behalf of the demand for money we simplify matters by adding a cash-
in-advance constraint to the consumer's problem only.3 
The market where money demand and money supply meet will always be 
cleared. The representative bank faces a given rate of interest and is a 
price-taker consequently. In chapter 3, we look at the same model under a 
money-market regime of monopolistic competition. 
Many ideas implicitly or explicitly used in the model of this chapter can 
be found in the economic literature. None of the literature, as far as we 
know, fulfils all of the requirements set out above. In constructing the 
model, we benefited notably from Saving(1977), Niehans(1978), 
Fama(1980), Hadjimichalakis(1982b) and Santomero(1984). 
banking firm. He distinguishes between "partial" banking models (in the 
sense that the size of the bank's portfolio is exogenous) and "complete" 
models. Our model is of the latter type and could be sub-labelled as a 
"real-resource" model. The prominent role of the "real-production" 
aspects of the banking process is seen to be an important feature of a 
banking model since the amount of real resources absorbed by the bank-
ing industry is of quite substantial order of magnitude (see Baltensper-
ger(1980), p.2). 
3
 This chapter is based on an earlier paper by Meijdam and myself (see 
Van Stratum(1989)). At that time, we had non-clearing at the market for 
goods by the assumption of sticky prices. The modelling of the demand 
for money by putting it into the utility function gave rise to a number of 
problems associated with the determination of the rate of interest. 
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2 The hanking firm 
A bank is just like any other firm, be it that the produced output has a 
number of special features. The product supplied by the banking firm is 
called credit and supplied only to consumers. So, consumers and produc-
ers alike accept this indebtedness of banks as an ultimate means of pay-
ment and as such, credit belongs to the total stock of money. In order to 
produce these banking services one needs some ingredients. Just as a nor-
mal firm needs (for instance) capital (£) and labour (/) as inputs to produce 
goods (y), the institution "bank" needs labour and a banking licence to 
produce credit in our case. The rationale behind the need for labour is that 
every consumer who wants credit has to travel to the bank in order to 
arrange things, talk to officials, sign contracts etcetera. People that work at 
the bank to serve clients act as labour input in the bank's production func-
tion. The other input, the banking licence, can be compared with capital as 
input in the case of a standard firm. There are a few important differences 
however. In the first place, capital can be accumulated over time as a 
result of the investment decisions of the firm. It is assumed that the licenc-
es to bank are available in a strict limited and fixed quantity. The reason is 
that money as a product is something special related to such phrases as 
reliability and trustworthiness. Another reason is that the government as 
a(n) (implicit) supplier of the licences, can control the money supply to a 
certain extent by adding some specific requirements to the possession of 
the banking licence (such as a cash-reserve requirement). 
A second difference with capital is that we assume that one and only one 
banking licence is needed to start banking. Earlier on capital and labour 
could be substituted for one another according to a CES specification. 
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Now we have for the banking process: 
(2 2 \\ —L = S8 ( 'ь ^ » Лел banking licence 
ρ " \ 0 >vAen no banking licence 
у 
where M
c
 denotes the nominal supply of credit and g(.) is the production 
function with banking labour (/b) as input. 
The availability of a banking licence thus defines which firm is a bank. 
Because one of the inputs is of fixed magnitude, it is assumed that the pro­
duction of the real supply of credit shows diminishing returns to scale in 
labour. Of course, the product of the bank is not for free. The price of a 
unit of credit is the nominal rate of interest. Labour hired by the bank is 
paid the nominal wage rate, assumed to be uniform across the economy. 
Furthermore, there is (indeed) a cash-reserve requirement for banking 
business, dictated by the government. As was the case with standard 
firms, the banking firm's goal is to maximize the shareholder's wealth. The 
licences to bank are distributed for free once in history and are valuable 
hereafter. 
Now the banker's problem can be stated as maximizing the following 
objective function: 
ζ 
ш - Г А ( * ) Л 
(2.2.2) Е
ь
- C{R.M
c
-lb.Pl-Z}.c ' dz, 
ι 
subject to the following constraints: 
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( 2 . 2 . 3 ) 4 , - 7 , 
( 2 . 2 . 4 ) Μ £ φ . Μ
ω
, 
M 
(2.2.5) jf-tgOJ. 
y 
The value of the bank-shares is Eb and is equal to the discounted flow of 
dividends. The first condition represents a condition for cash-
accumulation, while the second tells that a fraction 1/φ of credit supplied 
must be held at the bank in the form of cash (M^) . Cash at the bank is 
part of the total amount of base money, notes issued by the government. 
Part of the (assumed) fixed amount of government money is held by banks 
(as a cash-reserve requirement) whereas the other part is held by consum­
ers. Furthermore it is assumed that the cash-reserve parameter φ is greater 
than 1, while the first and second derivatives of the production function 
have properties g' > 0 , g" < 0 . The following first-order conditions can 
be obtained after some substitution: 
P./Ρ 
(2.2.6) g, - ' г 
Ф 
(2.2.7)M = φ . Μ
ο ί ) ) 
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M 
(2.2.8) y - - * ( / t ) . 
y 
The amount of labour hired by the bank, and thus the supply of credit, 
depends negatively on the real wage rate, and positively on the nominal 
rate of interest.4 The two inequality conditions turn out to be always bind-
ing. Now the worth of the licence {GW) can be computed as follows: 
(2.2.9) GW-Eb-M^, 
which represents the abbreviated version of the balance-sheet of the bank-
ing firm. The worth of licences is indicated here by the term "goodwill" 
since this worth is created "out of nothing" it seems. It is interesting to 
draw a parallel with the standard firm here. The balance-sheet for the 
goods-producing firm in the stationary state can be represented by the 
equality of the (value of) the capital stock and the value of equity. The 
goods-producing firm shows no sign of goodwill or surplus value in the 
stationary state. The reason is that the investment decision of the firm 
depends on the ratio of equity and capital stock, the so-called q-ratio. If 
this ratio is greater than 1 for some reason, it shows that there are advan-
tages to be got from extra investment. The marginal cost of one unit of 
The supply of demand deposits by the banking firm is more commonly 
found to be dependent on the rate of interest and some technological 
parameters of the banking process (see for instance Niehans(1978), 
chapter 9). 
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investment is less than the marginal revenue of investment in such a case. 
So, capital accumulation stops when the q-ratio equals 1, so there is no 
goodwill left. 
How does this relate to the banking firm? A crucial assumption is that 
there is no such thing in our model as "licences accumulation", the equiva-
lent of capital accumulation. So the limited amount of licences brings forth 
a "first owner" surplus value of licences. It can be clarifying to compute 
the q-ratio of the banking firm for the stationary state of the model. 
We define the q-ratio for banking as follows: 
( 2 . 2 . 1 0 ) 0 , - ^ - . 
We know that: 
E IP 
(2.2.11) D. - — - M - -^—- , 
where Db represents the dividend of the bank (see equation 2.2.2). Togeth-
er with equations (2.2.6) to (2.2.8) and the specification of the production 
function as follows: 
M 
(2.2.12)-^-g (lb)-tb.lb\ 
y 
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(2.2.13) g - b " , 
І
ь 
we get: 
(2.2.14) е
ь
- ф - ( ф - 1 ) . а
ь
 . 
Now it is clear that when а
ь
 = 1 (constant returns to scale in labour) we 
have a q-ratio of 1 and consequently no goodwill. In the relevant case of 
0 < а
ь
 < 1 we obtain a q-ratio between 1 and φ . The resulting goodwill or 
surplus value accrues to the first owners of licences. 
Defining the return on a banking licence as: 
D. 
(2.2.15) А
ь
- — £ - - { ф - ( ф - 1 ) . а
ь
} . Д , 
оь 
the relevant range of rate of returns is: 
(2.2.16) R<Rb<^.R , 
where the maximum possible return is determined by the cash-reserve 
requirement parameter φ . 
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3 The goods-producing firm 
As it is not the goal of this chapter to emphasize the producer's problem, 
we repeat the standard conandrum of before. There are some m i n o r adjust­
ments to be made in context of the introduction of a banking sector . Pro­
duction plans are made in order to maximize shareholders' wealth: 
2 
» -p»(.s>it 
(2.3.1) Е
г
^у.Р
у
-І
г
Р
г
І.Р
у
-)^' dz . 
t 
Clearly, the subscript ƒ denotes that the variable is associated wi th the 
(goods-producing) firm. Dividend payout is equal to the expression 
between the brackets (.), so, in contrast to the previous chapter, n o money 
balances are held by the firm. All specifications are exactly as before . 
Investment (_ƒ) includes installation costs in order to obtain a well-
behaved investment function. Maximization of the value of shares is done 
subject to the accumulation of capital stock, the only constraint in this 
case: 
(2.3.2) к - i - Ô . к . 
The first-order conditions of the problem read: 
(2.3.3) f^-jL , 
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(2.3.4) ρ - Ρ . ( 1 + A.) , 
(2.3.5) Q-(R
 + b).Q-Py.(fk-hk) . 
T h e firm hires labour up to the point where the marginal product of labour 
equals the real (uniform) wage rate. The real q-value (defined as Q IP ) is 
t h e relevant indicator for investment activity. A q-value greater than 1 
l e a d s to net capital accumulation, whereas a ratio between zero and 1 leads 
to net decumulation (under the chosen specifications). Assuming clearing 
market conditions (no effective rationing of the firm) the q-ratio expresses 
t h e ratio of the value of shares (E^ and the value of existing capital stock 
Q E! (2.3.6) q - -^- 1-
P k.P 
y y 
A stationary state is reached when the q-ratio equals 1 and no further 
incentives exist to change the stock of capital. 
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4 The representative consumer 
Consumers maximize intertemporal utility, which is a function of con­
sumption of goods and leisure. Consumers face two constraints. The first 
is the intertemporal budget constraint, while the second is the cash-in-
advance constraint. 
Cash must be taken here in a broad sense. Base money held by consumers 
of course is cash. Moreover, credit facilities of consumers are seen as a 
perfect substitute for base money. Producers accept both kinds of 
"monies" as a definitive means of payment when selling consumption 
goods. The reason why producers in the end have no cash (no base money 
and no account at the bank) is that all money left is paid to stockholders as 
dividend. The payment of dividend can either be done in the form of visi­
ble base money or by clearing the accounts at the bank. The same holds 
true for the payment of wage-income to workers. One could say that the 
goods-producing firms have an account at the bank only for infinitely 
short moments of time. 
The intertemporal budget constraint for consumers is: 
(2.4.1) Л = А . ( Л - М 1 ) + / . Р ; - с . Р . 
A again is the symbol for financial wealth, M, denotes the total stock of 
money (by definition in possession of consumers) and / stands for the total 
amount of labour sold to firms and banks together. The total amount of 
labour used for the production of goods and (bank) services is: 
(2.4.2) / = / / + / ь . 
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Base money is either held by the banking sector (as a reserve requirement, 
M
ob ) or by the consumers ( M^ ) : 
(2.4.3) М^М^М^. 
The total stock of base money is treated as a parameter to the model 
( M0 ) . The total amount of money (including the credit facilities at banks) 
is: 
(2.4.4) Ml~Molt + Me . 
The other constraint that t ie households face is the cash-in-advance con­
straint: 
(2.4.5) Ml * с. Py , 
which states that the total amount of money at hand must be as great as 
the nominal consumption expenditure. It is interesting to quote from Sti-
glitz(1987): 
"...in modern economies money provides a way of keeping score, but one 
which has increasingly being found to be inconvenient. In a world in 
which there is no way of peering into the future, to see whether individuals 
will be receiving income, and hence will be able to meet any promises, 
money might be required for transactions (other than barter) to occur. The 
fact that the individual has money ensures that the individual is not 
attempting to commandeer more resources than his life-time budget can­
il 
struint allows. Conventional macro-economic models, relying on the cash-
in-advance constraint, are not only ad hoc, in not explaining the source of 
this constraint, but plainly wrong. 
The growth of cash management accounts, in which individuals can write 
checks (on bank accounts in which funds are instantaneously deposited 
and withdrawn, generating an infinite velocity) against the value of their 
portfolio, has simply verified what is crucial for facilitating economic 
transactions is not money, but credit. "5 
The first-order conditions of the problem are: 
(2.4.6) u
e
-X.Py.(l+R) , 
(2.4.7) и шХ.Р 
m 
(2.4.8) M, - с. Ρ , 
(2.4.9) X-(v-R).X . 
As before, м(.) is used as instantaneous utility function, the parameter ν as 
exogenous rate of time preference and X as the shadowprice associated 
with the intertemporal budget constraint. The cash-in-advance constraint 
5
 Though I am sure that Stiglitz will not have any sympathy with the way 
we model the demand for money (because the demand for money 
springs from all kinds of uncertainty, informational asymmetries etc.), 
our cash-in-advance constraint reckons with credit too. 
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is always binding. 
A final remark can be made about the components of financial wealth of 
consumers. The total of financial wealth is made up according to: 
(2.4.10) Α -Ε, + Ε^Μ^. 
Shares of banks and firms are part of financial wealth. That part of total 
money stock that consists of credit supplied by banks does not belong to 
financial wealth at an aggregate level since it concerns inside money. The 
total stock of outside money (Mg) belongs to financial wealth, be it that 
part of outside money (cash held at the bank) is hidden from equation 
(2.4.10). Because the value of bank-shares consists of the value of the 
banking licences (goodwill) and the stock of base-money to fulfil reserve-
requirements, we have: 
(2.4.11) A - E + GW + М
оь
 + М^ 
and this in turn can be rewritten as: 
(2.4.12) A-Ef+GW + M0 . 
Without a banking sector, financial wealth in the economy's stationary 
state consists of the value of capital stock and the stock of outside money. 
Now there is an additional element to financial wealth, namely the value 
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of the banking licences, generated by the banking business.6 
5 The clearing of markets 
The banking economy incorporates four markets: goods market, labour 
market, market for shares and market for credit facilities. The three prices 
around are assumed to clear all four markets immediately all the time. The 
clearing condition for the goods market is: 
(2.5.1) y-c+j. 
The clearing condition for the labour market: 
(2.5.2) lf+lb-ld-ls-l. 
The clearing condition for the market for credit: 
(2.5.3) Mcd"Mes . 
It should be quite clear from the exposition above what belongs to 
wealth and what does not. The formulation of a well-specified macro-
economic model serves at least the purpose to skip (some confusing) 
discussions on this matter as can be found for instance in Nie-
hans(1978), pp.193-194). 
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6 Simulation of a technological shock 
We have formulated a complete model at an aggregate level with a bank-
ing sector and a clearing credit market. The main difference with earlier 
models is that the money supply becomes endogenous. Clearly there are 
incentives for an individual bank to sell more credit to the public when 
interest rates are high and/or real wages are low. As the main purpose of 
the model is to highlight an endogenous money supply, we did not focus 
on other functions that banks perform. One unsatisfactory element of the 
model is that still only one uniform rate of interest across the economy 
exists. It seems more realistic to incorporate the assumption that banks 
realize profits because the cost on liabilities (exclusive of bank capital) is 
lower than the yield on earning assets. Models that focus on the fact that 
banks earn their money thanks to the existence of this spread in yields in 
general fail to cater for the fact that banks produce their own earning 
assets in the form of credit supplied to customers. Our model focuses on 
the differences in quantities at both sides of the bank's balance-sheet in 
order to grasp some mechanisms behind an endogenous supply of money. 
The micro-foundation of different rates of interest is a different matter 
altogether and has got a great deal of attention in the literature over the 
past twenty years or so.7 A possible explanation for the existence of dif-
A great deal of the relevant literature is covered in Stiglitz(1987). Prob-
lems of adverse selection, moral hazard, asymmetric information, the 
principal versus the agent, are very fine concepts in explaining the exis-
tence of money, credit rationing, equity rationing and so on. At this 
stage of research we have not succeeded in leaving the very essential 
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ferent rates of interest can be found in the differences in the risks attached 
to the different assets which consumers can hold. This idea, which will 
suit another purpose in due course, is used in the chapter on the choice 
between debt and equity of firms. It is possible all right to use the latter 
framework for the modelling of the banking sector in order to highlight the 
bank's ability to reduce risk by asset diversification or their ability to use 
the law of large numbers. As said before, banks make a profit in our mod-
el thanks to the special character of their produced output. Producing cred-
it in a profitable way can be thought of as stemming from managerial 
capacities, specialized knowledge, the implicit reduction in informational 
and transaction costs, the credibility and trustworthiness associated with 
the banking sector etcetera. In this manner the existence of commercial 
banks is localized in the existence of sort of monopolistic characteristics 
inherent to banking activity. 
A further point to keep in mind is that all banking activity in the end runs 
through the relation with consumers of goods. Because firms do not use 
cash (or: use cash infinitely fast) they do not face a direct confrontation 
with banks. The need for money stems exclusively from the cash-in-
advance constraint that consumers face. Again we do not mind using this 
somewhat "forced" assumption to derive a demand for money. Excluding 
firms from holding money is a simpliflying assumption not harmful to the 
purpose of the model. Assuming cash-in-advance may be an assumption 
just as arbitrary as deriving a demand for money along the lines of money-
assumption of the representative agent behind, a prerequisite for imple-
menting the lemon-approach. In this respect we stick to the "conven-
tional" paradigm (Stiglitz/Weiss(1988)). 
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in-the-utility-function. The lack of some well-founded demand for money 
is regrettable but not killing for the study at hand. 
To have a plain reference simulation we start with a model that is exactly 
the same as used in this chapter, be it that a banking sector is left out alto­
gether (instead using an exogenous supply of money).The simulations of 
chapter 1 are not ideally suited for this purpose since firms hold cash in all 
variants presented there. The reference simulation for the banking model 
is shown in table 5. Again the economy is confronted with a technological 
shock of the same size. The discussion of this numerical simulation will 
be kept short as the results are in no important way different from earlier 
simulations. 
Since the stock of money is fixed at a value of one and the only demand 
for money springs from consumer transaction motives, nominal consump­
tion expenditure (c. Ρ ) will remain constant over time. Because the 
economy can produce technologically more efficient, the supply of goods 
rises. To encourage sufficient demand for goods, prices go down. Extra 
demand comes from both consumption and investment. Investment 
demand rises because new profitable opportunities are at hand, while con­
sumption demand rises due to additional real wealth of consumers. Initial­
ly less labour is used in production due to more efficient production, but as 
capital stock rises over time extra labour comes in. For that reason the 
nominal wage rate jumps downwards to rise from that moment on. Share 
prices go down since nominal revenues of firms fall. A share of the firm 
can buy more goods though. 
Now we turn to the stationary state of the same economy including a 
banking sector, comparing it to the same without one. The stock of money 
now is endogenous to the model, since banks supply additional money to 
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Table 5 A technological shock in reference model 
period —* 
variable i 
к 
Q 
U 
A 
X 
с 
Р
У 
j 
1 
У 
R 
Pi 
E 
0 
0 
-1.39 
45.37 
-1.07 
0.00 
4.17 
-4.00 
3.44 
-0.03 
3.99 
0.00 
-0.13 
-1.39 
1 
0.32 
-1.87 
46.30 
-1.20 
O.OO 
4.41 
-4.23 
3.44 
O.OO 
4.17 
O.OO 
0.01 
-1.56 
2 
0.62 
-2.31 
47.14 
-1.31 
0.00 
4.63 
-4.43 
3.44 
0.03 
4.33 
0.00 
0.13 
-1.70 
5 
1.34 
-3.36 
49.21 
-1.59 
0.00 
5.18 
-4.92 
3.44 
0.08 
4.74 
0.00 
0.44 
-2.06 
10 
2.16 
-4.53 
51.52 
-1.90 
0.00 
5.79 
-5.47 
3.43 
0.15 
5.19 
0.00 
0.78 
-2.47 
stationary 
state 
3.42 
-6.29 
55.01 
-2.37 
0.00 
6.71 
-6.29 
3.42 
0.25 
5.89 
0.00 
1.30 
-3.08 
the consumers depending on the rate of interest and the real wage rate. The 
stock of base money is held by consumers for about 83.4%, the remaining 
part is used as working capital at the banks. The economy including the 
banking sector faces a higher stock of money and consequently a higher 
price level. Since banking activities use labour in producing their banking 
services, less labour is available to do real activities. It is not so that all 
labour used in banking activities is crowding out the other labour. Total 
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employment in the banking economy is higher at the expense of leisure of 
consumers. The real wage rate in the banking economy is the same as in 
the standard economy and determined by the following expression. 
(2.6.1) - ί . - ( ΐ - α ) . ε . / ι \ ( 1 - α ) , α ( 1 - a ) + —» ^ 
ι 
- , σ - 1 
α,, ε 
- et, 
(see Meijdam and van Stratum (1990)) 
Real consumption and investment are lower in the banking economy, due 
to lower output of goods. The level of utility is lower when a banking sec­
tor is introduced. This result is very misleading however. One can certain­
ly not conclude that the banking sector is superfluous or unwanted. One 
can circumvent the utility-lowering status of banks quite easily by taking 
banking-services (providing ease of liquidity) into the utility functions of 
households. In the same manner one cannot say that "production" in the 
banking economy is lower, because there exists another basket of goods 
altogether. Output of the banking economy consists of a basket of 
industry-type goods and liquidity services. Consequently, the way one 
compares the results of both economies with respect to utility and produc­
tion is completely arbitrary. Whether the banking sector is productive is a 
matter that cannot be resolved by the model. The purpose here is to show 
the process of adjustments in monetary aggregates with and without 
banks. It is possible however to use the model to simulate a more efficient 
process of producing liquidity services. When utility rises in such a case, 
one can conclude that such a financial innovation is desirable for the econ­
omy. 
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Comparing the simulation of both economies facing the same technologic-
al shock leads to the following insights. Broadly speaking one c a n say that 
the time-paths of the non-monetary variables (such as consumption, pro-
duction, investment) give the same picture. Interesting differences arise 
when comparing the time-paths of the monetary variables. Prices go down 
after a technological shock because of the extra produced output coming 
to the market. A lower level of prices has consequences for the banking 
sector. There is less need for transaction money since nominal consump-
tion expenditure goes down. As a direct result, banks see a loss in their 
output of credit to households. Some curtailing of the loss of output is 
reached by the lowering of the rate of interest (as a result of forces at the 
market for credit). Banks hold (government) money themselves for cash-
reserve requirements. Less produced output in the form of credit means 
less need for government money at the bank. The surplus of visible cash 
at the bank is paid out to the holders of bank-equity in the form of extra 
dividends. We see that the total stock of money shifts in composit ion 
towards more visible government money at the expense of invisible bank-
money. Banks become smaller in terms of output and employment. Extra 
labour is available for production in the real sector. As in the no-banking 
case the picture remains that there is initially a loss of total employment 
which is offset later on in time. 
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Table б A technological shock in banking model 
period -»· 
variable | 
к 
Q 
U 
A 
X 
с 
Р
У 
j 
1 
If 
l b 
У 
R 
Pi 
Ef 
E b 
G W 
Mc 
Moh 
M l 
0 
0 
-3.61 
53.44 
-3.06 
2.49 
4.23 
-6.30 
3.63 
-0.06 
0.16 
-15.02 
4.08 
-1.16 
-2.75 
-3.61 
-17.37 
-20.66 
-16.39 
3.26 
-2.33 
1 
0.34 
-4.22 
54.59 
-3.28 
2.61 
4.49 
-6.64 
3.64 
-0.04 
0.20 
-15.77 
4.28 
-1.04 
-2.73 
-3.89 
-18.10 
-21.06 
-17.21 
3.42 
-2.45 
2 
0.65 
-4.76 
55.64 
-3.48 
2.71 
4.73 
-6.95 
3.65 
-0.02 
0.23 
-16.45 
4.46 
-0.94 
-2.72 
-4.14 
-18.76 
-21.43 
-17.96 
3.57 
-2.55 
5 
1.43 
-6.09 
58.23 
-3.97 
2.96 
5.31 
-7.71 
3.67 
0.04 
0.31 
-18.12 
4.90 
-0.69 
-2.68 
-4.75 
-20.35 
-22.31 
-19.77 
3.93 
-2.81 
10 
2.31 
-7.58 
61.15 
-4.52 
3.23 
5.97 
-8.56 
3.69 
0.10 
0.40 
-19.99 
5.40 
-0.41 
-2.64 
-5.44 
-22.13 
-23.31 
-21.77 
4.33 
-3.10 
stationary 
state 
3.72 
-9.86 
65.72 
-5.38 
3.66 
7.02 
-9.86 
3.72 
0.19 
0.54 
-22.87 
6.19 
0.00 
-2.56 
-6.51 
-24.84 
-24.84 
-24.84 
4.94 
-3.53 
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7 An increase in the required-reserve ratio 
Some short comments are made about the (long-run) simulation results of 
an increase in the bank's required reserve ratio. It is a legitimate question 
to ask why the government does not carry out the task of the banking sec-
tor in the model. The government (only implicit in the model) issues piec-
es of paper money in the famous helicopter fashion. Why then is it not 
possible to vary the stock of paper money continuously to ensure that the 
(endogenous) demand for money always equals the supply of base money: 
(2.7.1) M-c.P . 
Of course, the government in its most primitive form is not interested in 
creating extra inflation. All price movements in the model are a conse-
quence of real shocks and disturbances that smooth out over time. The 
assumption then is that the government has perfect information about the 
workings of the model. This is not a strange assumption since every agent 
of the model is perfectly informed in this respect. Nevertheless, the con-
tinuous change in the stock of money that has to be accomplished is a 
cumbersome affair. It takes labour and trouble to monitor a number of rel-
evant aggregates. Accepting the fact that it takes time and money to per-
form these monitoring activities, why not pass the job to private enter-
prise? Banks are specialized in performing these tasks, and probably more 
efficient too. It probably would not be a wise thing to carry over all mone-
tary matters to private enterprise. Government and law can restrict all too 
greedy actions of private monetary business. Starting a monetary enter-
prise in our model is only possible when some requirements are met. The 
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fact that it belongs to the possibilities to set the required-reserve ratio to 
the banking sector, gives the government an instrument in controlling the 
total stock of money without many costs. 
What roughly are the consequences of changing the required reserve ratio 
in the model? Let us take an increase of the ratio into account ( φ -
1.9909 instead of 2, see table 7). Given some stationary state of the mod­
el, banks must either pay less dividend to shareholders in order to re­
balance their cash-holdings or shrink the production of credit. The first 
option has consequences in the form of a higher rate of interest and less 
(ex ante) supply of credit, so effectively works out the same as the second 
option. Less credit means a smaller banking sector and less labour work­
ing at the bank. Employment and output of the goods industry grows at the 
expense of banking activities. The total stock of money declines and as a 
consequence prices fall too. 
8 Financial innovations in the banking model 
The model is suited to simulate the consequences of some forms of finan­
cial innovation. In dealing with the subject of financial innovation we take 
the formulation of Silber (1983) as starting point: 
"The main hypothesis is quite straightforward: new financial instruments 
or practices are innovated to lessen the financial constraints imposed on 
firms". 
We are dealing here with the constraints imposed on banking firms and 
their technological possibilities. The banker's model has two constraints of 
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The effects of tightening the first constraint have already been discussed in 
paragraph 7. A change in one of the parameters of the second constraint 
(eb , ab) can be interpreted as a change in the efficiency of the banking 
process. A cost-reducing financial innovation should have the same con­
sequences as simulated by the model when the technological parameters г
ь 
or а
ь
 are changed. The long run consequences of a change in the parame­
ter Eb have been indicated in table 7. 
The profit maximizing condition for the bank is: 
а.-1 P./P 
(2.83)g¡b-ah.eb.i; - - ^ . 
φ 
Since the stationary state value of the real wage is independent of the tech­
nological parameter г
ь
 and it is true that R - ν , a higher value of г
ь
 must 
have as a consequence higher employment in banking (since (а^ - 1) < 0). 
So better technological possibilities lead to higher bank-employment and a 
higher amount of credit-supply. The consumer consumes a greater part of 
his wealth in the form of liquidity services at the expense of normal con­
sumption. For the greater stock of money to be absorbed, the price level 
rises a great deal since real consumption expenditure declines 
( Л ^ - с . Р ) . 
The two constraint related innovations discussed sofar, are related to the 
supply-side of credit. One can imagine that for some reason or another 
consumers have less need for cash to complete their planned transactions. 
One can imagine a demand-reducing innovation in the way that goods-
producing firms accept other means as definitive payment. For instance, 
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consumers and firms deal with each other directly without intermediation 
of banks. Firms can make their own means of settlement and create what 
can be called "disintermediation". When the stock of money falls in such 
a case, it must be noted that the "old" stock of money does fall indeed, 
being the sum of government notes and credit supplied by banks, but as 
there is an additional form of money in existence it is impossible to con-
clude that the stock of what is properly called money falls. Firms take over 
part of traditional banking activities and in doing so they have an advan-
tage compared with traditional banks. Banks are regulated by all kinds of 
governmental rules, whereas firms are not. A demand-
for-(traditional)money reducing innovation is embarrassing for the gov-
ernment's money-regulating power. 
The demand-reducing innovation can be incorporated into the model in 
the following way. The consumers' problem is modified slightly into: 
Maximize intertemporal utility, subject to 
(2.8.4)i4-Ä.(A-A#1) + / . P J - c . P , 
(2.8.5) Λ/,* η . с. P . 
The new parameter η indicates to what extent traditional money is used in 
trade between firms and consumers. The most sensible range of values of 
η is between zero and 1. The new set-up of the problem changes a number 
of relations used before: 
(2Ji.6)u
e
-(l+r\.R).X.Py, 
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(2.8.7) Af,-η. с. Py . 
The first relation expresses the fact that a return is lost over a fraction η of 
total consumption expenditure. The second condition states that the new 
cash-in-advance constraint is always binding. 
The long run consequences of a demand-reducing financial innovation are 
shown in table 7. 
The innovation pushes up real consumption. A smaller part of income has 
to be spent on liquidity services, because the cash-in-advance constraint is 
relevant only for part of consumption expenditure. Consumers can buy 
more goods as a consequence. An upward pressure in prices results. The 
banking firm faces two opposite forces: on the one hand output diminishes 
because consumers demand less money in the form of banking services, 
on the other hand, since more goods are sold and prices rise along with 
this, consumers have to return to the banking industry. In the end, the 
banking sector is better off in the presence of the financial innovation. 
Both industrial firms and consumers are better off too. The stock of money 
is greater than before, while there are other forms of money or means of 
payment in the economy as well. The reason for this global prosperity is 
pretty obvious: the greater the part of the stock of money that can be used 
in carrying out transactions without losing interest, the better for the econ­
omy zs a whole. A more sophisticated monetary economy (in terms of the 
amount of traditional cash in use) will benefit its inhabitants. 
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9 Conclusions 
In the value-maximizing tradition of finance, we have formulated a 
macroeconomic model including a banking sector and an endogenous 
money supply. Banks maximize the value of outstanding shares and use 
labour and banking-licences as input in producing lines of credit. It turns 
out that the supply of credit is determined by the real wage rate and the 
nominal rate of interest, representing the costs and benefits of the bank. 
Furthermore, the supply of money is determined by the parameters of the 
banker's production function and the cash-reserve requirement parameter. 
In our model, banking licences have a net worth due to their cash-flow 
generating character. The stationary state return on these banking licences 
is higher than the market rate of interest due to the monopoly supply of the 
licences. 
An economy that includes a banking sector (the way we modelled it) faces 
a higher stock of money and a higher price-level, compared with an econ-
omy that lacks this banking sector. Total employment is higher, while the 
real wage rate is the same. Utility comparisons cannot be made since our 
banking model is not apt to answer these kind of questions. The banking 
model seems to be able to generate reasonable simulations of some forms 
of financial innovation. 
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APPENDIX 
Reference model, table 5 
u
e
-(l+R).Py.X 
y-f(l,k) 
Q-PyH + b) 
j-i + h(i,k) 
y-c+j 
Mt-c.P, 
м-м
л 
u-u(c,l
m
-[) 
E-A-M 
k-i-b.k 
Q-(R
 + à).Q-Py.(fk-hk) 
Á-R.(A-M) + l.Pl-c.Py 
X~(v-R).X 
Ü-v.U-u 
Specifications used in simulations: (1.3.11), (1.3.12) and (1.3.13). 
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Banking model, tables б and 7 
Ρ IP 
Ь ' ο ι .
 л 
Φ 
ιι
β
-(1+η.Α).Ρ 7 .ΑΓ 
^.,-Ρ,.ΛΓ 
Λ/,-η.ο.Ρ^ 
Моь-
φ 
M' 
y 
β - Ρ , - ί Ι + Α , ) 
j-i + h(i,k) 
y-c+j 
Md-M'-M
e 
e с e 
Е
ь-
А
-
Е
Г
М
он 
GW-Ε,-Μ^ 
D
r
y.Py-lrPl-j.Py 
u-u(c,l
m
-l) 
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Q 
A 
Χ 
и 
E t 
β - ( Α + δ ) . β - Ρ , . ( Λ - Α 4 ) 
Л - Л . ( Л - Л / 1 ) + / . Р , - с . Р у 
X-(v-R).X 
Ü-v.U-u 
Èf-R.ErDf 
Specifications used in simulations: (2.2.12), (1.3.11), (1.3.12) and (1.3.13). 
Parameter values: 
af =0.25 
L =90 
M = 1.00 
δ = 0.10 
φ = 2.00 
92 
а
ь
 =0.70 
Ef = 0.25 
М0 = 1.00 
ν =0.10 
η = 1.00 
у
с
 =0.85 
ε, =1.40 
σ = 0.40 
ψ = 0.125 
γ, = 0.10 
Stationary state: 
Reference 
к 
Q 
U 
A 
X 
с 
Р
У 
j 
1 
У 
R 
Pi 
E 
= 3.599 
= 0.932 
= 1.032 
= 4.355 
= 0.813 
= 1.073 
= 0.932 
= 0.360 
= 7.533 
= 1.433 
= 0.10 
= 0.088 
= 3.355 
Banking 
к = 3.554 
Q = 1.100 
U = 0.907 
A = 4.960 
X = 0.698 
с = 1.059 
Py = 1.100 
j = 0.355 
If = 7.440 
lb =0.111 
у = 1.415 
R = 0.10 
Pi =0.104 
Ef = 3.912 
Eb = 0.216 
GW = 0.050 
Mc = 0.332 
MOh = 0.834 
Mi = 1.166 
Mob = 0.166 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE BANKING FIRM: THE CASE OF MONOPOLISnC 
COMPETITION 
1 Introduction 
In this chapter the consequences are studied of changing the perfect com-
petition setting of chapter 2 into a setting of monopolistic competition. We 
have dealt explicitly with the credit market as a product market. Introduc-
ing a market imperfection at the credit market can be accorded with the 
basic philosophy of this study. The starting point for capturing the idea of 
monopolistic competition is the famous study of Chamberlin(1933). A 
modern restatement of the Chamberlin-notion in a macroeconomic model 
is found in Meijdam(1991a). We have studied this paper and the referenc-
es therein in order to reformulate the model in terms of the banking model 
of chapter 2. The idea that banks sell slightly different types of credit (or 
think they do) with their own fringe of buyers makes banks think they do 
have price-setting power. Our intention is to study the impact of this price-
setting power (where the price is "the" rate of interest) on the main bank-
ing variables, such as the value of bank-shares, the value of licences and 
the rate of interest. Since the banking model of chapter 2 is exactly the 
same in all other respects, a comparison between the two banking models 
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is legitimate. In fact, the full-competition case of chapter 2 is a special ver­
sion of the model of this chapter (the difference springs from changing the 
value of one parameter). 
There are a few important consequences of the imperfect competition set­
up. In the first place there is no market-clearing as a rule. It is up to the 
banking decision to deviate from (ex ante) demand. Secondly, though the 
model exhibits perfect foresight for most variables, the bank actually 
clings to the wrong model. Bankers think they can set a rate of interest of 
their own (vis-a-vis the market rate of interest), but since all banks do the 
same thing this appears to be impossible ex-post. In this respect, the model 
struggles with the notions of rational expectations and perfect foresight. A 
nice comparison can be made with chapter 18 of Вагто(1984). 
Barro uses a many-local-markets set-up. In this model, agents know the 
local price of goods, but are less sure about the general or average price. 
Because there is an implicit process of obtaining costly information, sell­
ers and buyers make do with incomplete knowledge about the prices of 
other-than-their-own-market goods. In this maimer buyers and sellers alike 
may (mistakenly) think they are situated in a favourable market. The 
Barro-model is consistent with the formation of rational expectations 
(assuming imperfect information). As a consequence it is very unlikely 
that people keep making the same mistakes in estimating the general 
price-level for very long by not receiving enough information in due time. 
These kinds of models (including ours) are clearly best suited for studying 
short-term behaviour. 
In contrast with the Meijdam(1991a)-paper, we start our simulations in 
absence of adjustment costs of changing the rate of interest. It turns out 
that it is optimal for banks to "over-supply" the market for credit. In order 
95 
to gain further insights into spill-over effects from the financial sector to 
the real sector, we simulate the model with the inclusion of adjustment 
costs thereafter. 
2 The banking firm 
The difference with the banking model of the chapter before is that each 
bank is capable of setting a rate of interest of its own. When banks are per-
fectly equal in all respects and are rate-of-interest takers, it is a standard 
practice to assume clearing money markets.1 In case of price-setting 
behaviour, markets generally do not clear. We will discuss a variant of the 
model in which the regime of credit-rationing is a rational possibility open 
to banking decisions. We will discuss the new banking environment first. 
A crucial feature is that we keep assuming a representative banker, who 
thinks (in this chapter wrongly so) that he is different from other bankers. 
Suppose the market for credit is divided into many small local submarkets. 
For some reason, customers like to go to their own local banks in order to 
obtain credit-lines. Reasons for this behaviour can be manifold. Maybe 
some time and effort is spent on building a strong customer-bank relation-
ship. Search-costs can be taken into account: when a customer wants to 
visit another, hopefully cheaper, bank, he has to forego some search costs. 
It is possible to have representative banks being rate-of-interest takers 
and a non-clearing money market by adding a relation to the model that 
describes some arbitrary process for sluggish rate-of-interest formation. 
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Customers may dislike travelling to banks that are further away, they may 
(wrongly) think that their own bank is cheaper, better, more trustworthy 
etc. The problem with all these motivations is the specification of the costs 
and benefits of deviating behaviour (compared to standard models on the 
matter): the behaviour has to be accounted for in the model explicitly. 
Another way round the problem is to assume that banks just have some 
price-setting behaviour. So, banks act as if they have some price-setting 
behaviour. The problem now is that as time evolves it must come out that 
the model the bank has in mind when formulating pricing policy is sys-
tematically wrong. Clinging to the wrong model for a long time clearly 
contradicts the rationality postulate used throughout. 
So, a satisfactory answer of why markets are segmentated or why banks 
act as if they have price-setting power will not be given here. The set-up 
is that banks just think they face a market for credit that is locally separat-
ed to a certain extent to be specified. In fact all banks make different prod-
ucts with their own circle of customers around it. It comes to the same 
thing as assuming that all products are alike except for their colour. Every 
colour however has its own special set of customers (see Barro(1984)). 
We assume that total demand over all existing products is divided into 
such a way that the banking firm faces the following (perceived) demand 
for his type of credit: 
<«.,)*;..£.{£}•', t,o. 
N indicates the large number of banks and types of credit, M f is the total 
demand for credit (given to the individual bank), Mcd is the demand for the 
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л"
1
 type of credit ( 1 s n s A r ) , Ä i s a weighted average of all rates of inter-
est,2 while r is the n'h product specific rate of interest. The parameter ζ 
indicates to what extent total demand comes to the specific bank in case 
the specific rate of interest differs from the market rate of interest. 
In case ζ approaches infinity, we obtain the case of price-taking banks 
again, discussed in chapter 2. The indicator of the monopolistic power of 
the individual bank is therefore ζ. 
Another point is that we need some sort of adjustment costs to obtain the 
mere possibility of credit rationing or credit absorption. We use the sym­
bol s as defining the change of interest related to the market rate of inter­
est: 
(3.2.2) s - — . v
 ' R 
We define the real costs of change as a function z(s) to be specified for 
numerical simulation as: 
2 
(3.2.3) z ( O - ^ T - , 
2. ρ 
where β indicates some measure of the penalty of adjustment. In case β 
approaches infinity there are no costs of change. In the case of β equalling 
zero, the costs of change are infinitely large and no change of the rate of 
2
 A further elaboration on this matter can be found in Meijdam(1991a), 
which deals with monopolistic competition at the market for goods. 
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interest will ever occur. Infinitely large costs of adjustment prevent ration­
al bankers from deviating their price of credit from the general price of 
credit. 
Apart from the issues discussed so far, the banking environment is exactly 
as described in the previous chapter. 
The parameters ζ and β can be used to summarize the three possible bank­
ing models. There is either price-taking behaviour or some degree of mon­
opolistic competition and, in the latter case only, there are adjustment 
costs or not: 
Banking model 1 (chapter 2): ζ tends to infinity. 
Banking model 2 (this chapter): ζ - 4 and β tends to infinity (no costs of 
change). 
Banking model 3 (this chapter): ζ = 4 and β = 4 (costs of change). 
The objective function, to be maximized by the individual bank, can be 
stated as follows: 
z 
« -Год* 
(3.2.4) El>-f{r.Mc-Ib.Pl-Z-z(.s).Py}.t, dz . 
t 
Maximization must be done considering the following five constraints: 
(3.2.5) M-Z, 
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(3.2.6) ^-s , 
(3.2.7) M s M e - I L . l 
(3.2.8) M^ * φ . Λ / , 
оь 
Λ/ 
( 3 . 2 . 9 ) - £ . S g ( / b ) . 
y 
A number of remarks are in order here. Shareholders of each type of bank 
require the market rate of interest. No specific risk is attached to one bank 
vis-a-vis another one, or alternatively, the average shareholder consumes a 
basket of credit-types. Costs of change are modelled as expenses that must 
be financed out of retained earnings. We suppose that costs of change 
come about by buying goods from the industry-type firms. Costs of 
change are therefore part of the total demand for goods as can be seen 
from the clearing condition for the goods market (section 4). Everything 
is, as before, formulated in terms of cash-flows. 
The following first-order conditions result from the above formulated 
maximization problem: 
P.I Ρ (3.2.10)5, i — * 
ь . R 
r-λ 
Φ 
100 
M 
(3.2.11) у - - * ( /
ь
) , 
y 
(3.2.12) ζ
ί
-Ну?- , 
y 
(3.2.13) μ - Α . μ - Μ + ϋ . λ . Λ ί / , 
(3.2.14) M
c
- φ . М
оь
 . 
μ is the shadowprice of the rate of change of the interest rate, λ
Γ
 is the 
Lagrange-multiplier of the demand-constraint. Two of these equations are 
the same as before (chapter 2) and do not call for further explanation. 
Equation (3.2.10) indicates that banks go on hiring labour to produce cred­
it until marginal costs equal marginal revenues of labour. Equation 
(3.2.12) represents the same thing with respect to changing the own rate of 
interest. Equation (3.2.13) describes the time path of the shadowprice of 
the rate of change of the rate of interest. 
As we introduced a representative bank from the outset, it must be so that 
in the end all banks end up doing the same thing (without their knowing 
this beforehand). The macroeconomic consequence is that in the end there 
will be only one rate of interest for all types of credit. The relevant rela­
tions above can therefore be simplified by inserting R - г into equations 
(3.2.10) and (3.2.13): 
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P.I Ρ 
( 3 · 2 · 1 5 > * , - - 7 - 7 - ^ 
φ 
M 
(3.2.16) μ - Α . μ - _ ^ . ( Α - ζ . λ
Γ
) 
The latter equation represents the motion of the shadowprice of the change 
in the rate of interest all right, since: 
M<Md — λ - 0 , 
е е г 
M -M* -• λ > 0 . 
c e r 
Now it is about time to define what we called earlier the regime of credit 
rationing and the regime of credit absorption: 
X с о <—»· credit rationing , 
λ > 0 «—* credit absorption . 
In case consumers are credit-rationed, repercussions are to be expected at 
other markets. The credit-rationing regime shows the interesting phenom­
enon of spill-over effects from financial to so-called real activities. 
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3 The representative consumer 
The representative consumer faces a slightly different environment as 
described in chapter two due to the monopolistic behaviour of bankers. 
The consumer has to reckon with the possibility that he cannot buy all the 
goods he wants due to the inavailability of credit lines from the banking 
sector. Vis-a-vis the previous chapter, the consumer faces one extra con­
straint. Now the consumer problem is as follows: 
Maximize intertemporal utility U ( с ,l
m
-l ) 
subject to the constraints: 
(3.3.1) À-R.(A-Ml) + l.Prc.P , 
(3.3.2) M ^ c . P , 
(3.3.3) M^M* . 
The representative consumer considers the relevant stock of money 
(including credit facilities) as given. First order conditions for the problem 
at hand are: 
(3.3.4) ue-Py. {X. (1 + Ä) + Xe} , 
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(3.3.5) M, _
r
X.Pt, 
m 
(3.3.6) M , - с Ρ . 
Only the first of these three equations contains a new element. The fact 
that the consumer can be credit-rationed is discounted for in the first mar-
ginality rule. The Lagrange-multiplier λ. represents the same regimes as 
mentioned earlier, credit rationing and credit absorption. It is therefore 
true that λ
Γ
 of the bankers problem and X
e
 of the consumers problem con­
tain the same information: 
λ - 0 л λ > 0 *—• credit rationing: M < M , 
λ > 0 л λ - 0 ·«—• credit absorption: M -M . 
r e
 л
 e с 
The model of the goods-producing firm is exactly the same as used (and 
discussed) in chapter 2, section 3. Therefore, we will start with the section 
on markets immediately. 
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4 The markets 
The market for credit is dealt with via a standard rationing scheme in the 
following way: 
(3.4.1) Me-mm(Mf,M¿) , 
where Mc is the actual amount of credit supplied, determined by the mini-
mum of ex ante supply and demand for credit. 
The clearing condition for the goods market must meet the requirement of 
adjustment costs, since we assumed that the adjustment was serviced by 
production of goods: 
(3.4.2) y-»c+y' + z ( i ) . 
The clearing condition for the labour market stays as it was before: 
(3.4.3) lf+lb-ld-ls-l. 
5 Some remarks about the stationary state 
The stationary state of the economy is the same whether there are adjust-
ment costs or not. Of course, this characteristic is due to the chosen speci-
fication of adjustment costs. These are treated in the same way as the 
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installation costs in the case of investment.3 In the stationary state there 
are no adjustment costs, since: 
(3.5.1) z - ± - R / R 
ß ß ' 
and: 
(3.5.2) R - 0 . 
However, it is only in the case of positive adjustment costs that the possi-
bility of two credit regimes opens up during adjustment from one old sta-
tionary state to an other new one. When no costs are associated with alter-
ing the own rate of interest vis-a-vis the market rate of interest, the bank 
will always charge a rate of interest to its clients in a way that the demand 
for credit is never binding. This can be seen as follows. In the case of no 
adjustment costs, we have β -* <x> and therefore: 
3
 We introduced installation costs as: 
¿2 
2 . β 
Applying this idea to rate-of-interest-adjustment-costs: 
K )
 2 . β 
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2 
(3.5.3) z (s)-^—.Q. 
2.ρ 
The optimal adjustment rule (3.2.12) reads in this case: 
(3.5.4) ζ - i . - 0 - ü - ^ - . 
As both the rate of interest and the price level of goods are assumed to be 
of positive value (which is not an unreasonable assumption after all), we 
conclude that μ - 0 . This value of μ is always relevant in the case without 
adjustment costs (not only in the stationary state). Therefore, from 
(3.2.16): 
M 
( 3 . 5 . 5 ) μ - 0 - - - ^ . ( Α - ζ . λ ) . 
Assuming only positive levels of credit supply, the shadowprice of the 
demand-constraint facing banks is equal to: 
(3.5.6) λ - | . > 0 , 
which implies that there will be credit absorption all of the time, while the 
regime of credit rationing is not possible. 
The information so far about the possibilities of rationing can be summa­
rized into the following scheme. 
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Monopolistic competition in the banking sector ( ζ - 4 in simulations to 
come): 
- Positive adjustment costs ( β = 4 in simulation): 
λ
Γ
 = 0 if M
c
 < M
c
d
 (credit rationing). 
X
r
 > 0 if M
c
 = M f (credit absorption). 
- No adjustment costs (β -» oo ) : 
\ - — > 0 (no credit rationing possible). 
As before, we can derive the so-called "banking Q" for the case of monop­
olistic banking for the stationary state (see chapter 2). Remembering that 
we defined this ratio as: 
E. (3.5.7) α . 
ь
 м
пи 
оь 
A banking Q greater than one implies that a windfall gain can be derived 
from trading in the sum of money M^ (necessary to start a banking busi­
ness) for a new share (worth Eh ) just by starting to produce credit. In the 
previous section a banking Q different from 1 (greater than 1) could exist 
in the stationary state because an additional licence to bank was needed to 
start banking. The number of licences was given and therefore we could 
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assume decreasing returns to scale in banking. The difference Eb - M^ 
describes the worth of the licence and as such represents a windfall profit 
for the very owner of the license (or for that matter: the issuer of the 
licence). Using the right relations again in case of the monopolistic bank­
ing case, we obtain for the banking Q : 
.ЛЛ + Ф-
In the case of credit rationing ( λ, = 0 ) we have (2.2.14) back again. That 
is to say: the rate of return on a banking licence is the same as the market 
rate of interest in the "normal" case of constant returns to scale in licences 
( ak - 1 ). In the case of a fixed number of licences ( 0 < ab < 1 together 
with λ
Γ
 - 0 ) a higher rate of return is realized, bounded from above by the 
cash-reserve parameter φ . When the other regime prevails ( X
r
 > 0 ) the 
interesting parameter determining the height of Qb and consequently the 
rate of return on a banking licence is λ
Γ
 itself. In the stationary state it is 
true that: 
(3.5.9) λ
Γ
- | . > 0 . 
Now, we see from equation (3.5.8) that the greater λ
Γ
 the greater the return 
on a banking licence. A starting point in understanding this is that the 
parameter ζ is crucial here. The parameter ζ expresses the relative power 
of the type of credit vis-a-vis other types of credit. In case ζ tends to infin­
ity we have a homogenous type of credit and perfect competition in this 
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(3.5.8) е
ь
- ф - ( ф - 1 ) . а
ь
. . 
market. So, the lower ζ, the greater the relative power or attractiveness of 
the type of credit. The lower the parameter ζ the higher the Lagrange-
multiplier λ
Γ
 for the stationary state, the higher the monopolistic rent for 
banking. We can summarize this discussion by stating that the lower the 
demand elasticity ζ for the type of credit, the higher the rate of return on a 
banking licence. In this way equation (3.5.8) seems to be a banking variant 
of the well-known Amoroso-Robinson formula. 
In the appendix the complete macroeconomic model is summarized. 
Because of the possibility of credit-rationing, a number of ex ante vari­
ables show up. Bankers have an ex ante demand for labour based on the 
real wage and rate of interest, not reckoning with the sales constraint 
(assuming λ
Γ
«0 in equation (3.2.15)). Consumers have an ex ante 
demand for consumption goods based upon (among other things) the price 
level of goods and the rate of interest, not reckoning with the eventuality 
that the credit constraint can be binding (assuming λ. = 0 in equation 
(3.3.4)). Given the ex ante demand for consumption goods there is an ex 
ante demand for credit. The ex ante supply of credit is computed by insert­
ing the ex ante demand for labour in the bankers production function. The 
actual level of credit is then computed as the minimum of ex ante supply 
and demand for credit. Given this new information (will there be rationing 
or absorption) actual (ex post) levels of consumption and labour can be 
computed. This in turn influences the sales of goods relevant for the goods 
producing industry. If credit is rationed, consumers cannot buy the goods 
they want and firms consequently cannot sell as much. Consumers then 
face the fact that less labour demand springs from industrial firms. This 
affects the real wage rate, the demand for goods and so on. 
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6 Simulation of a technological shock 
Because of the identical stationary states of the monopolistic banking 
model with or without adjustment costs, we will discuss the differences 
between the stationary states of the banking model with full competition 
and monopolistic competition. The first important difference is, as said 
before, that the return to first owners of a banking licence rises from 13 
percent in the case of perfect competition to 16.5 percent in the case of 
monopolistic competition. Due to monopolistic banking powers there is an 
Amoroso-Robinson-like extra-rent above what can be called a normal rent. 
So the traject of rates of return starts with a normal return equal to the 
(exogenous) rate of time preference ν with a chosen value of 10 percent. 
In the case of decreasing returns to scale in banking technology (due to the 
limited number of licences) the return on a banking licence rises to 13 per­
cent in the case of full-competition-banking. The final rise in return, from 
13 percent to 16.5 percent, springs from monopolistic market characteris­
tics in banking business. A second important difference compared to the 
full-competition case is the fact that the banking-sector becomes smaller in 
size. The labour-hiring rule for full competition was: 
P.I Ρ 
(3.6.1) g , • ' У . 
φ 
The macro-rule for the monopolistic competition case reads: 
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Since the real wage rate and rate of interest are the same in both cases, a 
positive value of λ
Γ
 implies that the marginal productivity of a unit of 
banking labour must be higher. Less employment in the banking sector 
results in less credit supply and a higher return on supplying credit (com­
parable to the standard case of monopoly on the goods market). Therefore 
the stock of money will be lower. Greater part of labour supply is used in 
producing goods. Consumption, investment and the stationary stock of 
capital are higher. The smaller amount of money therefore does not result 
in smaller real magnitudes but in a lower general price level. 
Simulation assuming no adjustment costs 
As said before, without adjustment costs a regime of credit rationing is not 
possible. The shadowprice of the constraint is always equal to — . In the 
table this is confirmed by the fact that the percentual deviation of the sha­
dowprice λ, always equals the percentual deviation of the rate of interest. 
The general idea of the simulation of a technological shock is the same as 
before. There is extra produced output alongside a lower price level. 
Transaction demand for money goes down and the banking sector sells 
less credit to consumers. To regain some of the lost credit-output, the rate 
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Table 8 A technological shock, no adjustment costs 
period -*· 
variable 1 
к 
Q 
U 
A 
с 
p y 
i 
If 
lb 
1 
У 
R 
Pi 
Ef 
Eb 
GW 
M
c 
MOh 
Mi 
\ 
0 
0 
-1.76 
46.07 
-1.43 
4.18 
-4.36 
3.41 
-0.01 
-13.01 
-0.03 
4.00 
-0.25 
-0.53 
-1.76 
-15.09 
-17.92 
-13.25 
0.39 
-0.37 
-0.25 
1 
0.32 
-2.26 
47.02 
-1.58 
4.42 
-4.61 
3.42 
0.02 
-14.00 
0.00 
4.18 
-0.22 
-0.42 
-1.94 
-15.82 
-18.37 
-14.17 
0.42 
-0.40 
-0.22 
2 
0.62 
-2.71 
47.88 
-1.71 
4.64 
-4.84 
3.43 
0.05 
-14.90 
0.02 
4.35 
-0.20 
-0.32 
-2.11 
-16.48 
-18.76 
-15.00 
0.44 
-0.42 
-0.20 
5 
1.35 
-3.82 
49.59 
-2.03 
5.19 
-5.38 
3.44 
0.11 
-17.05 
0.08 
4.76 
-0.14 
-0.07 
-2.52 
-18.07 
-19.73 
-16.99 
0.50 
-0.47 
-0.14 
10 
2.18 
-5.05 
52.35 
-2.39 
5.80 
-5.99 
3.45 
0.17 
-19.41 
0.15 
5.21 
-0.08 
0.21 
-2.99 
-19.81 
-20.79 
-19.17 
0.57 
-0.53 
-0.08 
stationary 
state 
3.45 
-6.90 
55.95 
-2.94 
6.74 
-6.90 
3.45 
0.28 
-22.87 
0.24 
5.92 
0.00 
0.64 
-3.69 
-22.37 
-22.37 
-22.37 
0.66 
-0.62 
0.00 
of interest is lower during adjustment. The composition of the total stock 
of money shifts from credit to government paper-money. 
Comparing the precise results with the full-competition case shows that 
banks in the case of some monopolistic power can cope better with the 
adverse effects of the technological shock. The price of credit does not fall 
as much as was the case before. Consequently one can see some of the 
beneficial effects in the table by looking at the time paths of the volume of 
credit, the worth of licences and the price of a bank-share. 
Simulation in the case of adjustment costs 
What we are most interested in is the simulation of the regime of credit 
rationing and the spill-over effects of the monetary to the real sector. As a 
matter of fact it proved practically impossible to generate this regime by 
simulation, whatever the set of parameters chosen. The shocks have to be 
so big to possibly generate credit-rationing during a short interval of time 
(by forcing the shadow-price Xr down to the value zero), that the regime of 
credit absorption practically always prevails during adjustment. 
The main point to focus on is that due to the adjustment costs of changing 
the rate of interest, the latter is predetermined. That is to say that the rate 
of interest cannot react immediately in response to changing market condi-
tons. Though it is optimal for banks to lower the rate of interest in 
response to the technological shock, they can only do this gradually 
because the existence of adjustment costs. More correctly: by definition 
the response of banks is optimal, but in the case of absence of adjustment 
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Table 9 A technological shock, adjustment costs included 
period -• 
variable | 
к 
U 
A 
с 
Р
У 
i 
If 
lb 
1 
У 
R 
Pi 
Ef 
Eb 
GW 
Mc s 
M
c
d 
MOh 
Mi 
\ 
0 
0 
46.07 
-1.48 
4.17 
-4.44 
3.42 
-0.01 
-17.10 
-0.03 
4.00 
0 
-0.61 
-1.82 
-17.02 
-18.29 
-12.81 
-16.20 
0.48 
-0.45 
1.68 
1 
0.33 
47.03 
-1.61 
4.42 
-4.66 
3.43 
0.02 
-16.73 
0.00 
4.18 
-0.05 
-0.47 
-1.99 
-17.09 
-18.58 
-13.88 
-16.13 
0.48 
-0.45 
1.08 
2 
0.62 
47.89 
-1.73 
4.64 
-4.87 
3.43 
0.05 
-16.67 
0.02 
4.35 
-0.08 
-0.35 
-2.14 
-17.30 
-18.87 
-14.80 
-16.27 
0.48 
-0.45 
0.66 
5 
1.35 
50.00 
-2.04 
5.19 
-5.39 
3.44 
0.11 
-17.43 
0.08 
4.76 
-0.11 
-0.08 
-2.53 
-18.22 
-19.70 
-16.93 
-17.26 
0.51 
-0.48 
0.06 
10 
2.18 
52.36 
-2.39 
5.80 
-5.99 
3.45 
0.17 
-19.28 
0.15 
5.22 
-0.08 
0.21 
-2.98 
-19.73 
-20.73 
-19.17 
-19.08 
0.56 
-0.53 
-0.13 
stationary 
state 
3.45 
55.95 
-2.94 
6.74 
-6.90 
3.45 
0.28 
-22.87 
0.24 
5.92 
0.00 
0.64 
-3.69 
-22.37 
-22.37 
-22.37 
-22.37 
0.66 
-0.62 
0.00 
costs it is optimal to lower the rate of interest immediately, whereas with 
these costs it is not. 
As a result of the relatively high rates of interest, banks will loose more 
customers and sell less credit than could have been the case without costs 
of adjustment. 
7 Conclusions 
The perfect competition bank-model of chapter 2 is modified to show the 
characteristics of monopolistic competition at the market for credit. In 
line with the literature (see Meijdam(1991a), Barro(1984)) some degree of 
imperfect knowledge (or myopicity) is introduced on behalf of the bank-
ers. When banks are thought to have price-setting power, it appears that in 
the absence of adjustment costs the regime of credit-absorption is always 
relevant, that is to say that banks always find it optimal to over-supply the 
market for credit. Introducing adjustment costs regarding the change of the 
rate of interest (in the same way as installation costs for capital-stock were 
dealth with) shows that both regimes, credit absorption and credit ration-
ing, can be optimal outcomes depending on the value of the relevant 
shadow-price. Simulation shows that it is virtually impossible to generate 
the regime of credit-rationing. Very strong adjustment costs and relatively 
big shocks to the economy should give scope for simulating the regime of 
credit rationing, though computational problems arise in these cases. 
The stationary state rate of return on a banking licence is determined by 
the attractiveness of credit. This can be read from the Amoroso-Robinson 
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formula for the banking-model. The lower the demand elasticity for credit, 
the higher the rate of return on a banking licence. 
Simulation results show that the monopolistic bank can cope better with 
adverse shocks than its full-competition brother or sister. Introducing 
adjustment costs decreases the advantages for the monopolistic bank to 
some degree. 
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APPENDIX 
Banking model, tables 8 and 9 
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f(if,k) 
^ . ( 1 + A , ) 
i + h(i,k) 
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s 
Еь 
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Dr 
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Ч 
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Q 
R 
A 
X 
U 
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Г
М
Л 
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u-u(c,l
m
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Φ 8,t 
к-і-Ь.к 
Q-(R + b).Q-Py.{fk-hk) 
У 
À-R.(A-Ml) + l.Pl-c.Py 
X-(v-R).X 
Ù-v.U-u 
ÈrR.Ef-Df 
μ - Λ . μ - ^ . ( * - ζ . λ
Γ
) 
Specifications used in simulations: (2.2.12), (1.3.11), (1.3.12), (1.3.13) and 
(3.2.3). 
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Parameter values: 
α / 
L 
К 
ν 
ß 
= 0.25 
= 9.0 
= 1.00 
= 0.10 
= 4.00 / oo 
Stationary state: 
к 
Q 
и 
A 
Χ 
с 
Р
У 
j 
1 
if 
lb 
У 
= 3.594 
= 0.960 
= 1.020 
= 4.469 
= 0.791 
= 1.071 
= 0.960 
= 0.339 
= 7.535 
= 7.524 
= 0.011 
= 1.431 
α
* = 
ε/ = 
σ = 
ψ = 
ζ = 
R 
Ρ| 
Ef 
Eb 
GW 
Mc d 
Mc 5 
Mc 
Moh 
Mi 
Mob 
к 
= 0.70 
= 0.25 
= 0.40 
= 0.125 
= 4.00 
= 0.10 
= 0.091 
= 3.451 
= 0.047 
= 0.019 
= 0.057 
= 0.289 
= 0.057 
= 0.971 
= 1.029 
= 0.029 
= 0.025 
Ус 
Ч 
δ 
Φ 
Υ/ 
= 0.85 
= 1.40 
= 0.10 
= 2.00 
= 0.10 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CHOICE BETWEEN DEBT AND EQUITY 
1 Introduction 
We return to the basic model of chapter 1 to study the introduction of a 
risky asset. This makes it of interest to distinguish between shares and 
bonds (equity and debt) at the firm's level. The main point of this chapter 
is to re-discuss the Modigliani-Miller results of their original (1958)-paper 
and the (1963)-correction thereof. When dealing with matters associated 
with "risk", we want to analyse the issues of uncertainty without departing 
from the approach taken for deterministic problems. Uncertainty is just 
another dimension to the model. Different probabilistic "states of nature" 
are introduced to compute expected rates of return at any given moment. 
Now it is the cash-flow to the holder of the security that determines the 
value of that security, alongside the expected rate of return and the amount 
of risk. A project of which the returns are not the same in all states of 
nature is risky, in the sense that the investor's realized return cannot be 
predicted with certainty (see Auerbach(1983), p.931). Uncertainty is mod­
elled following the Yaari-Blanchard life-time model. Any firm has a con­
stant probability π at any moment of continuous time of stopping econom­
ic activity. The probability of failure at time t is π . e""'' . The probability 
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г 
that a firm is "dead" before a fixed date Τ is Γπ . e'^'dt = 1 - е"яГ . There­
to 
fore, the probability that the firm is still alive at time Τ is е _ я Г . The 
да 
expected life-time of a firm is Γί. π . e'^'dt - Ι/π . The reference model 
of chapter 1 appears to be a special case of the model of this chapter: as π 
goes to zero, the expected life-time of the firm goes to infinity. 
To finance their activities, firms have equity and debt outstanding. Con­
sumers think they are small enough not to be able to completely diversify 
all risk of their portfolios at no cost. The choice between risk and return is 
being made continuously according to a CES-utility specification, assum­
ing the degree of certainty and return to be inputs. 
There are several ways out of the well-known problem that the optimal 
amount of equity is indeterminate. Most, if not all, of them are "deus ex 
machina" for explaining the coexistence of sources of finance with appar­
ently different costs. Not satisfactory at all are approaches that assume 
some arbitrary maximum debt-equity ratio or that assume that the required 
rates of return on debt and equity increase (arbitrarily) with leverage, pre­
sumably because of some (undefined) factor of (most of the time: bank­
ruptcy) risk.1 Our approach is, given the framework of the thesis, less 
The fact that the firm in our model faces some probability of breakdown 
must not be confused with the notion of bankruptcy costs. The introduc­
tion of bankruptcy costs serves to make the sum of pay-offs discontinu­
ous at the point of bankruptcy (so avoid MM-irrelevance) (see also 
Hayashi(1985)). Our probability of breakdown is connected with differ-
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arbitrary to a greater extent, though (certainly) not free of caveats. 
In dealing with the problem of optimal leverage, we impose an additional 
constraint upon the firm's problem. This capital-in-advance constraint 
guarantees the absolute risk-freeness of debt. We assume management to 
make the same decisions as equity holders would have made, so as to 
exclude agency problems. An agency problem arises when there is a con-
flict between the interests of several groups within the firm, to be seen as a 
"nexus of contracts" (See Bishop, Crapp and Twite(1983)). For example, 
as managers are also utility-maximizers, it is possible for them to direct 
resources to their own benefit rather than that of the equity holders. The 
costs of divergence between the interests of the equity holders and manag-
ers is referred to as an agency cost. We assume that the market for manag-
ers will be able to control deviant actions of managers, so that this kind of 
agency problem is non-existent. Since we assumed that no new equity is 
ever issued (that is to mean that no new equity holders come into play) 
there cannot be the question whether management should operate in the 
interest of existing or all equity holders. With debt securities outstanding, 
maximizing equity holders' wealth and maximizing the total value of the 
firm are not necessarily consistent objectives. Management could sell all 
the assets of the firm and distribute the proceeds to equity holders as divi-
dend. This would leave the debt-holders with empty claims, the value of 
their claims being passed to the equity holders. In the model of this chap-
ter, the objectives of maximizing the value of equity or the value of the 
firm turn out to be the same. A distortionary element is introduced in the 
chapter in the form of a profit tax with tax-deductible interest payments. 
ent states of nature and exogenous to the model. 
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The latter is done to escape the irrelevance of financial structure of the 
MM-world without taxes. 
Again we have a number of departures from the basic postulates of chapter 
0. Because of the uncertainty structure of the model, there is no longer 
perfect foresight with respect to the moment of financial breakdown of the 
individual firm. Secondly, consumers think (mistakenly) that they can't 
diversify all risk (whereas they can by organizing an insurance company).2 
Thirdly, debt holders require a certain amount of real assets to be held by 
the firm to guarantee their claims to be of risk-free quality. In fact, debt is 
risk-free from the outset, since equity holders reckon with the fact that 
debt must be repaid at all times and this shows in the expected value of 
equity. 
2 Firm behaviour 
Every individual firm continuously faces the possibility of going bankrupt. 
In the case of bankruptcy, the firm ceases to exist. This sudden breakdown 
can be looked upon as caused by a local earthquake that destroys all mana-
gerial capabilities embodied in this particular firm. It is assumed that all 
2
 One can imagine that consumers pay for the organization of an insur-
ance company that reduces the risk of their portfolios. Then the question 
would be to what extent consumers would want to pay for letting their 
risk be reduced. Modelling these costs in the "right" way could deliver 
the same results as obtained in our model. 
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firms face a constant probability of managerial breakdown, π . This struc­
ture of breakdown-activity bears great resemblance with the age-structure 
of population assumed in Blanchard (1985).3 It is legitimate to say that 
the representative firm in our model is finitely lived. To finance its activi­
ties, the firm issues shares of equity. It is clear that the holder of equity 
bears the risk of breakdown of the firm. In order to supply a range of 
assets to the public, the firm also issues debt. Debt is assumed to be risk-
free, so that the individual holder of assets can decide upon the optimal 
risk-structure of his portfolio by combining the appropriate amounts of 
equity and debt. 
Let us assume for the moment that the firm's objective is to maximize 
shareholders' wealth, E . The value of equity consists of all dividend pay­
ments that are expected to be generated by the firm, discounted by the 
required rate of return on equity: R,. The moment of breakdown is denot­
ed by Τ and it is assumed that in the case of breakdown all outstanding 
debt, В , is repaid by the owners of the firm. Capital stock, к, is the only 
assumed physical asset at the firm's level. The stock of capital can be sold 
at price Py per unit. Once sold, these units of capital are assumed to be of 
the same quality as produced output, у, and can consequently be used for 
consumption or investment purposes. 
The probability that the firm breaks down at moment Г is: π . e " " ' τ . We 
have to integrate the (certain) value of equity when the firm stops at (a cer­
tain) moment Τ over all possible moments of breakdown in order to obtain 
3
 This implies that in order to obtain a constant number of firms at any 
moment of time, it has to be assumed that at each moment of time, a 
certain amount of entrepreneurs starts a new firm. 
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the expected value of equity. When doing this, the certain values have to 
be weighted with the probability that the firm breaks down exactly at 
moment T. Hence, the expected value of equity of the representative firm 
should be: 
(4.2.1) E- ƒ ' ƒ 
-ƒ*<* -ƒ».* 
D . e ' dz+{k.P -B}.e ' -Я.Т — 
π . e αΤ 
This expression can be rewritten as follows, by changing the order of inte­
gration (see Yaari(1965)): 
« -Ç(Rt + n)ds 
(4.2.2) E- f{D + n.(k.Py-B)}.e ' dz 
Dividend payments, as used in the latter two expressions, consist of: 
V23)D~y.Py-l.Pl-j.Py-RrB + В 
Another way of writing expression (4.2.2) is: 
oo - Г Rt efc 
(4.2.4) £-(*{£>+ π . (it. Ρ -В)- п. E), e ' dz 
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The latter expression can be more insightful than the others because the 
value of equity is related directly to the required return on equity itself. 
As expression (4.2.3) indicates, dividend payments consist of a series of 
cash-flows, springing from different sources: sales of produced output 
(y . Ρ ) minus wages paid to hired labour force ( /. P,) minus investment 
expenditure (j-P ) minus interest paid on the existing body of debt 
( R.. В ) plus the additional funds available from issuing new debt ( 5 ) .4 
The first three components of the right hand side of (4.2.3) are standard 
and can be found in earlier chapters too. It is assumed that output is a 
function of labour and capital inputs, y=f(l,k), and that investment, 
;', includes installation costs, the latter a function of investment and the 
level of capital stock. The last two terms of the right hand side of (4.2.3) 
are due to the introduction of debt. The return on debt is the risk-free rate 
of interest, Rf. In maximizing the value of equity, the firm has three 
instruments at its disposal: labour, investment and debt accumulation. The 
producers' problem can now be solved, taking into account the constraints 
on capital and debt accumulation. Capital stock depreciates at a constant 
rate of δ , whereas only investment net of installation costs, /, is assumed 
to build up capital stock: 
(4.2.5) k-i-b.k . 
It should be noted that this process of capital accumulation is relevant only 
for individual firms during their producing period, implying that capital 
accumulation at the aggregate level must take into account the conse-
In fact this can be redemption as well as issuance of debt. 
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quences of breakdown. 
Debt accumulation is catered for by substituting the dummy variable Ζ in 
equation (4.2.3) for В and adding the constraint on debt accumulation 
according to: 
(4.2.6) B-Z . 
Use of standard solution procedures delivers as one of the first-order con­
ditions the well-known result that the required rate of return on equity 
should equal the risk-free rate of return: 
(4.2.7) R
e
-R
r 
The interpretation of this statement is that the firm accumulates debt untili 
the rate of return on debt and equity are the same. In a risk-neutral world, 
which implies that investors (in our case: consumers) do not require a risk-
premium on top of the risk-free rate, the debt/equity-ratio would be indet­
erminate. In the more common case of risk-averse consumers (implying 
that R
e
 > Rf ) the firm would accumulate debt infinitely. 
This result is most problematic. We avoid this perfidious result by adding 
another constraint to the producers problem. While the return on debt is 
assumed to be risk-free, there is no guarantee whatsoever that debt is 
repaid by stockholders at the moment of bankruptcy. There is always some 
unspecified probability of debt not being totally risk-free. It does not seem 
unreasonable therefore that holders of debt require the firm to back the 
claims of debt by holding a certain amount of real (i.e. non-financial) 
assets. Let us therefore take it that holders of debt require the total amount 
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of nominal debt not to exceed the nominal sales-value of capital stock: 
(4.2.8) B^k.Ρ . 
We shall refer to this important condition as the capital-in-advance condi­
tion.5 Adding this condition and solving the producers' problem once 
again, delivers the following first-order conditions: 
(4.2.9) ƒ, - ¿ , 
y 
(4.2.10) β - Ρ . (1 + A) , 
5
 Here and before, we assihned that the scrap value of capital stock is the 
same as the market value of the other goods at that moment. In general 
the scrap value is some fraction of this amount. There is no problem in 
taking a more general relation into the model. It is quite possible how­
ever that, depending on a number of additional assumptions that have to 
be made, the variance of returns on shares changes from a simple and 
constant π . ( 1 - π ) (see section 3), into a very complex expression, 
containing several variables of the model. We have actually run the 
model with a variable scrap value of capital stock. Since no additional 
benefits could be seen from this operation, we present a simplifying 
case. 
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(4.2.11) 0 - ( Д
е + я + о ) . е - Р у . ( / 4 - А і + Я + ц) , 
(4.2.12) μ - Ä - Λ , ( > 0 ) , 
(4.2.13) В'к.Ρ . 
The function h (i, к) describes, as before, installation costs, Q denotes 
the shadowprice of capital accumulation and μ is the Lagrange-parameter 
for the capital-in-advance condition. Assuming risk-averse consumer 
behaviour (see next section) it is clear that R
e
>Rf. As a result, the sha­
dowprice μ is positive and the capital-in-advance condition is always 
binding.6 This imposes an optimal debt/equity-ratio to the firm. How­
ever, as we will demonstrate below, the value of the firm, being the addi­
tion of equity and debt, is unaltered by shifting from equity to debt or vice 
versa.
7 
6
 The fact that В - к . Py will be used in deriving various expressions to 
come. 
7
 As the shadow-price μ is always positive, the firm wants to finance as 
much with debt as possible. Our model knows only one finance regime 
that is optimal at all times: debt finance. Hayashi(1985) deals with 
bankruptcy costs in order to make a distinction between three relevant 
financing-regimes: the regimes of retained profits, debt finance and 
(new) equity finance. In our model it should be quite easy to discrimi-
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Now we wonder whether it is more suitable for the firm to maximize the 
value of the firm, this including the value of debt: 
(4.2.14) V = E + B . 
We already have an expression for the value of equity in equations (4.2.1), 
(4.2.2) and (4.2.4). By definition it is true that: 
ζ 
OD - f ( Д
і
 + я ) ds 
(4.2.15) ß - C{(Re + K).B-B}.e ' dz. 
t 
By adding relations (4.2.2) and (4.2.15), we get for the total value of the 
firm at the micro-level: 
nate between a number of different finance-regimes. Forgetting for a 
moment about the distinction between internal and external equity 
finance, we can discriminate between financing with retained profits 
and debt-finance as optimal regimes by the introduction of flotation 
costs associated with the issuance of debt. For example, introduce a 
function z{s) to describe flotation costs, where: s - BIB . The stationary 
state of the model does not change by adding these flotation costs. Solv-
ing the complete model of the firm shows that in the case of flotation 
costs the shadowprice μ no longer has to be of positive value all the 
time. In case the shadowprice is zero it is optimal for the firm to finance 
with retained profits. Moreover, the market value of debt no longer has 
to coincide with the value of the stock of capital. 
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ш -Г(Я
е
+л)<іі 
(4.2.16) V-J{y.Py-l.Pl-j.Py+(Re-R^.B + n.k.Py}.c ' ' dz . 
t 
Now one can easily see that all actions taken by the firm under this alter­
native value-maximizing regime are exactly the same as derived above 
under the assumption of value maximization of shares. Because it is 
impossible to make debt-holders worse off by shifting risk from equity to 
debt, it is clear that the two seemingly different objective functions deliver 
the same results. 
Another problem is whether the value of the firm depends on the amount 
of debt issued. In other words: does leveraging affect the value of the 
firm? To demonstrate the Modigliani-Miller proposition that the value of 
the firm does not alter with the debt-equity ratio, we introduce two vari­
ables at the micro-level: 
VL = value of the levered firm. 
V
u
 = value of the unlevered firm. 
Of course, the value of the levered firm corresponds with expression 
(4.2.16) above. We gain some insight when rewriting (4.2.16) in terms of 
the weighted average cost of capital (the so-called WACC), which is 
defined as: 
(4.2.17) WACC = R,. — +R .— . 
K
 ' f V ' V 
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The value of the levered firm, using the definition of the WACC, reads: 
» -CWACCds 
(4.2.18) VL-J{y.Py-I.Prj. Py-n.E}. e * dz 
If this firm is forbidden to issue debt (B - 0), we get the unlevered value 
of the firm. We know beforehand that the following conditions hold true 
for the unlevered firm: 
(4.2.19) ν
υ
-Ε , 
(4.2.20) WACC-R
e
 . 
Reckoning with the continuous probability of managerial breakdown, we 
derive the following for the equity-only firm: 
"О - Г ( Д + Л ) < І 5 
(4.2.21) V
u
.j{y.Py-l.Prj.Py}. e ' ' dz 
Rewriting this in terms of the WACC: 
<= - CwACCtk 
(4.2.22) V
u
-f{y.Py-l.Pl-j.Py-K. E}, e ' dz 
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which is the same as expression (4.2.18) for the levered firm above. By 
now we have stated the Modigliani-Miller proposition at the firm's level in 
a world without taxes and a continuous probability of managerial break­
down: 
(4.2.23) W 
Staying on speaking terms with the finance literature, the expression 
(y . Py - /. P,-} . Ρ ) is called the net operating income of the firm 
(NOI). The NOI constitutes the cash-flow of the unlevered firm above. It 
is clear by now that even in the presence of uncertainty the choice of the 
debt-equity ratio has no effect on market-value (MM-theorem), since the 
cost of capital is (ultimately) independent from the firm's debt-equity ratio. 
We have reached two important conclusions of the analysis so far. Firstly, 
firm behaviour does not change whether the goal is maximizing the value 
of equity or maximizing the value of equity and bonds taken together. 
Secondly, the value of the firm is independent from the value of bonds 
(irrelevance of finance structure). 
3 Consumer behaviour 
In contrast with firm behaviour, we assume that each consumer is a repre­
sentative one and infinitely lived. Consumers are very large in number and 
so small in terms of financial wealth that they cannot avoid (or they think 
they cannot) the risk of losing the value of equity in the case of a financial 
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breakdown of "their" firm. Of course, a collection of asset-holders could 
cancel out all existing risk by holding all equity together in one portfolio. 
Consumers are ignorant or myopic at this particular point. Financial 
wealth of consumers (A) can be stored in equity, bonds or (helicopter) 
money: 
(4.3.1) A-E + B+M . 
Holding bonds promises to pay the risk-free rate of interest R,, holding 
equity has an expected return R
e
, whereas money does not deliver a nomi­
nal return. Consumers are supposed to choose in two stages. In stage one 
they decide how much to consume of the three "goods" from which 
(direct) utility can be derived: consumption of goods (c) , consumption of 
leisure (/
m
 - /) and consumption of liquidity services by holding money. 
Clearly we assume a traditional intertemporal utility function with as 
inputs consumption, leisure and real cash-balances. In stage two, consum­
ers decide every time again hereafter (continuously in fact) how to divide 
the non-monetary part of their financial wealth between bonds and equity. 
Equity promises to pay a higher return at a higher level of risk. The con­
sumers are supposed to be risk-averse, a standard assumption in the theo­
retic financial literature. 
To derive a capital market-line, representing all combinations of risk and 
return open to consumers, we need to know the risk of equity. Risk is 
looked upon by the consumer as the variance of returns. Holding a share 
of the firm gives a return of R* with probability (l-π) and a return of R^ 
with probability π. R* and R~ denote the rate of return in case of success 
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and failure of the firm respectively: 
(4.3.2) R+-2-Î-Ç-
D + È-E + (k.P -В) 
(4.3.3) R; г ¿ 
The first of these two expressions speaks for itself: in case of succes the 
shareholder benefits from dividend payout and capital gains. In case of 
failure, according to (4.3.3), the normal return accrues to the shareholders 
for the last time, but in addition the shareholders guarantee the risk-
freeness of debt (which means paying or receiving a sum of money equal 
to k.Py -B ) and face the fact that equity is worthless from that moment on. 
The standard deviation of returns on equity is in this case: 
(4.3.4) σ - V π . ( 1 - π ) , 
whereas the expected return on equity should be: 
(4.3.5) R =. D + E-n-E 
Now the consumer can choose the most desired portfolio of risk and 
return, according to the following relation: 
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(4·3·6>νν{^}·ν 
OsÄ S Ä , Oso s o , 
p e ρ t 
where R and σ symbolize the amounts of (expected) return and risk to 
choose respectively. Expression (4.3.6) represents the capital-market-line. 
Which of these combinations of risk and return is chosen, depends on the 
degree of risk-aversion of consumers. For the sake of convenience, we 
suppose a simple CES-structure between risk and return: 
_ 1 _ 
(4.3.7) u*-{Y ,.A í (V + ( l -Y*).(o e-O í ))-p '} p' . 
The difference between ae and σ figures as a measure of portfolio-risk 
( o
e
 being the maximum amount of risk available) while the parameter γ* 
indicates the degree of risk-aversion.8 Part of the consumer's problem 
consists of maximizing the "risk-utility" subject to the possibilities offered 
by firms according to (4.3.6). Solving this part of the consumer's problem 
delivers: 
We have also experimented with a quadratic utility function (following 
much of the literature on the topic) but met insurmountable stability 
problems when the results were inserted into the complete macroeco-
nomic model and numerical simulations were carried out. 
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+ 1 
(4.3.8) Rt~Rf-
l - γ J 
Ρ 
. σ . • 
e 
R 
e 
R 
L Ρ 
• 
- 1 
To simplify matters still further we assume from now on that ρ = 1 , and 
state the following properties, which can be derived from (4.3.8), verbally. 
When the parameter for the degree of risk-aversion γ* is increased the 
required return on the portfolio will be greater, while an increase in the 
maximum amount of risk available, o
e
, also increases the required rate of 
return on the portfolio. 
Though the treatment of the risk-return trade-off falls completely within 
the textbook framework, note that our approach is more complicated 
because the return on equity is endogenized in the complete macroeco-
nomic model, which implies that the capital-market line is on the move all 
the time during adjustment. 
The last step in formulating the consumer model is the maximization of 
intertemporal utility (U) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint. 
The objective function reads: 
м
 л <,-ν·(*-'), (4.3.9) U-fu(c,lm-l,j-).c-v(í"'W 
while the intertemporal budget constraint is: 
(4.3.10) À-R .(A-M)-c.P +Ι.Ρ
ι
 + π.Β 
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The latter equation can be derived using the aggregate values of equity 
(see next section) and bonds, assuming a constant nominal stock of mon­
ey. The financial wealth of a representative consumer is determined by 
macroeconomic variables. It is therefore remarkable that for all consumers 
taken together financial wealth is deterministic in character, devoid of any 
risk. The reason is, as mentioned before, that on a macro-level it is known 
with perfect certainty how many firms go bankrupt and stop economic 
activity. It is therefore important to remember that the representative con­
sumer in the model is too small to eliminate all risk of the portfolio at no 
cost. The behavioural equations of the consumer's model therefore reflect 
the riskiness of equity. 
Solving the intertemporal maximization problem of the consumers subject 
to the budget constraint, delivers as first order conditions: 
(4.3.11) u
c
-X.Py , 
(4.3.12) u^-X.P,, 
(4.3.13) и
к
-Х. Py. Rp, 
ρ 
у 
(4.3.14) X-(y,-Rp).X, 
where X is the shadowprice of financial wealth, as it was before. 
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4 Aggregate behaviour 
When turning to macro relations, we have to aggregate over all existing 
firms. This has implications for a number of relations derived previously. 
In order to avoid notational problems, we do not use subscripts to denote 
aggregate variables. It should be clear from the context whether micro or 
macro variables are meant. The value of equity aggregated over all exist-
ing firms is: 
(AA.\)E'f{y.Pr-l.Prì.PrRrB + B}.e "' dz 
Comparing this result with the value of equity at the firm's level shows 
that a fraction π of the value of aggregate equity is destroyed continuous­
ly. The value of all firms taken together is: 
(4A.2)V^j{y.Py-l.Pl-j.Py}.t 'P dz 
The latter expression can be obtained by adding the value of equity and 
bonds at the macro level. The value of bonds can for that purpose be 
rewritten as: 
(4.4.3) B=\{R
e
.B-B}.e, dz 
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The return on the consumer's total portfolio is determined by: 
(4.4.4) R .V-R,.B + R .E . 
4
 ' ρ f f 
Physical capital stock at the firm's level depreciates at a constant rate Ô. At 
the macro level a fraction π of the capital stock is sold as goods for con­
sumption and (new) investment purposes. This implies for the macro-
model: 
(4.4.5) ¿ - ί - ( δ + π ) . * , 
(4.4.6) y + π .к- c+i . 
The last equation describes the continuous goods-market clearance, which 
of course implies that total supply of goods (y+K.k) equals total demand 
for goods (c+/). 
Financial wealth of consumers consists of the total of aggregate equity, 
bonds and money: 
(4.4.7) A-E + B + M-V+M . 
Given a constant stock of money, the budget constraint of all consumers 
together (which equals the budget constraint per individual consumer, for­
getting about the different interpretation) is: 
(4.4.8) À - V -R .V-y.P+l.P+i.P . 
\ ' Ρ У ' У 
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Together with the expression for the market clearance of goods, this deter-
mines the expression for the dynamic budget constraint as used in the pre-
vious section on consumer behaviour. 
All other relations derived in the micro sections can be used straightaway 
in the macro-model (be it that they must be interpreted as being macro 
relations). The model is completed by assuming market clearance both on 
the money and labour market. 
5 Introducing a tax on profits 
As one of our main concerns in this chapter is studying the impact of lev-
eraging between equity and bonds, it is interesting to incorporate some 
form of tax on profits. We assume that a tax is levied on profits of firms. 
In order to avoid any problems associated with government behaviour, it is 
assumed that tax revenues are simply redistributed among consumers in a 
lump-sum fashion. To obtain a straight comparison with the model with-
out taxes, we use the same structure as before in dealing with the producer 
problem, the consumer problem and the macro model respectively. 
Firm behaviour 
As before we assume the goal of the firm to be the maximization of the 
value of equity: 
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ζ 
и -ÙR+iCyls 
(4.5.1) E- C{(l-T).{NOI-Rf.B}+B + n.(k.Py-B)}.e ' dz , 
ι 
where τ is a constant tax rate on profits. The government al lows for com­
plete deductability of investment outlays and interest paid to debtholders. 
The maximization is done subject to the additional capital-in-advance con­
dition. Should the maximization be done without the capital-in-advance 
condition (while reckoning with the conditions of capital and debt accu­
mulation), one of the first order conditions turns out to be: 
(4.5.2)R
e
-(l-x).R
r 
Even in a risk-neutral world, the firm would go on accumulating debt end­
lessly, which is clearly not a very satisfactory starting point for numerical 
simulation.9 The benefits of accumulating debt would be even greater in 
the case of risk-averse consumers (R
e
 > R,). 
9
 The deductibility of interest imparts a bias to the financing decision as 
firms have an incentive to finance their investment by borrowing. The 
firm and the household face different after-tax rates of interest. There­
fore, the firm's owners, in order to finance investment, will maximize 
their wealth by borrowing at the firm's level, rather then at the personal 
level (see Auerbach(1983), p.919). Some constraint is needed to prevent 
endless borrowing at the firm's level. 
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The following results can be obtained, taking the capital-in-advance con­
straint into account: 
(4.5.3) f
r
L· , 
y 
(4.5.4) ρ = Ρ . (1
 + Α . ) . ( 1 - τ ) , 
(4.5.5) 0 - ( Л , + я + о ) . е - Р
у
. { ( 1 - т ) . ( / 4 - Л 4 ) + Я + ц} . 
(4.5.6) μ - Λ ^ - ί Ι - τ ) . ^ ( > 0 ) > 
(4.5.7) Β - к.Р
у
. 
It is stated here without proof that the alternative goal of maximizing the 
value of the firm again leads to exactly the same behavioural results as 
derived in the case of equity maximization. The total value of the levered 
firm is: 
ζ 
αο -Ç(R+n)ds 
(4.5.8) VL - Γ{(1-τ). NOI + (Α
Γ
(1-τ) .R^.B + n.k. Py}.e ' dz . 
ι 
In the case of a profit tax, the WACC and the return on the consumer's 
portfolio are not the same anymore. 
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As before we have the definition of the return on the consumer's portfo­
lio:10 
(4.5.9) R -R . — +R.— . 
v
 ' ρ · y f γ 
But now, since the firm reckons with the after tax cost of debt, we have for 
the weighted average cost of capital: 
(4.5.10) WACC -R . — + R,. ( 1 - τ) . — . 
Now it is time to refer to chapter 0. There we discussed how to obtain the 
results of MM(1958 and 1963) in the case of a corporate tax. Crucial is 
the introduction of a new financial asset S that represents the market value 
of all tax-payments to consumers. The relevant rate of discount is cal led 
R
m
. Rational consumers who "see through" the model recognize t h e fact 
that tax-redistributions are characterized by the same risk as the dividends 
they receive. The implication would be that consumers require the s a m e 
rate of return on holding these two assets. We define the return o n the 
"enlarged" portfolio of consumers: 
(4.5.11) R =—£-.R +-Ë—.R+-A—.R . 
v J u
 V+S ' v+s f v+s 
In this section V and VL will be used interchangeably. 
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A s can be seen in chapter 0 this leads to the relation expressing that the 
required rate of return on equity depends on the amount of leverage in the 
following manner: 
^.S.12)Rt-Ru + (Ru-Rf).(i-x).^ 
I t is now straightforward to rewrite the value of the levered firm in terms 
o f the enlarged portfolio return: 
(4.5.13) VL - Г{ ( 1 - τ ) . NOI + τ . ^ . Β - π . E }.e ' dz 
Let us look at the value of the firm when financed only with equity. In that 
case a number of conditions hold: 
(4.5.14) ν
υ
-Ε , 
(4.5.15) WACC-R
e
 , 
(4.5.16) R
e
 = R
u
 • 
We have for the equity-only firm: 
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oo -Г(Л
г
 + я)Л 
(4.5.17) V
u
- Г {(Ι-τ). NOI}. e ' dz 
Rewriting this in terms of R
u
 (or for that matter in terms of R
e
 or the 
WACQ: 
oo - f R
u
 ds 
(4.5.18) ν
υ
~ Ç{{l-x).NOI-n.E}.e, ' dz 
The comparison of the value of financial wealth (equity plus bonds) 
between the levered and unlevered situation in the case of a profit tax with 
tax-deductable interest payments, shows: 
oo - f Ras 
(4.5.19) VL.Vu+^{x.Ru.B}.t ' " dz 
This implies that MM-relation (0.3.13) of chapter 0 holds for the station-
ary state of our model: 
(4.5.20) VL-Vu + r.-f.B-Vu + r. В . 
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Consumer behaviour 
The government redistributes taxes levied on profits in a lump-sum man­
ner to consumers: 
(4.5.21) τ . (y . Py - I. P ; - ; . Py -Rf. В ) - Τ , 
where Τ are lump-sum transfers to consumers. 
The intertemporal budget constraint for consumers changes therefore into: 
(4.5.22) V-R .V-c.P +Ι.Ρ, + π.Β + Τ . 
The trick now is to write the intertemporal budget constraint of consumers 
in terms of the enlarged portfolio (including the new transfer asset S ). 
Financial wealth of the consumer must be written as: 
(4.5.23 A = E + B + S + M . 
From the definition of the market-value of transfers, we know that: 
(4.5.24) S - R
ov
. S - Τ . 
For the rewritten intertemporal budget constraint, we obtain: 
(4.5.25) À=Ru.(A-M)-c.P +Ι.Ρ
ι
 + π.Β . 
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Solving the consumer's problem again, this time with the inclusion of tax-
es, leads to the same optimal strategies for consumers as derived in the 
section without taxes (see equations (4.3.11) to (4.3.14)). The one differ-
ence however is that the symbol Rp has to be replaced by the symbol Ru. 
Now it is not at all clear that the consumer can decide upon the amounts of 
all financial assets around. The addition of lump-sum transfers to the prob-
lem and letting the consumers optimize over the amounts of debt and equi-
ty (and the relevant portfolio return) does not lead to the standard MM-
results however (see section 0 once again). 
Aggregate behaviour 
The value of equity aggregated over all firms is: 
«o - ÇRtds 
(4.5.26) E - Γ{(1-τ) . (NOI - Rf. В) + È + π . (к. Py - В)}л ' dz 
The aggregate value of firms can be expressed as follows: 
ш -(WACCJs 
(4.5.2T)V-f{(l-x).(y.Py-l.PrJ.Py)}.t ' dz 
or alternatively as: 
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« - ¡R ds 
(4.5.28) V-j{y.Py-l.Pl-j.Py-T}.t ' ' dz . 
ι 
The aggregate value of financial wealth is described by the following con­
dition (a rewritten version of (4.5.25)): 
{A.S.29)À-Ru.{A-M)-y.Py + l.Pl+j.Py . 
This completes the discussion on the change of the model on behalf of the 
introduction of a profit tax. 
6 Some remarks about the numerical simulations 
In order to simulate the effects of some disturbances hitting upon this 
economy, parameter values have to be chosen and some concrete specifi-
cation of functions have to be introduced. As mentioned earlier, all speci-
fications of functions and parameter sets are chosen uniformly across all 
chapters. 
The computer program starts to compute the stationary state of the econo-
my. Because we assume clearing markets throughout, we encounter the 
problem of solving a large number of non-linear relations simultaneously. 
A shock to the economy is modelled by a change in the parameter set. A 
new stationary state, belonging to the changed parameter set, is computed 
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by the program. The time paths between the two stationary states are 
found by utilizing the method of multiple shooting, using the relevant dif-
ferential equations mentioned above, provided that the complete system 
exhibits the right stability properties. 
The confrontation of producers' and consumers' plans leads to equilibrium 
outcomes of all prices. The nominal wage rate equilibrates labour supply 
and demand. The price of goods is found by equating total goods supply 
and total goods demand. The total return on the consumers portfolio turns 
out to be a constant due to the Cobb-Douglas intertemporal utility specifi-
cation. The demand and supply for risky and riskless assets determines the 
level of the returns on equity and bonds. It is superfluous to say that the 
demand and supply at every market co-determines demand and supply at 
every other market. The capital market line, which normally represents a 
straight line between two fixed points, is itself determined by market forc-
es (while remaining a straight line). The risk on bonds and equity is 
assumed to be constant and it is the return at a specific level of risk that is 
determined by market forces. 
7 Some remarks about the stationary state 
We do not intend to discuss the computation of the stationary state at 
length. There are important differences with the previous chapters how-
ever. The specification of the adjustment costs was chosen originally to 
ensure that the stationary state of the economy did not exhibit adjustment 
costs. In the model under consideration there would be no adjustment 
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costs in the stationary state if no firm was ever to break down (π - 0). 
Because this economy not only shows physical depreciation of capital 
goods at the firms level, but also shows capital destruction at the aggregate 
level (π > 0), this economy also faces adjustment costs in the so-called sta­
tionary state. 
From к - 0 it follows that: 
(4.7.1) i - ( 6 + π ) , ft . 
Therefore, given the specification of adjustment costs: 
(4.7.2) h. - — , Α. . 
» ψ * 2 .ψ 
Therefore: 
( 4 . 7 . 3 ) /
Α
- ( ^
 + ο + π ) . ( 1 + ^ ) - π 2 + 2 · 0 · π - ^ ± ϋ . 
* « ψ 2 .ψ 1-τ 
Inserting the fact that μ - Rt - ( 1 - τ ). Rf (according to equation (4.5.6)) 
and assuming for the moment that no taxes are levied, we have: 
2 
(4.7.4) f.-i? . — +Α,+ δ + ^ — . 
* ' ψ f 2. ψ 
Now it is clear that the equilibrium capital stock in the stationary state of 
our economy depends critically on both the returns on equity and bonds, a 
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result that can be of great help when analyzing the simulation results.11 
For the average q of the economy, the following can be established: 
(4.7.5) average q 1 + . 
v
 '
 ô
 ^ к.Ρ ψ R 
У * 
The marginal q for the stationary state of the debt-equity model is differ­
ent, since: 
(4.7.6) marginal q - — - 1 + — 
у 
The difference between average q and marginal q must be attributed to the 
costs associated with the additional capital-in-advance constraint. 
8 Numerical simulation results 
1 1
 Note that in case there are no taxes and no probability of failure, we 
have a familiar equation (see chapter 1) back again: 
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Consumers show greater risk-aversion 
Greater risk-aversion (γ* - 0.45 instead of 0.50) on behalf of consumers 
means that a greater weight is attached to certainty. In order to achieve 
more certainty, consumers want to take more bonds in portfolio at the 
expense of equity holdings. So, there is initially an excess supply of equity 
(as consumers want to get rid of it) and an excess demand for riskfree 
bonds. Prices of equity and bonds adjust to accomplish equilibrium at 
these two financial markets. The price of equity has to go down, whereas 
bond prices have to go up. The possibility that consumers have to buy 
equity at a lower price means that they realize a higher expected return on 
equity. The return on holding equity rises in order to restore equilibrium. 
Just the opposite can be said of bonds. In order to restore equilibrium at 
the bond market, the risk-free rate of interest goes down. Of course, both 
rates of return contribute to the firm's decision to invest in physical capital. 
The strong rise in the cost of equity finance dominates the fall in the cost 
of bond finance (see equation (4.7.3) by inserting the appropriate parame­
ter values). The marginal product of capital can be raised by establishing 
a lower stock of capital, that is to say: investment falls. Some marginal 
profitable opportunities are no longer profitable. 
The higher return on equity is not the only factor determining the value of 
equity. The holders of equity benefit from the fact that cost of debt dimin­
ishes. Furthermore, the fact that investment outlays and wage payments go 
down leads to higher dividends during a number of periods and higher val­
ue of equity. On the other hand, the smaller amount of debt can only be 
realized at the expense of dividend payments. 
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Table 10 Greater risk-aversion 
period -* 
variable | 
к 
Q 
U 
A 
X 
с 
Р
У 
J 
1 
У 
Rp 
Rf 
Re 
Pi 
E 
В 
V 
μ 
0 
0 
-0.92 
-0.51 
1.07 
0.00 
0.37 
-0.37 
-0.84 
-0.06 
-0.02 
0.00 
-1.88 
7.95 
-0.28 
26.83 
-0.37 
1.27 
26.27 
1 
-0.09 
-0.79 
-1.20 
1.11 
0.00 
0.29 
-0.29 
-0.86 
-0.07 
-0.08 
0.00 
-1.92 
7.97 
-0.32 
27.86 
-0.38 
1.32 
26.43 
2 
-0.18 
-0.68 
-1.83 
1.15 
0.00 
0.21 
-0.21 
-0.89 
-0.08 
-0.14 
0.00 
-1.96 
8.00 
-0.36 
28.79 
-0.39 
1.37 
26.57 
5 
-0.39 
-0.38 
-3.42 
1.25 
0.00 
0.02 
-0.02 
-0.94 
-0.10 
-0.27 
0.00 
-2.07 
8.06 
-0.46 
31.17 
-0.42 
1.49 
26.93 
10 
-0.65 
-0.03 
-5.32 
1.37 
0.00 
-0.20 
0.20 
-1.00 
-0.13 
-0.44 
0.00 
-2.19 
8.12 
-0.58 
34.00 
-0.45 
1.63 
27.36 
stationary 
state 
-1.12 
0.62 
-8.91 
1.59 
0.00 
-0.62 
0.62 
-1.12 
-0.18 
-0.75 
0.00 
-2.43 
8.26 
-0.80 
39.31 
-0.51 
1.89 
28.18 
Consumers choose to consume more goods and leisure. Less labour supply 
combined with less labour demand (because of a shrinking capital stock) 
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apparently dictates a lower nominal wage rate for the labour market to 
clear. Realized consumption can rise at the expense of investment demand. 
Prices fall initially to guarantee an equality of demand and supply. After 
the jump, prices start to rise slowly due to the smaller capital stock and the 
effect on output. 
Shifting from equity to debt does not alter the value of the firm in the 
absence of any tax rate. The rationale behind the smaller amount of debt 
is that the back-up of debt, being the value of capital stock, becomes 
smaller. It is amazing to see how holders of equity benefit from the new 
situation, because the firm shrinks down in terms of capital stock and pro­
duction. 
More risk-hating behaviour results in higher share-prices, a greater return 
for bearing risk of course, and, more importantly, to a smaller and less 
producing economy. Cautious investors cause unemployment at the aggre­
gate. 
Firms are faced with a smaller probability of managerial breakdown 
This simulation is derived by introducing a change in the parameter к 
from the old value of 0.05 to the new value of 0.04. The news that firms 
are not as risky as before of course benefits the existing holders of equity. 
The required rate of return on the (less) risky asset declines instantaneous­
ly and the equity market shows a booming tenet. One would expect the 
promised rate of return on equity to go down as a consequence. 
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Table 11 Smaller objective risk 
period -» 
variable I 
к 
Q 
U 
A 
X 
с 
p y 
J 
1 
У 
Rp 
Rf 
Re 
Pi 
E 
В 
V 
μ 
0 
0 
-1.82 
20.88 
3.98 
0.00 
-0.93 
0.94 
-4.12 
0.15 
0.06 
0.00 
-2.81 
5.05 
0.71 
63.74 
0.94 
4.72 
19.70 
1 
0.50 
-2.49 
24.49 
3.75 
0.00 
-0.50 
0.50 
-4.01 
0.21 
0.38 
0.00 
-2.58 
4.92 
0.94 
58.14 
1.00 
4.44 
18.92 
2 
0.96 
-3.11 
27.80 
3.53 
0.00 
-0.10 
0.10 
-3.91 
0.25 
0.68 
0.00 
-2.37 
4.81 
1.16 
52.99 
1.07 
4.19 
18.20 
5 
2.14 
-4.65 
36.13 
3.00 
0.00 
0.91 
-0.90 
-3.66 
0.37 
1.42 
0.00 
-1.85 
4.52 
1.71 
39.94 
1.22 
3.55 
16.40 
10 
3.55 
-6.43 
45.92 
2.36 
0.00 
2.10 
-2.06 
-3.38 
0.51 
2.29 
0.00 
-1.24 
4.18 
2.36 
24.43 
1.42 
2.80 
14.28 
stationary 
state 
6.14 
-9.58 
63.48 
1.22 
0.00 
4.28 
-4.10 
-2.88 
0.75 
3.88 
0.00 
-0.15 
3.56 
3.53 
-3.89 
1.79 
1.45 
10.47 
The representative consumer faces a sudden shift in his portfolio from 
debt to equity. Apparently, consumers want to restore portfolios in the 
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direction of bonds. The demand for portfolio compensating bonds is such 
that the return on these riskless assets goes down, whereas the return on 
equity goes up for that matter. 
The effects of the lower probability of breakdown on dividends clearly 
dominates the effect of the higher cost of equity, so the net effect is higher 
stock prices initially. The effect of the higher cost of equity together with 
lower cost of debt is difficult to predict. The net effect of (good) news of 
lower risk is that firms establish a higher stock of capital. Concluding that 
this requires more aggregate investment is clearly false, since the aggre-
gate capital stock depreciates more slowly as a consequence of more firms 
staying alive and kicking. A bigger stock of capital establishes itself in this 
case. Investment demand even goes down as the simulation shows. It is 
plausible to assume that this economy, which benefits at the aggregate, 
wants to consume more in terms of goods and leisure. However, prices 
must rise in order to bring down consumption demand sufficiently. Total 
supply of goods initially falls because less physical capital is coming free 
for consumption purposes. This is a consequence of our assumption that 
the capital stock of "dead" firms is sold as consumption in order to repay 
debt-holders. In due course the positive effect of a growing capital stock 
on output brings about greater consumption and lower prices. Firms want 
to hire more labour, consumers want to enjoy more leisure, so the wage 
rate has to rise. The amount of debt again rises along with the value of 
capital stock. 
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Firms are faced with a more efficient production process 
This is the technological shock that dominates all chapters of the book. 
The value of the parameter ε is brought up from 0.25 to 0.26. The results 
of the simulation of the technological shock in the debt/equity economy 
are (happily) in line with results obtained before. Producing more effi­
ciently means that given a certain amount of labour and capital (which are 
inputs to the technology) more output is possible. The extra supply of 
goods at the market leads to falling prices. The firm's cash-flow benefits 
from the gains in producing output more efficiently, but suffers from 
lower goods prices. It is clear that life-time utility benefits from the greater 
productivity. Households want to consume more goods together with more 
leisure. Firms need less labour for a given amount of output and therefore 
it is not clear beforehand whether wages will show tendencies in an 
upward or downward direction. In contrast with simulations presented in 
earlier chapters, the net effect is an increase in wages together with more 
employment in the economy. 
Though a great number of variables affect the value of equity, it seems fair 
enough to expect a big upward jump in share-prices. Households want to 
reallocate their wealth in order to counterbalance the dominating position 
of equity in their portfolios. The return on bonds falls as a consequence of 
(ex ante) excess demand for bonds. The return on equity shows the mirror 
image. Firms supply less bonds because the scrap-value of capital stock is 
lower due to lower prices. New investment activity (financed out of 
retained earnings) dictates that some extra debt will be issued in the course 
of time. The nominal value of capital stock increases over time (after the 
initial fall) because additional investment dominates the ever falling price 
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Table 12 A technological shock 
period -* 
variable 1 
к 
Q 
U 
A 
X 
с 
Р
У 
J 
1 
У 
Rp 
Rf 
Re 
Pi 
E 
В 
V 
μ 
0 
0 
-1.52 
88.49 
-0.62 
0.00 
3.74 
-3.61 
3.34 
0.04 
4.02 
0.00 
-1.74 
0.97 
0.19 
44.00 
-3.61 
-0.74 
6.03 
1 
0.36 
-2.01 
91.13 
-0.79 
0.00 
4.07 
-3.91 
3.43 
0.08 
4.26 
0.00 
-1.59 
0.89 
0.36 
40.07 
-3.56 
-0.94 
5.52 
2 
0.70 
-2.45 
93.54 
-0.94 
0.00 
4.37 
-4.19 
3.52 
0.11 
4.48 
0.00 
-1.45 
0.82 
0.51 
36.46 
-3.52 
-1.12 
5.05 
5 
1.54 
-3.56 
99.62 
-1.32 
0.00 
5.14 
-4.89 
3.72 
0.20 
5.03 
0.00 
-1.11 
0.63 
0.90 
27.33 
-3.42 
-1.57 
3.87 
10 
2.55 
-4.85 
106.76 
-1.77 
0.00 
6.04 
-5.70 
3.96 
0.29 
5.69 
0.00 
-0.71 
0.40 
1.36 
16.53 
-3.30 
-2.10 
2.48 
stationary 
state 
4.39 
-7.14 
119.53 
-2.58 
0.00 
7.68 
-7.14 
4.39 
0.47 
6.87 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.18 
-3.06 
-3.06 
-3.06 
0.00 
of goods (the latter due to ever increasing supply of goods out of new pro­
duction technology). 
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A tax on profit is levied on firms 
The three simulations discussed so far assumed no tax on profits. Now a 
profit tax is introduced along the lines of section 5. In practical terms this 
means that the simulations so far have been carried out with the parameter 
τ set to zero. This simulation presents the effects of an introduction of a 
profit tax of value 0.025 (starting from a situation without taxes). An 
essential feature of the model is that interest on debt is tax deductible. 
It is clear that this tax structure favours debt financing over equity financ­
ing (in the form of retained profits). It would be an understatement to say 
that this tax structure is not exempt from connections with real-world situ­
ations. It is stressed that from a macro-point of view, the behaviour of the 
tax-levying institute seems devoid of any economic sense. The govern­
ment levies taxes on firms, which implies less dividend for holders of 
equity, in order to give the money back to households in a lump-sum fash­
ion. But of course the introduced tax is distortionary in character. It 
proves very difficult to guess (on an intuitive basis) the impact of a tax on 
profits. What is most striking is that life-time utility jumps upwards after 
introducing a distortionary tax. In an all-clearing, almost standard neo­
classical model the introduction of a nasty tax-levying government can 
improve welfare significantly. Let us try to interprete the simulation 
results. 
It is very clear from the outset that the introduction of any tax at the firm's 
level causes a fall in share-prices. The reason is simply that a third party 
takes away cash, which could have been given to shareholders. House­
holds, or equivalently shareholders, want to compensate portfolios by sell­
ing debt and buying equity. The result is a higher risk-free rate of interest 
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Table 13 Introduction of a profit tax 
period -* 
variable I 
к 
Q 
U 
A 
X 
с 
Р
У 
j 
1 
У 
Ru 
Rp 
Rf 
Re 
Pi 
E 
В 
ν 
μ 
0 
0 
-1.14 
0.65 
-1.64 
0.00 
-0.56 
0.56 
1.28 
0.09 
0.04 
0.00 
-0.04 
1.39 
-0.90 
0.42 
-42.47 
0.56 
-2.03 
-0.44 
1 
0.14 
-1.32 
1.69 
-1.70 
0.00 
-0.44 
0.44 
1.32 
0.11 
0.13 
0.00 
-0.04 
1.44 
-0.93 
0.49 
-43.98 
0.58 
-2.10 
-0.61 
2 
0.27 
-1.50 
2.64 
-1.76 
0.00 
-0.33 
0.33 
1.35 
0.12 
0.21 
0.00 
-0.04 
1.48 
-0.96 
0.55 
-45.37 
0.60 
-2.17 
-0.77 
5 
0.59 
-1.93 
5.04 
-1.91 
0.00 
-0.04 
0.04 
1.43 
0.15 
0.42 
0.00 
-0.04 
1.60 
-1.02 
0.70 
-48.90 
0.64 
-2.34 
-1.17 
10 
0.98 
-2.44 
7.90 
-2.09 
0.00 
0.30 
-0.30 
1.53 
0.19 
0.66 
0.00 
-0.04 
1.74 
-1.10 
0.88 
-53.11 
0.69 
-2.55 
-1.65 
stationary 
state 
1.72 
-3.40 
13.23 
-2.43 
0.00 
0.93 
-0.92 
1.72 
0.26 
1.12 
0.00 
-0.03 
1.99 
-1.25 
1.22 
-61.00 
0.78 
-2.94 
-2.54 
and a lower risky rate. Firms have strong motives for issuing debt (extra 
supply of bonds). Though the return on debt rises, it is still true that the 
cost of debt falls. The cost of debt equals ( 1 - τ ). Rf and differs from the 
return on debt Rf. Indicative for investment behaviour is (among other 
things) the total cost of capital. The ultimate indicator for investment is 
marginal q which equals: 
- l+A. . 
( Ι - τ ) . Ρ y 
The upward jump in this variable12 dictates higher investment activity, 
which in turn allows the firm to go heavier into debt. Strong investment 
demand forces lower (realized) consumption and higher prices initially. 
Capital accumulation during time delivers a higher potential for the pro­
duction of goods. Consumption can rise after some periods of time. Strong 
investment also brings higher wages and more employment. A most 
remarkable insight is that introducing a distortionary tax can produce extra 
output, bring more employment and welfare to the economy. The reason is 
that the tax system forces firms to invest by introducing a subsidy on debt 
finance. Extra investment clearly dominates this scenario. 
1 2
 The average q for this economy could be defined as the ratio between 
the market-value of the firm (debt plus equity) and the market-value of 
the stock of physical capital. See also formula (4.7.5) on page 153. 
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9 Conclusions 
Risk is introduced by assuming a Yaari-Blanchard population structure. 
Riskless debt and risky equity can both be used to finance the firm's activi-
ties. Assuming a MM-world without taxes shows that the irrelevance-of-
finance claim of MM holds in our macroeconomic model. Introducing a 
distorti onary corporate profit tax shows that the levered firm has a higher 
value than the unlevered firm. The value of the tax-shield is higher as 
more debt is used. For practical purposes, the level of debt is bounded 
from above by the introduction of a capital-in-advance condition. In order 
to obtain the MM-results in a world with a corporate profit tax for our 
macroeconomic model, some kind of "super-rationality" had to be 
imposed on consumers. Consumers must look upon government transfers 
as being the same in nature as the dividend payments of firms. It is not so 
hard to see parallels between the Modigliani-Miller (ir-)relevance and the 
Ricardian (non-)equivalence.13 
Simulation results show that more risk-hating behaviour results in higher 
share-prices, a greater return for bearing risk and a smaller and less pro-
ducing economy. Introducing a corporate profit tax improves life-time 
utility of consumers. The tax-system subsidizes debt-finance. As firms 
want to go into debt more heavily, they meet the requirements of debt 
Some inspiring discussion on the Ricardian equivalence doctrine can 
be found in the dissertation of Meijdam (1991b, chapter 4). It is left to 
the reader as a(n) (probably time-consuming) excercise to draw the 
parallels between the finance of firms and governments in the context 
of the kind of models used in both dissertations. 
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holders that more physical capital has to be installed to back up their 
claims. Extra investment and more output dominates the tax-scenario. 
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APPENDIX 
Debt-Equity model, tables 10,11,12 and 13 
с «v 
"/.-
f,-
i*-
y-
Q' 
j -
-Ρ,.Χ 
.,-ρ,χ 
p, 
ι,-ι 
ƒ ( ' , * ) 
• ^ • ( l + A . ) 
i + A ( i , * ) 
y+n.k-c+j 
M< 
R
P 
R 
-K-X.P, 
-M 
- β . Α / + ( 1 
.
 E
 .R 
( 1 - τ ) 
- ß ) - Ä . 
В 
v+s 
« f * — 
v+s f v+s 
в 
R, 
p-l—L.(R-R ). 1 1 
ß В 
μ-R
e
-(l-x).Rf 
B-k.Py 
V = A-S-M 
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τ 
к 
Q 
А 
Χ 
S 
и 
E-V-B 
M 
y 
T-x.(y.P,-l.P,-j.Py-RrB) 
k-t-(ô + π).к 
ρ-(Λ
ί + π + δ) .ρ-Ρ.{(1-τ).(Λ-Α,) + μ + π} 
À-Ru.(A-M)-y.Py + l.Pl + j.Py 
X-(v-Ru).X 
S-RM.S-T 
Ù-v.U-u 
Specifications used in simulations: (4.3.7), (1.5.3), (1.3.12) and (1.3.13). 
Parameter values: 
α 
ε 
Y™ 
ψ 
• 
Ρ 
= 0.25 
= 0.25 
= 0.05 
= 0.125 
= 1.00 
y
e
 =0.85 
Λ? =1.00 
δ = 0.10 
π = 0.05 
τ = 0.00 
'-
σ 
ν 
• 
Υ 
Ίι 
= 9.0 
= 0.40 
= 0.10 
= 0.50 
= 0.10 
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Stationary state: 
к 
Q 
U 
A 
X 
с 
Р
У 
i 
j 
1 
= 2.732 
= 2.589 
=-0.539 
= 6.376 
= 0.500 
= 0.919 
= 1.849 
= 0.410 
= 0.437 
= 7.378 
У 
Rp 
Rf 
Re 
Pi 
в 
E 
V 
μ 
Ru 
= 1.220 
= 0.10 
= 0.097 
= 0.149 
= 0.123 
= 5.052 
= 0.323 
= 5.376 
= 0.052 
= 0.10 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
AN OPEN ECONOMY: A FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE ON DEBT 
ACCUMULATION 
1 The closed model 
This chapter draws heavily on Meijdam and Van Stratum(1990). The 
results of the paper will not be repeated here. Instead the focus will be on 
the financial implications of modelling a small open economy. 
The model used here is exactly the same as used in the paper, with the 
exception of the inclusion of a clearing labour market, in order to bring 
this chapter in line with the other chapters. Equation (2.3.1) on page 7 of 
the paper describes sticky nominal wage formation: 
(5.1.1) P
r
Q.(ld-ls).Pl, 
where actual employment is determined by the minimum of ex ante 
demand and supply of labour: 
(5.1.2) / - т т ( / ^ ) . 
169 
These latter two equations regarding the labour-market will be replaced by 
the market-clearing conditions of earlier chapters: 
(5.1.3)^ | / ,-/, , 
(5.1.4)1-/,-/,. 
Actual employment equals ex ante demand and supply of labour, accord­
ing to the last equation. 
A closed economy version is used to have a point of reference in discuss­
ing the implications of opening up an economy. The model exhibits mon­
ey in the utility function (see chapter 1) in the following manner: 
(5Л.5)и-и(с,І
т
-1,У-) 
У 
The supply of money is exogenous (a parameter to the model). Combining 
this with the results of chapter 1 gives for the consumer's problem: 
(5.1.6) u
e
-X.Py, 
(5.1.7) «,_,-*.P, , 
(5.1.8) uM -X.P^.R , 
у 
ρ 
у 
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(5.1.9) À-R.(A-M) + l.Pl-c.P , 
(5.1.10) X'(v-R).X . 
The producer's problem will not be discussed here, as it is the same as 
used in chapter 1. The relevant equations will be repeated here: 
(5.1.11) f r ^ . , 
y 
(5.1.12) ß - P . ( 1 + Λ.), 
(5.1.13) y - i + h (i, к) , 
(5.1.14) k-i-ò.k , 
(5.1.15) Q-(R + b).Q-Py.(fk-hk) . 
Finally, there are the three market clearing conditions. The clearing condi-
tion for the labour market has already been specified by (5.1.3). The 
remaining two conditions read: 
(5.1.16) у - с +j , 
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(5.1.17) Md-M . 
This model can be seen as a micro-founded intertemporal version of the 
standard IS-LM framework. A more simple micro-founded model in the 
dynamic tradition is hardly imaginable. 
Table 14 shows the effects of a technological shock in the closed model. 
The results are in line with the relevant table of chapter 1 and will not be 
repeated here for that reason. 
It is interesting to compare the results with the ones from the paper. Com­
paring table 1 from the paper (p. 11) with table 14 shows the effects of 
introducing flexible wage-formation or a clearing market for labour. The 
stationary states of both models are the same, so the differences can be 
found in the adjustment processes. The effects of introducing flex-wages 
are: 
- The stock of capital accumulates faster, due to higher levels of invest­
ment. 
- The path of consumption is higher during all periods. 
- The level of employment is higher during all periods. 
- The nominal wage is not predetermined anymore. In the first period the 
wage rate declines but thereafter nominal wages rise. From period 1 
onward the clearing economy shows higher nominal wages. 
- Prices are lower during all periods. 
- Utility levels are higher during all periods. 
Note that the rate of interest is constant over time and equal to the exoge-
neous rate of time preference, ν . This phenomenon is described by propo-
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Table 14 A technological shock in reference closed model 
period -» 
variable [ 
к 
Q 
U 
A 
X 
с 
Р
У 
J 
1 
У 
R 
Pi 
E 
0 
0 
-1.40 
58.53 
-1.19 
0.00 
4.17 
-4.00 
3.44 
-0.02 
3.99 
0.00 
-0.13 
-1.40 
1 
0.32 
-1.88 
59.73 
-1.33 
0.00 
4.41 
-4.23 
3.44 
0.00 
4.17 
0.00 
0.01 
-1.56 
2 
0.62 
-2.31 
60.81 
-1.45 
0.00 
4.63 
-4.43 
3.44 
0.02 
4.33 
0.00 
0.13 
-1.71 
5 
1.34 
-3.36 
63.46 
-1.76 
0.00 
5.17 
-4.92 
3.43 
0.08 
4.74 
0.00 
0.45 
-2.07 
10 
2.16 
-4.53 
66.42 
-2.10 
0.00 
5.78 
-5.46 
3.42 
0.14 
5.19 
0.00 
0.79 
-2.47 
stationary 
state 
3.40 
-6.27 
70.86 
-2.62 
0.00 
6.69 
-6.27 
3.40 
0.23 
5.87 
0.00 
1.32 
-3.08 
sition I of the paper. 
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2 Turning the closed economy into a (small) open one. 
The focus of our thesis is the modelling of financial assets in macroeco-
nomic perspective. The starting point of the paper at that time was: why 
not see a (small) country as a big firm that pays dividends to the rest of the 
world. A country produces goods and uses goods and other means in pro­
ducing them. Say, Americans own the small country called the Nether­
lands, what would they want to sell it for? In other words: what determines 
the market-value of the Netherlands in the world economy? 
Assuming homogeneous, internationally traded, goods greatly simplifies 
matters. How do we define the dividend of the big firm "The Nether­
lands"? All goods that stream across the borders can be seen as net pay­
ments to the rest of the world, to the shareholders of the firm. So, export of 
goods is seen as the net production of a country. All production of course 
equals y but the amount of с +) is "used" in producing this output. So, net 
output equals export of goods: 
(5.2.1)0-у-c-j . 
The price the Americans want to give for this bundle of goods equals the 
world price of the good at the moment of arrival of the goods. Assuming 
purchasing power parity (in conjunction with homogeneous goods) brings: 
(5.2.2) Py -P. e , 
where P' is the goods price in dollars (at moment t), Py the goods price in 
guilders and e the (flexible and market clearing) rate of exchange. The net 
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output of "The Netherlands" measured in dollars, thus is b. P' at every 
moment of time. 
At what rate must the levels of net output (=dividends to the owners) be 
discounted to obtain the market-value of "The Netherlands"? Assuming 
interest-rate parity again simplifies matters enormously: 
(5.2.3) R - R' + - , 
e 
where R' is the American rate of interest, R the Dutch rate of interest. The 
net worth, or market-value, of "The Netherlands" (vis-a-vis the rest of the 
world) should therefore be: 
CD 
(5.2.4) V^-jib.Py.^'^dz, 
t 
where R ' is assumed to be a constant. The market value V^ is measured in 
dollars (of moment t) and represents the amount of money Americans 
would want to sell or buy "The Netherlands" for at the beginning of time.1 
In the paper, the value of net foreign claims of the small country is indicat­
ed by the expression (Λ* -E) and is denominated in guilders. The symbol 
A' stands for the total value of non-monetary financial assets (being Dutch 
The expression "at the beginning of time" is meant to denote the fact 
that no trade has ever taken place. All countries start with a zero debt 
position. This implies that£0 =A 0. 
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and foreign shares) that are in possession of inhabitants of the country, 
while E stands for the value of shares issued by Dutch firms.2 The posi-
tion of debt in guilders at any moment in time then is ( E-A' ) , while the 
position of debt in dollars is: (E-A')/e . The debt position of the Nether-
lands exactly represents the market value as mentioned before: 
i 5 · 2 · 6 ) ^ - ^ 
According to (5.2.4): 
(5-2.8) VNL-R.VNL-b.P, 
or, alternatively: 
(5.2.9) £ z i _ - £ . ( £ - / ) - Ä ' . a-â-.b.P 
е е e 
Multiplying by e 
(5.2.10) È -À' - (R + - ) . (E -A' ) - b . Ρ . e 
e 
Assuming interest rate parity and purchasing power parity: 
2
 The total value of financial assets (including money) now is: 
A-Α' +M. 
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(5.2.11) È-λ -R.(E-A )-b.Pt y 
Assuming a flexible exchange rate comes to the same thing as requiring 
the balance of payments to be in equilibrium all the time (assuming the 
appropriate stability requirements). The current account reads: 
b.P +R.(A' -Ε) , 
while the capital account is: 
Ê-A' . 
The total balance of payments can therefore be written as: 
(5.2.12) Sb-b.P +Λ. ( Л * - £ ) - ( Д ' - £ ) « ( ) , 
which is equation (3.1.8) of the (1990)-paper. 
It is clear by now that the equation of debt-accumulation (5.2.11) comes to 
the same thing as the balance-of-payments condition as stipulated in the 
(1990)-paper. 
Now, returning to equation (5.2.4): 
(5.2.13) VNL- fb.P'.c'* •(!'')dz 
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We can look upon this as being the life-time budget-constraint of a small 
country. A "rational" country will not allow a positive value of the present 
discounted value of current and future trade imbalances at the beginning 
of time. In the case of VNL > 0 (at the beginning of time) the small country 
gives some amount of goods away to the rest of the world. In summary: 
the condition that the value of a country must be zero, VNL = 0 , can be 
seen as the no-Ponzi-game condition for a small open economy.3 
The simulation results of a technological shock in a small open economy 
are presented in table 15.4 We have chosen to focus on a small open econ-
omy that looks like being closed before the technological shock arrives. 
Now it becomes possible to concentrate on the effects of being open as 
such. This implies that the stationary state of our small open economy dis-
plays no exports of goods and no position of debt. Whatever the shock to 
this economy, the position of debt remains zero at period zero (and a very 
short period after that). This is quite logical since the zero debt position 
does not allow for (unforeseen) changes in the value of debt. So it should 
be clear that the position of debt is not a predetermined variable per se. An 
economy that has some positive amount of debt for some reason faces a 
windfall profit in the case of an appreciating home currency. This situ-
ation can be compared with the case of a household that is in possession of 
shares of the firm. An unexpected shock to the economy causes a sudden 
This of course implies that the market-value of any country (now 
defined as the addition of net exports and existing debt) must be zero at 
any moment of time. 
The variables b and VNL are shown in absolute values (xlOO). 
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jump in the value of shares. At this very moment the rate of return on 
shares is undefined and the household faces some windfall (say) profit. 
The American people in possession of "The Netherlands" may be con-
fronted with surprises in the value of their small-country-shares in case the 
exchange rate jumps to other heights. The situation changes drastically in 
case the contracts of delivery to Americans are stated in terms of goods. 
Due to the Cobb-Douglas utility-specification there is the phenomenon of 
consumption-smoothing over time and a once-and-for-all appreciation of 
the guilder. Consumption smoothing can be attained by importing goods 
during a number of periods and by exporting goods, by the time the own 
production has reached appropriate heights. In this way the economy is 
taking a short-cut to future returns of the technological innovation. Maybe 
one would expect a diminishing position of debt after the moment that the 
economy starts exporting goods. Due to the accumulation of debt and the 
fact that a rate of return has to be paid over this debt, the absolute height 
of debt rises continuously (till the stationary state is reached). 
Note that the stationary state of the small open economy after the techno-
logical shock is different for flexible and sticky wages. This is a special 
feature of the open economy as modelled here and must be explained by 
referring to the so-called hysteresis-phenomenon (implying that the 
equilibrium-position is path-dependent). 
The main differences comparing the results with sticky and flexible wage 
formation in the small open economy can be summarized as follows (these 
being the effects of introducing flexible wages): 
- Output of goods is higher in the short and middle-long run, lower in the 
long run. 
- The same applies for the accumulation of capital. 
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Table 15 A technological shock in a small open economy 
period -» 
variable j 
к 
Q 
и 
A 
X 
с 
p y 
J 
1 
У 
R 
Pi 
E 
b 
VNL 
0 
0 
-1.95 
58.58 
-1.95 
0.00 
5.47 
-5.19 
4.34 
-0.20 
3.89 
0.00 
-1.14 
-1.95 
-1.88 
0.00 
1 
0.40 
-2.32 
58.35 
-2.38 
0.00 
5.47 
-5.19 
4.26 
-0.13 
4.14 
0.00 
-0.73 
-2.38 
-1.49 
1.77 
2 
0.76 
-2.64 
58.14 
-2.77 
0.00 
5.47 
-5.19 
4.18 
-0.07 
4.36 
0.00 
-0.37 
-2.77 
-1.14 
3.34 
5 
1.61 
-3.42 
57.66 
-3.69 
0.00 
5.47 
-5.19 
4.01 
0.09 
4.88 
0.00 
0.49 
-3.69 
-0.32 
7.05 
10 
2.51 
-4.22 
57.15 
-4.65 
0.00 
5.47 
-5.19 
3.83 
0.24 
5.42 
0.00 
1.39 
-4.65 
0.53 
10.92 
stationary 
state 
3.61 
-5.19 
56.54 
-5.82 
0.00 
5.47 
-5.19 
3.61 
0.43 
6.08 
0.00 
2.50 
-5.82 
1.56 
15.62 
- The utility-index is higher all the time. 
- The flex-wage economy accumulates less debt. 
- The fluctuation in the level of employment is less. 
- There is less import of goods in the short run, while there is less export 
in the long run. 
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- The currency-appreciation is higher in case of flexwage, an indication for 
the fact that the flex-wage country is the economically stronger one. 
- Consumption of goods is higher all the time. 
Exactly the same model as presented here is dealt with in Mei-
jdam(1991b), be it that the latter caters for spill-over effects due to the 
existence of non-clearing markets. 
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APPENDIX 
Reference model, table 14 
с 
ι. 
la 
p. 
У 
i 
j 
Р
У 
Md 
u
€
-P,.X 
\-,-ρ,·χ 
'-k 
L'h-i 
yf(l,k) 
Q-Pyil+h,) 
j-i + h(i,k) 
y-c+j 
u„-R.Py.X 
M-Md 
у 
D~y.Py-l.Pl-j.Py 
k-i-ò.k 
Q-(R + b).Q-Py.(fk-hk) 
À-R.(A-M) + l.Pl-c.Py 
X-(v-R).X 
Ù-v.U-u 
È-R.E-D 
Specifications used in simulations: (1.5.3), (1.3.12) and (1.3.13). 
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Model of small open economy, table 15 
Replace the clearing condition for the goods market by: 
b | b-y-c-j 
Add the following three relations: 
A* | À'-b.Py + R.A'-D (A'-A-M) 
Py | Py-Py.(R-R') 
VN L | V^-R'.V^-b.P' 
Parameter values: 
α = 0.25 
ε = 0.25 
γ = 0.05 
ψ = 0.125 
γ, =0.10 
Stationary state: 
к = 3.653 
Q = 1.561 
U = 0.804 
A = 6.703 
Χ = 0.500 
с = 1.089 
Py = 1.561 
j = 0.365 
γ =0.85 / =9 
M =1.00 σ =0 
δ =0.10 ν =0 
Я' =0.10 Ρ' =1 
1 
У 
R 
PI 
E 
b 
VNL 
A* 
= 7.646 
= 1.454 
= 0.10 
= 0.148 
= 5.703 
= 0 
= 0 
= 5.703 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SUMMARY 
We took the Blanchard/Sachs(1982) and Peters/Van de Klundert(1986) 
models of the intertemporally optimizing consumer-producer variety as 
starting points for our study. We tried to capture several ideas of the 
finance literature into the macroeconomic framework of the kind men-
tioned. This synthesis of financial theory and macroeconomics is best seen 
as an asset-approach to macroeconomics. In principle, all markets are 
assumed to be cleared all the time in our study, this assumption being 
made to exclude matters of price-stickiness and disequilibrium. One of the 
drawbacks of the study (and the papers mentioned above) is that the mod-
els are virtually impossible to solve analytically. For that reason all chap-
ters are illustrated with numerical simulations. The models are simulated 
with the same parameter-set and the same (technological) shock every-
where in the study, in order to make comparisons between the different 
chapters feasible. In order to get interesting dynamics (in the presence of 
clearing markets), adjustment costs are introduced at several places in the 
study. The focus of the study is mainly on the behaviour of firms and 
finance. One of the accepted elements of finance is the principle of value 
maximization. The firms in our study maximize the value of equity (share-
holders' wealth) or the value of the firm (equity and debt taken together). 
Chapter 0 gives an outline of the scope and subject of the study and serves 
as an introduction, clarifying concepts and philosophy. It is already in 
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chapter 0 that a simple example of the MM-propositions is set out. The 
purpose of this exercise is that the reader can see the parallels of our chap-
ter 4 and the standard textbook results quite easily. It hopefully stimulates 
reading of chapter 4 too, since it forms the heart of our study. 
Chapter 1 is intended to build and discuss the ingredients of a micro-
founded, intertemporal analogen of the clearing IS-LM model. Construct-
ing this model is done in several steps by looking at Crusoe and barter 
economies first. The introduction of financial assets is the key to passing 
from the one model to the other in chapter 1. 
The subject of chapter 2 and 3 is the modelling of the banking firm. 
According to financial theory, a bank is just like any other firm and strives 
for value maximization accordingly. Our bank produces lines of credit and 
maximizes shareholders' wealth. To cope with the problem of price-level 
indeterminancy, we introduced a banking licence, which forms a financial 
asset in its own right. The main difference between chapters 2 and 3 is the 
competition structure of the credit market. Chapter 2 assumes that banks 
take the rate of interest as given, while chapter 3 sees banks as having 
some degree of monopolistic power. The supply of credit is determined by 
the real wage rate and the nominal rate of interest (and some technological 
parameters). In the case of monopolistic competition the demand elastici-
ty of credit is another element determining the supply of credit. An econo-
my that includes a banking sector faces a higher stock of money and a 
higher price level, compared with an economy that lacks this banking sec-
tor. Simulation results show that the monopolistic bank can cope better 
with adverse shocks to the banking industry. Banks that have monopolistic 
power find it optimal to oversupply the market for credit when there are 
no adjustment costs in changing the rate of interest. The introduction of 
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adjustment costs shows the theoretical possibility of optimal credit ration-
ing. Very strong adjustment costs and relatively big shocks are needed to 
generate the regime of credit rationing by numerical simulation however. 
Chapter 4 introduces a risky asset by assuming a Yaari-Blanchard popula-
tion structure. Assuming a MM-world without taxes shows that the 
irrelevance-of-finance claim of MM holds in the macroeconomic model. 
Introducing a distortionary corporate tax shows that the levered firm has a 
higher value than the unlevered firm in the macroeconomic model. The 
more debt is used the higher is the value of the tax-shield. The height of 
debt is bounded from above by the introduction of a so-called capital-in-
advance condition. MM compute the value of the tax-shield by discount-
ing one-period tax-shields at the risk-free rate of interest. Reproduction of 
this result in the macroeconomic model is judged to be possible only when 
consumers have perfect "see-through" on behalf of the character of the 
transfers they receive from government. 
Chapter 5 focuses on a small open economy. A country is looked upon as 
being a big firm that pays dividend to the "shareholders", which are the 
people from the outside world. The phenomenon of debt accumulation can 
then be looked upon as being the mirror image of the formation of capital 
gains to the outside world. Assuming interest rate parity and purchasing 
power parity across the world, a life-time budget constraint of a small 
country is derived looking at the value of the small country. Of course, the 
"shareholders" and "employees" of the small country are quite different 
from the normal case of the value-maximizing firm. It is clear that the 
Dutch government cannot be looked upon as the management of the firm 
"The Netherlands" operating in the interests of the American people, being 
the shareholders(?). 
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SAMENVATTING 
Modellering van financiële activa vanuit macro-economisch perspectief. 
Onderwerp van deze studie is de vraag hoe financiële activa in een macro-
economische context gemodelleerd kunnen worden. Als uitgangspunt 
daarbij dienen de modellen van Blanchard en Sachs uit 1982 en van Peters 
en Van de Klundert uit 1986. Deze modellen zijn macro-economisch van 
opzet en gaan uit van intertemporeel optimerend gedrag van consumenten 
en producenten en lijken op voorhand goede mogelijkheden te bieden aan 
te knopen bij gedachten uit de financieringstheorie. Met "macro-
economisch" bedoelen we in deze studie eigenlijk alleen maar te zeggen 
dat de kringloopgedachte verwerkt is (de schuld van de een is het tegoed 
van de ander), een gedachte die de financieringsliteratuur ten ene male 
vreemd is. De echte aggregatie en dus het loslaten van het concept van de 
representatieve agent blijft in deze studie meestentijds achterwege. Bij de 
implementatie van de financiële activa proberen we in deze studie zoveel 
mogelijk aan te sluiten bij in de financierings-theorie gebruikelijke en 
beproefde concepten. Het principe van de waardemaximalisatie neemt een 
centrale plaats in in onze studie en hoe kan het ook anders. 
Om de bestudering van de financiële markten te bevorderen nemen we aan 
dat alle markten ruimen, dit in tegenstelling tot de twee bovengenoemde 
artikelen die uitgaan van trage prijzen op de goederen- en arbeidsmarkt. 
Ruimende markten lijken het best aan te sluiten bij voor onze studie nutti-
ge concepten als efficiënte markten en rationele verwachtingen. Numerie-
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ke simulatie met behulp van de geformuleerde macro-economische model-
len is de gebruikte methode om de werking van een en ander te illustreren. 
Steeds wordt daarbij uitgegaan van dezelfde technologische impuls en 
dezelfde parameter set teneinde een zinvolle vergelijking tussen modellen 
onderling te bevorderen. 
In hoofdstuk 0 wordt een overzicht en introductie gegeven van wat gaat 
komen in de hoofdstukken 1 tot en met 5. Een eenvoudig rekenvoorbeeld 
dient als eerste kennismaking met de proposities van Modigliani en Miller. 
In hoofdstuk 1 wordt een Crusoe-model geformuleerd waarin geen enkel 
financieel activum aanwezig is. Het vormt het meest simpele model dat 
geformuleerd kan worden in de traditie van intertemporele optimering. 
Het eerste financiële activum dat aan deze economie wordt toegevoegd is 
een aandeel van de representatieve onderneming. Zo ontstaat een ruil-
economie waarin lenen mogelijk is zonder de aanwezigheid van geld. De 
ondernemingsleiding maximaliseert de waarde van de uitstaande aandelen 
(oftewel de waarde van de onderneming) in opdracht van de aandeelhou-
ders. Een volgende stap is de introductie van het activum geld. Het aan-
bod van geld wordt in hoofdstuk 1 stiefmoederlijk behandeld teneinde een 
intertemporele versie van het bekende IS-LM model te verkrijgen. De 
vraag naar geld wordt afgeleid volgens de methoden van "geld-in-de-
nutsfunctie" en "cash-in-advance". We doen alsof deze methoden niet pro-
blematisch van aard zijn, daar de aandacht in deze studie uitgaat naar de 
aanbodzijde van de economie. 
Onderwerp van de hoofdstukken 2 en 3 is het endogenizeren van het geld-
aanbod in de geest van de waardemaximalizerende gedachte uit de finan-
cieringstheorie. Een bank wordt ten tonele gevoerd. De bank heeft als taak 
de waarde van de bank-als-onderneming te maximalizeren. Het belang-
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rijkste instrument van de bank is haar potentie om meer of minder krediet 
te verlenen aan kooplustige consumenten. Het verschil tussen de hoofd-
stukken 2 en 3 is gelegen in het feit dat hoofdstuk 2 de bank ziet als een 
rente-nemer en een hoeveelheidsaanpasser, terwijl hoofstuk 3 de bank eni-
ge ruimte toebedeelt de rente te zetten in een omgeving van monopolisti-
sche concurrentie. In hoofstuk 3 behoort rantsoenering van krediet als uit-
komst van optimaliserend handelen tot de economische mogelijkheden. 
Hoofdstuk 4 heeft tot onderwerp het onderscheiden van eigen en vreemd 
vermogen op het niveau van een onderneming. We nemen aan dat elke 
onderneming een kans heeft om failliet te gaan en ophoudt te bestaan. In 
zo'n geval zal de aandeelhouder de negatieve gevolgen van het faillise-
ment voor zijn rekening nemen, terwijl de verschaffer van vreemd vermo-
gen geen enkel risico loopt. Aangezien de beleggers een risico-aversie ten 
toon spreiden, zullen zij een hoger rendement eisen op aandelen dan op 
obligaties. De waarde van de onderneming blijkt in het macro-
economische model niet te variëren als een andere financieringsstructuur 
wordt gekozen (MM-irrelevantie). De introductie van een winstbelasting 
verandert de zaak drastisch. De waarde van de onderneming zal toenemen 
naarmate meer met vreemd vermogen wordt gefinancierd, een resultaat dat 
geheel in overeenstemming is met de micro-georiënteerde financierings-
theorie. Een opmerkelijk fenomeen is, en hier blijkt de meerwaarde van de 
macro-economische aanpak, dat simulatie toont dat een (verhoging van 
de) winstbelasting bij gelijktijdige lump-sum teruggave van de belasting-
opbrengsten aan de beleggers, nutsverhogende effecten kan hebben. 
Hoofdstuk 5 vraagt zich af of het mogelijk is een kleine open economie te 
zien als een (grote) onderneming die in handen is van de buitenwereld. De 
waarde van zo'n klein land zou dan uitgedrukt kunnen worden in termen 
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van de opbrengsten die ze genereert voor haar buitenlandse "aandeelhou-
ders". 
Hoofstuk 6 tenslotte is een samenvatting van de studie en, zo men wil, het 
Engelstalige equivalent van het hier geschrevene. 
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